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Introduction  
Art or Politics, Yes Please!  
 
The myriad orientations will be tragically wasted, the genius of one of the world’s 
 most vigorous centuries will be allowed to go unused, unless we can adapt  
its very welter of interpretations as skeptical grounding for our own certainties.  
---Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change 
 
When all provisional acceptances have lapsed, when the single references and their 
connections which may have led up to the final response are forgotten, we may still have an 
attitude and an emotion which has to introspection all the characters of a belief.  
--- I. A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism 
1. Conduct and Faith  
Why take action? There are several motivations that proclaim themselves causes for 
action: hope, despair, memory, desire, interest, will, prospect, economic circumstance, social 
force, genes, language, ideology, information, and the list goes on. There may not be a single 
cause that presides over all others. It is possible to have several causes at once or to have 
conflicting causes at the same time. A certain cause of action may be an effect of a different 
cause, and thus there is the possibility of infinite regression in search of the primary cause. 
While an actor has some reasons to perform an action, the actor may not be conscious of all 
causes of action. We may wish other people to act as we want them to act, but we realize in 
some periphery of our mind that it is very difficult to cause them to do so.     
 Intellectual tendencies in the 1930s in the US hardly ignored the importance of 
developing a theoretical system to entangle the complexity of action. The economic 
depression in the 1930s demanded action, especially collective action, to direct society out of 
turmoil. There were many attempts to understand human motives and to provoke actions. 
Technological developments in mass communications allowed individuals to reach large 
numbers of people through images and words, and magnified the possibility for mass 
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movements. Propaganda was a word in fashion at the time. However, the basis of collective 
action was revealed to be less solid than researchers and theorists had anticipated. As we will 
see throughout this dissertation, discourses on action became more tangled and dialectical, 
none satisfactorily pointed to the primary cause of action. Faith came to be a prominent 
theme since it was deemed arrogant to consider one’s own actions to be founded on truth, 
rationality, or morality. The boundaries separating rationality from irrationality, object from 
subject, reason from emotion were obscure. Despite this, many people, including the writers 
and activists of the era, thought that many individuals had faith in a political cause and acted 
according to that faith. It seemed as though people knew the reasons for their actions, but, in 
fact (blind) faith did not allow them to see that the reason was wrong.   
 A long introduction is necessary if we are to step out of the false choice between art 
and politics and to investigate why that choice is false and how it narrows down our 
discussion of the 1930s and even of our own time. There are two purposes for this 
introduction. One is to diachronically survey how the literary discourse of the 1930s was 
constructed and how historical research interpreted causes of past actions. Another is to 
disentangle the faith-disillusionment narrative and to emphasize the significance of the 
aesthetic in halting the cycle of faith and disillusionment. These two purposes are related to 
Kenneth Burke, who criticizes an inability to renounce the faith-disillusionment narrative in 
his retrospection of the first American Writers’ Congress and implies a different approach to 
the 1930s in his discussion with Fredric Jameson. A closer look at René Wellek and I. A. 
Richards reveals that their “New Critical” awareness can be construed as far much 
polymorphic and viable when we suspend the crude identification of formalism with them. 
This discussion will make it clear that reappraisal of the aesthetic is crucial for our 
understanding of relationships between faith and conduct, and also that the 1930s was 
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especially rich with resources to enhance our aesthetic discourse. 
 
2. An Age of Faith 
Thinking back on the 1930s, Malcolm Cowley retrospectively defined the decade as 
“an age of faith.” Against the argument that there were some authors who “did not share in 
the social interest of the time,” Cowley, a prominent literary critic and an editor of New 
Republic during the 1930s, emphasizes the presence of “the spirit of the 1930s” among 
literary works of the decade (“What Books” 293). On the surface, he claims that each writer, 
whether committed or reactionary to “the spirit of the 1930s,” was sensitive to social forces 
or “the same fears and aspiration for human society” (293). Even though proletarian literary 
and cultural movements did not dominate the whole spectrum of American culture,1 the 
literary canon of the 1930s seemed to have obliged the accentuation of social perspectives 
and political stances of writers, critics, producers, and so forth. The canonization of the 1930s 
comes with the moral lesson that didacticism does not match up with genuine creativity in the 
arts. Alfred Kazin, one of the earliest literary historians to provide a foundation of post-war 
canonization of the 1930s, criticizes the literary trend of the 1930s: “[writing] was an 
expression of belief, a participation at once so urgent and so vague that unusual sensibility 
seemed almost immoral in a world where mediocrity could conceal itself by the assumption 
of a political faith that compensated for the lack of perceptions by decrying the need of them” 
(368). Kazin distinguishes social “belief” of mediocre writers from the “unusual sensibility” 
of literary genius to accuse political consciousness of breaking down the distinction. 
Furthermore, Kazin observes, “criticism became a totalitarianism in an age of totalitarianism” 
(401). Even though the two main contenders—sociological criticism of “leftist” Marxism and 
aesthetic criticism of “rightist” Formalism—had no contents in common, “the search for an 
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absolute that each represented brought them together in spirit” (402). Whatever ideological 
disagreements there might have been, the 1930s in the US seems to have had a peculiar 
atmosphere which encompassed and enchanted everyone there.   
It is not too exaggerated to point out that the most prominent and haunting issue in 
literary and critical polemics of the 1930s was the futile but boisterous question of “Art or 
Propaganda.” This opposition, which pertains to other dichotomies, such as the aesthetic and 
the cognitive, the personal and the social, and the cultural and the political, has been too 
controversial for reconciliation even though the notion of modernism works towards this. Not 
only did the literary discussion of the 1930s witness a formidable inquiry over “Art or 
Propaganda,” but the interest in the “Propaganda” side of proletariat literary aims was 
exaggerated in the literary canonization of the 1930s during the 1940s and 1950s. The 
repetitive uses of the famous definition “art is a class weapon,” which Max Eastman brought 
back from the Kharkov conference as the Communist party line’s definition of art, have 
obscured its context and contributed to the negative impression of proletarian “realist” arts 
and of the 1930s in general. This sound-bite definition is combined with another sound bite, 
“proletarian literature is the literature of a party disguised as the literature of a class,” from 
Philp Rahv whose trust in Marxism made him critical of the Stalinist “Popular Front” strategy. 
Ignoring Rahv’s criticism of the Comintern for “put[ting] away its revolutionary aims and 
embark[ing] on national-reformist policies” (626), some critics interpret his criticism as 
another insider viewpoint of misgiving about the communist party’s instrumentalization of art. 
These two sound bites have been passed down from Kazin’s On Native Grounds (1942) to 
Irving Howe and Lewis Coser’s The American Communist Party (1957) to contribute to the 
prevailing narrative of faith in and disillusionment with new literary movement.2 Against the 
optimistic view of Maxwell Geismar’s Writers in Crisis (1942)—one of the earliest criticisms 
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of the 1930s—Cowley argues that “the period of social fiction described by Mr. Geismar has 
ended already, and disastrously…[and] ended with Moscow trials and the Russo-German Pact” 
(“Success” 26).3 On the premise that writers in the 1930s must be divided into “Art or 
Propaganda” to determine the relationship of art and society, post-World War II literary critics 
appear to be a non-political “center” whose enemies are “totalitarianism.”4  
While the anti-Communist atmosphere of the Cold War trivializes the complexity of 
the 1930s into temporary ideological intoxication with a bad hangover, the remnants of faith 
in radicalism are inserted into American tradition. Walter B. Rideout’s The Radical Novel in 
the Unites States, 1900-1954 (1956) and Daniel Aaron’s Writers on the Left (1961) represent 
the two main efforts to cause the thirties to converge with the stream of American radical 
tradition. These are on what Alan Wald calls a “liberal paradigm” which “broke with 
red-baiting conspiracy theories of left-wing cultural influence” (19).5 While their respective 
research revealed the negative side-effects of faith in anti-capitalist movements, their 
treatment of literary debates is more elaborate than those of Kazin and Geismar. Rideout, for 
example, makes strenuous efforts to detach American writers from the Soviet party line and 
to attach them to the realist “idol-smashing literature of the twenties”: “the American 
proletarian writers were not appreciably influenced in their craft by the practice of Soviet 
novelists” (207) simply because they could not speak Russian. Aaron also claims that “the 
radical impulse before and after 1930 sprang from the motives that had prompted good men 
in all ages to denounce, in Hawthorne’s words, ‘the false and cruel principles on which 
human society has always been based’” (150). Because Aaron, who strived for objectivity in 
the aftermath of McCarthyism, utilizes plenty of citations and avoids his passing judgments 
on them, it is often hard to distinguish the opinions of the thirties from his evaluation of them. 
He often stresses the arbitrary nature of Communist appeal in the thirties by generalizing 
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human impulses in regard to the religious experience: “As in all periods of great revivals, 
whether religious or political, the majority of the converts lapsed into their old ways, unable 
to maintain the enthusiasm that momentarily overcame them” (160). In Aaron’s narrative, 
writers primarily desired to believe in something other than capitalistic society and 
secondarily accepted Communist doctrines, bringing them grave consequences.   
As the cold war and McCarthyism exhume the thirties to drive a stake through 
Communist specters, self-censorships in the republication of works during the thirties 
reinforced to Aaron and other historians the image of a cycle of faith and disillusionment. 
Many novelists could not survive in literary circles of the forties. Even the Avon edition of 
Jews without Money (1930), the American representative of the proletarian novel by Michael 
Gold, had its last lines deleted in its republication in 1965.6 Moreover, the famous literary 
critics, who were especially productive and influential during the thirties, carried out minor 
but necessary modification in their works in efforts to dodge redbaiting. Cowley’s Exile’s 
Return (1934, 1951), Edmund Wilson’s The American Earthquakes (1958), which includes 
articles collected in The American Jitters (1932), and Kenneth Burke’s Permanence and 
Change (1935, 1954) and Attitudes toward History (1937, 1959) are prominent examples of 
this. David R. Peck claimed in 1968 that “the canon of Thirties literature which we have 
established in the last ten years has been carefully constructed to suggest that social, political, 
and economic questions played no major role in the literature of the period” (377).7 It is less 
likely that these excisions and revisions have initiated a distorted view toward the thirties 
than that they reinforce the faith and disillusionment narrative. The possibility is that the 
disillusionment narrative indirectly nourished a particular attitude in the sixties towards what 
was considered mistaken ideas of the thirties and created a lapse in the history of literary 
criticism. With a counter-cultural sensibility of the 1960s that tolerated radical visions in the 
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cultural domain, for example, Peck finds faults in the “formalist assumption that literature is 
in some way free of concerns of society” (381). Peck’s argument indicates both an effort to 
break free from biased views toward the Red decade and a gradual shift into what Wald 
names the “radical paradigm” of the eighties.     
Anyone familiar with the literary theories, especially Marxist literary theories which 
were considerably refined through the seventies and eighties, should agree that history is not 
something fixed and permanent, but something which reciprocally situates us and is projected 
by us. How we talk about past events depends on the very position of our perspectives, which 
both construct and are constructed by past events to create expectation for the future. This 
curious complexity is most felt in examples from the 1930s. Alan Wald emphasizes,  
the liberal paradigm of the 1930s was based on selections of authors and issues that 
were intimately bound up in the ‘moment’ at which such scholarship appeared. It is 
thus obligatory that we not forget that our own selections of authors and issues are 
linked to the contradictory and complex location of intellectual and cultural workers 
in current national and international history. (26)  
Even this theoretical admonition can be applied to those who were participants of the very 
events that are re-narrated as the past. Thus, even though participants actually claim that they 
felt enthusiastic about the new faith and disillusioned with its loss, we need to determine the 
context or framework of such claims in order to acknowledge the change in the emotional 
contents. In other words, it is not enough to admit that people are retrospectively recognized 
as blindly passionate about their politics. We need to go a step further than the cycle of faith 
and disillusionment. Otherwise, there would be no other choice than to observe political 
failures and maintaining a cynical distance toward them—the choice many critics hitherto 
took.  
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A careful analysis of Kenneth Burke can make a crack in the cycle of faith and 
disillusionment, which has muddled ex-comrades of the Popular Front. Since the revisions of 
his books and his influence on New Criticism made it difficult for academic critics to see his 
political stance during the thirties, Burke was considered a fellow traveler who attended The 
First American Writers’ Congress in 1935 without much commitment to the Communist 
cause. In 1965, Cowley, Burke, Aaron, Granville Hicks, and William Phillips held a 
discussion about the literary movement of the thirties in general and the Congress of 1935 in 
particular.8 This discussion has been considered a historical fact proving the 
behind-the-scenes details of reactions to Burke’s speech, which initiates a strategic affiliation 
with “people” rather than “workers.”9 In the thirties, Burke’s speech was problematic for 
some writers who thought it identical to the fascist rhetorical emphasis on “people” or Volk. 
In the 1965 discussion, Burke’s tenacious and repetitive inquiries about the enemy or, in his 
words, “goat,” demands other discussants to confront the insistence that they really had 
believed in Communism and indeed had lost faith. Cowley’s explanation of his past 
experience is typical in its ambivalence: “Our emotions at that time were not cheap; they 
were deeply felt….So there was a great deal of almost religious feeling going on at the same 
time among people you would never suspect of having it” (500). For Cowley, it is evident 
that they used to be devotees of what turned out to be a sham. In the face of the outright 
apology for the past ignorance, Burke asks if the Popular Front and its aftermath had relied 
on “the opponent as a unifying force” (497). By this question, Burke reveals his implicit 
doubt that they really believed in the ideology of the Communist party line. Burke also 
indicates that there is similar structural antagonism in both social movements of the thirties 
and the sixties:  
Whether we have ideology or not, is it not a terrifying fact that you can never get 
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people together except when they have a goat in common?....That’s how they have to 
operate; they get congregation by segregation….they get together by having an 
enemy in common. This is to me a tremendously important thing because there is 
talk of having moved on, in relation to certain questions of ideology. But as for 
having moved on from the standpoint of the way to confront the word, are we just 
going to do these same things all over again, in some other form? (499) 
Contrary to the New Left’s presumption “that the Old Left might be characterized basically as 
a movement that got burned by the Communist party” (502), Burke observes continuity from 
the thirties and the sixties in the sense that political identity relied less on centripetal 
attraction of ideology as on the concept of “enemy.” In other words, Burke urges the other 
discussants to go beyond a simple transition from falsity to truth, or from faith to 
disillusionment, and to confront the elements of enemy necessary for “a change of identity” 
(512). In short, Burke brings up the complexity of having and renouncing faith. His gesture to 
appreciate enemies by saying “I thank God for my enemies” (514, 516) implies that the 
narrative of disillusionment preserves the same political basis, which prolongs the 
supposition of “goats.”  
Discussions of the American Writers’ Congress underline a legacy of the theoretical 
insights of the thirties rather than the historical facts of participants’ hypocritical attitudes. 
Burke’s questioning provokes us to ponder why the narrative of faith and disillusionment 
seemed like reasonable and acceptable means for the writers of the thirties to convey their 
experiences, or more generally how our structuring and renouncing of faith are related to our 
political identities and discourses. At the very least, the discussion propels Daniel Aaron to 
rethink his Writers on the Left and to acknowledge his difficulty in determining the true 
feelings of the writers. Looking back at his research methods and referring to a letter, which 
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Burke sent him and which was mentioned in the discussion, he reached the conclusion about 
the historian that “[d]epending upon people with fallible memories, trusting to the 
‘reconsidered passion’ of his informants, his attempts to reconstruct the recent past can be at 
best only experiments in model building” (Writers 414). In his hesitation, we can glimpse a 
lessening confidence in historiographical objectivity. Yet we also should not ignore Burke’s 
insights into cultural politics. The political is usually not a fundamental or autonomous 
motivation of human action, but something necessarily mingled with nonpolitical motives. In 
his letter to Aaron, he writes, “the merging [of political and nonpolitical strands] is so 
thorough, one would be hard put whether to say that it is or is not ‘deeply or religiously felt’” 
(Aaron, Writers 412). This is not to say that everything is political. But the political cannot 
exist without its connection to personal motives for maintaining ordinary lives or creating 
literary works. It is crucial here that Burke suggests making obsolete an opposition of Art or 
Propaganda and growing out of the cycle of faith and disillusionment in political discourse. It 
is not about the beginning and the ending of a certain faith, but about asking how a shift in 
faith occurs, often with violent cries, and what makes faith manifest as (irrational and blind) 
faith. These kinds of questions are not only a new way to look at the 1930s, but the very set 
of inquiries in which many discursive practices intentionally or unintentionally neglect to 
engage themselves.     
 
3. Art for Art’s Sake: Old Criticism of New Criticism  
In order to appreciate reconceptualization of faith without the art-or-propaganda 
dichotomy, we need to reexamine the theoretical consequences of the literary discussions 
which have developed in opposition to criticism of arts of the 1930s. It is necessary for us to 
avoid the temptation to repeat dichotomous divisions in criticism, such as “intrinsic” and 
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“extrinsic” or “Formalist” and “Sociologist.” In a curious way, the legacy of literary criticism 
of the thirties was reconstructed and merged with the mainstream of contemporary literary 
discourses. Even though Rideout and Aaron’s “liberal paradigm” initiates a wider 
reevaluation of art-works from the thirties, “most of dissertations written then and through the 
1970s…were never published” (Wald 20). By contrast, the seventies witnessed an influx of 
“French theories” and “Western Marxism” into American literary discourses. Despite 
terminological and conceptual borrowings from other disciplines, including cultural criticism 
of the Frankfurt school, literary studies made an enormous effort to criticize and revise 
literary disciplines derived from New Criticism. Such borrowings have precedents in the 
interdisciplinary studies of the thirties. Yet, these tendencies of the 1930s, as a germinal stage 
of critical theory, have been thought unworthy of attention. Jonathan Culler, in his summary 
of historical development of literary theory in the US, makes a quick note of the fact that the 
“attempts [of borrowings from other disciplines in the 1930s] had often seemed reductionist, 
ignoring complexities of literary language and making the text, in effect, a symptom, whose 
true meaning lay elsewhere” (Framing 15). Culler implies here that interdisciplinary literary 
criticism attempted to identify “true” meaning of texts with social or psychological discourses, 
which would motivate the reader to change his/her value system and act on this change. From 
a different perspective, Michael Denning argues that American Studies has developed in 
opposition of Marxist cultural criticism:  
American Studies has become a ‘substitute marxism’ in the pleonastic sense, from 
the popular front claim that Communism was simply twentieth-century Americanism, 
to the New Left sense that there was an indigenous radical tradition that preempted 
marxism, and now to the covert, pragmatic appropriation and Americanization of 
marxist concepts without the baggage of the marxist tradition. (360)    
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Therefore, the legacy of the literary discussion of the thirties had been either abandoned or 
incorporated into American Studies and New Criticism, whose theoretical groundings were 
objects of revision during the 1970s.10  
 In the late seventies, cultural criticism of the thirties began an adjustment to literary 
studies within the process of revising, if not downgrading, formal-aesthetic perspectives of 
New Criticism (and historicist-critical approaches of American Studies). We might overlook 
the complexity of this revision if we denounce anything from the “new critical” perspective 
as old prejudices of a white-male-oriented view whose “intrinsic” criticism conceals a certain 
political interest and aspires for ahistorical and scientific objectivity toward the universal 
value of arts. It is not enough for literary theories to celebrate the historical and social 
dimensions of art-work and to criticize the aesthetic function for sugarcoating “false 
consciousness.” This critical attitude of unmasking “false consciousness” still preserves the 
old art-or-propaganda argument. René Wellek, for example, tried to dispel misapprehension 
about New Criticism by translating it into French structuralism. Against criticism which 
accuses New Criticism of its disguise of disinterestedness and ahistoricity, Wellek claims,  
[t]he New Critics are overwhelmingly concerned with the meaning of a work of art, 
with the attitude, the tone, the feelings, and even with the ultimate implied world 
view conveyed. They are formalists only in the sense that they insist on the 
organization of a work of art which prevents its becoming a simple communication. 
(618)  
What Wellek probably distinguishes from New Criticism here is the positivist conception of 
language, where individuals have little trouble exchanging thoughts through “simple 
communication.” The New Critics’ efforts were not an imitation of scientific positivism to 
observe literature as an object for rational and coherent analysis. Rather, they were desperate 
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attempts to avoid the positivist conception and to redeem literary significance from 
communicative imperfection. Despite Wellek’s argument, Gerald Graff, who acknowledged 
the intention of New Criticism to fend off scientific rationalism, suggests that its 
presupposition of a difference between science and poetry ends up establishing an undesired 
façade of “art for art’s sake.” The New Critics were, according to Graff, “reluctant” formalists 
“driven to formalism against their own temperaments by their reaction against the mechanical 
“mimetic” rationality of industrialism and positivistic science” (Literature 146). The New 
Critics themselves as well as the critics of New Criticism, therefore, depended on the 
assumption that rationality is too rigid or reductive to capture the elusive dynamism of 
literary experiences. They “all combined to oppose rational objectivity to experience and 
doom themselves to the polarizations they aim to heal” (149). Similar to the cycle of faith and 
disillusionment mentioned above, the paradox in New Criticism seems to be a cycle of 
rationality and its inevitable excesses sensed in experiences. Both cyclical movements 
indicate a kind of restraint that draws critics back from approximating the truth by 
overcoming their opponents’ counter-arguments.  
 One of the most profound endeavors to solve the theoretical problems inherited from 
the thirties is rehabilitating a conception of “form.” In the same year that Wellek and Graff 
reexamined the gist of New Criticism, Frederic Jameson, who explored “Western Marxism” 
and “French structuralism” in his Marxism and Form (1971) and The Prison-House of 
Language (1972), recovered the richness of Kenneth Burke’s theoretical acumen from 
amnesia. In his 1978 essay “The Symbolic Inference; Or, Kenneth Burke and Ideological 
Analysis,” Jameson admires Burke as “the precursor of literary theory in this new, 
linguistics-oriented sense” and his “Freudo-Marxism” as “the sign of a different structural 
relationship to abstractions of technical philosophy than that of many of his contemporaries” 
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(507). For Jameson, who has grappled with the noble dream of fusing psychoanalysis and 
Marxism, Burke’s emphasis on “symbolic action” performed “the function of restoring to the 
literary text its value as activity and its meaning as a gesture and a response to a determinate 
situation” (509). In other words, the literary works are social activities in the sense that 
meanings as products of “gesturing toward” and “reacting to” a social background require 
language, an audience, and a historical context. Jameson’s intention in his essay “The 
Symbolic Inference” is to both praise and criticize Burke’s discussion of the symbolic 
function to extend the range of ideological analysis to make it more open to social as well as 
historical dimensions. Thus, Jameson complains that Burke stops at the level of literary texts 
reconciling social contradictions “before [ideological analysis] can begin to draw in the social, 
historical, and philosophical parameters which are the ultimate horizon of every cultural 
artifact” (517). With the exception of this matter of extension, Jameson accepts sociality of 
literary forms emphasized by Burke’s “symbolic action.”  
Despite a gap between Jameson’s treatment of Burke and Burke’s response to it, it is 
profitable here to engage our attention with their similarity. It would be an exaggeration to 
say that much of Burke’s concerns flow into meaning shifts, or, more precisely, into internal 
contradictions of logical thoughts. In other words, he might have been curious about the 
plausibility of the faith-and-disillusionment narrative with which the veterans of social 
movements in the thirties identified themselves. Burke does not begin with an opposition 
between deceit and veracity in his consideration of faith. Generally speaking, we tend to think 
that people believe only if the object of belief is true, and people may be disillusioned 
because what they believe to be true is revealed to be mere deception. This logic can be found 
in the definition of ideology as “false consciousness” and in the discourse of “art or 
propaganda,” which presuppose that an authorial intention or derivative effect to elicit “actual” 
15 
 
actions makes the art-work propaganda. Things are much more complex for Burke. He 
hesitates to use the word “ideology” because accusations of “ideology” or “false 
consciousness” usually rebound on the accusers.11 Of course, Jameson does not intend to use 
the word “ideology” in terms of “false consciousness.” Yet, Burke’s point is the logic of 
exposing falsity or, in the terminology of the thirties, “debunking,” as self-defeating so that 
any idea can become the product of “ideology.” Therefore, Burke tries to determine not the 
cause of “illusion” or “mystification” but the structural point or linguistic function that 
enables individuals to affirm others’ illusions or mystifications. Referring to the case of the 
writers of the thirties, this is the structural point through which the writers retrospectively 
perceive themselves as illuded or mystified. Any value is not a simple, objective reflection of 
reality: the value of values lies in their ability to function as objective reflection of reality.  
As Jameson restates the polemical entangle in his response to Burke’s article, there is 
a moment of “dialectical reversal in which we now read its ‘values’ and attitudes as sheer 
function or in other words as the conceptual expression of what is in reality the dynamic 
praxis of a given social group or class” (“Ideology” 419). Any value turns out to be the object 
of (false) belief when the valuable object is revealed to have a meaning other than what one 
thought it had. This sort of object nevertheless includes theoretical terms such as “ideology” 
and “symbolic action” or any cultural or literary theory. When Burke points out that Marx 
defines the term “ideology” “[a]n inverted genealogy of culture, that makes for ‘illusion’ and 
‘mystification’ by treating ideas as primary where they should have been treated as derivative” 
(“Methodology” 404),12 it is clear that this definition inevitably assimilates contradictory 
definitions since the definition paradoxically both reflects and structures objective reality. 
The value of “ideology” as a theoretical concept resides in its naming of the fact that an idea 
is secondary to a material condition. The definition also has what we would now call a 
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performative dimension in which any assertive statement of “value” has a function to 
provoke and maintain that value regardless of objective existence. I do not think that their 
insights are as remote from one another as their terminological differences and polemic tones 
suggest. It is fair to say with the terminology of Jameson that both “symbolic action” and 
“ideology” represent a “mediatory concept: that is, it is an imperative to re-invent a 
relationship between the linguistic or aesthetic or conceptual fact in question and its social 
ground” (510). In short, literary “form” is not limited to internal aspects of each individual 
work of art, but extended to larger issues with dialectical reversals and internal 
contradictions.   
 Since their discussion left a trace in Jameson’s The Political Unconscious (1981), the 
critical writings of the thirties started to be incorporated into the theory-laden discourses and 
building their steps toward cultural criticism along with the importation of British Cultural 
Studies. Frank Lentricchia in his Criticism and Social Change (1983), for example, compared 
Burke with Antonio Gramsci whose hegemony theory has proven useful for a new way to 
think about social movements. Giles Gunn’s The Culture of Criticism and the Criticism of 
Culture (1987) revived arguments of the thirties to make them resonate with Gunn’s 
contemporary issues. As sociological emphasis on “literature” disputes the validity of canon 
formation in the preceding years, the literary “canon” came to be recognized as an object of 
polemics. In the revision of literary canon, the 1980s witnessed the recovery and the 
republication of forgotten works, and this paved the way for further discussion on cultural 
and literary values of the Depression era. Scholars such as Alan Wald, Cary Nelson, Barbara 
Foley, Paula Rabinowitz, James Bloom, and Michael Denning have shown awareness of 
theoretical debates on the significance of literature within culture. They have performed 
formal analyses of literary works through the lens of a historical context in which the Stalinist 
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party line was not assumed to be propagated and dominant. Foley argues that “most 
[Communist party] critics, while not guided by anything resembling a party ‘line’ on aesthetic 
matters, were in fact uneasy with the view of literature as weaponry and repudiated the notion 
that proletarian literature should be written as ‘propaganda’” (Radical 37). Foley claims that 
an anti-Stalinist aesthetic, which separates politics from aesthetics and obscures the 
connection between the fictional and the actual, developed under the Cold War atmosphere 
and was passed down to what she calls “postmodern textual radicalism” (32). Foley evaluates 
critical discourse and technical invention of the thirties with an approach similar to Jameson’s 
critique of “ideology of form.”  
 As the revival of the thirties has functioned not only to recover the forgotten past and 
renew the canonical texts but also to conflict with postmodern theories, underrating the 
thirties indirectly results in the preservation of the art and politics dichotomy that strangles 
both politics and art. It is problematic to consider aesthetics as a discourse which prolongs 
false consciousness in order to smooth over an otherwise incongruous society. The common 
line of argument of postmodernism is bulked up against “disinterestedness” or “objectivity” 
which endows knowledge with authority to control. The postmodern thoughts are radical in 
the narrow sense that any claim for truth is embedded in practical interests. Terry Eagleton 
points to the foremost priority of interest in postmodern thinking by saying that “a 
transcendentalism of truth is merely ousted by a transcendentalism of interests. Interests and 
desires are just ‘givens’, the baseline which our theorizing can never glimpse behind” 
(Ideology 172). This emphasis on interests indicates two important points about aesthetics. 
On the one hand, postmodern radicalism sees a political dimension of arts in the absence of 
“objective” beauty or universal taste. Thus, the arts are political in the sense that they 
privilege a certain set of aesthetic values and reproduce the power balance in a society. The 
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aesthetic is nothing but the effects of rhetoric, if not deceptive reasoning. On the other hand, 
postmodern thoughts smuggle intuitive sensation back to its theoretical foundation where all 
knowledge is considered a product of beliefs ranked at the same level. Interests are a “natural” 
or “objective” foundation that discerns preference or prejudice in every value. Although 
postmodernism does not discursively deepen the conception of interest in terms of aesthetics, 
there is a remnant of aesthetics bequeathed by the thirties.  
  The aesthetic discourse which has left a mark on postmodern thinking is centered 
around emotivism in the thirties. Emotivism denotes the impossibility of an absolute good 
that grounds moral judgments. In his discussion on ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre defines 
emotivism as “the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral 
judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling insofar 
as they are moral or evaluative in character” (12). Meanings produced by moral judgments 
are subordinated to the uses of those meanings, and the uses reflect the (un-)conscious 
preference of users. This concept induces the reduction of morality to personal preference or 
what is intuited. The separation of meaning and use foregrounds practical aspects of language 
while the cause of practical interests is derived from pleasure or a “sense” of goodness which 
is untranslatable to meanings. I. A. Richards himself contributed to the US literary debates on 
emotivism in the 1930s. His famous distinction between emotive and scientific uses of 
language has been inscribed in aesthetic discourses ranging from Communist party critics to 
Southern agrarians.13 According to Richards, the scientific use of language involves “the 
reference, true or false, which [a statement] causes” while the emotive use of language aims 
at “the effects in emotion and attitude produced by the reference it occasions” (Principles 
250). These two uses are often interpreted as oppositional and classified based on whether 
statements refer to the outside world. That is why critics have thought that Richards 
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maintained the “scientific” division between art and science and withdrew into formalistic 
analysis of art-work in a desperate effort to preserve the artistic domain.  
However, Richards’ argument does not stop at two distinctive uses of language; 
rather, he admits pitfall in his argument where postmodernists would be comfortable. In his 
concluding chapter, Richards subverts the causality of scientific and emotive languages by 
giving temporal antecedence to emotive use: “there can be no doubt that originally all 
language was emotive; its scientific use is later development, and most language is still 
emotive” (256). This temporal causality, if pushed a little further, tips over to postmodern 
thinking which discerns emotive usage in every statement: all statements are meant to 
persuade others to accept the speaker’s interest. Yet, unlike postmodernism, Richards hangs 
on the difference between knowledge and belief and argues for the elusive character of belief, 
which conducts attitudes without referring to certain objects. He claims that “the 
intermingling of knowledge and belief is indeed a perversion, through which both activities 
suffer degradation” (265). In order to fend off the degradation which we are now confronting 
in the postmodern age, Richards avoids categorizing all thoughts as the same kind of “belief.” 
He asserts a difference in kind between scientific beliefs and emotive beliefs. While scientific 
beliefs are based on references to objects, an emotive belief is not a belief in some objects but 
a parasitic to reference to objects. Emotive beliefs are provisional; they are “entertained only 
in the special circumstances of the poetic experience. They are held as conditions for further 
effects, our attitudes and emotional responses, and not as we hold beliefs in laws of nature, 
which we expect to find verified on all occasions” (260-61). Emotive belief or whatever 
belief we have while appreciating a work of art, is an “objectless belief which is 
masquerading as a belief in this or that, which is ridiculous” (262).  
 It is probably a mistake to start from the presupposition that aesthetics refers to 
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nothing but the doctrine, “art for art’s sake,” whose concerns are formalistic, elitist, and 
ahistorical in the sense that it asserts a universal mode of human sensitivity. This 
presupposition has a twin doctrine: “art is a class weapon.” It is tempting to criticize that 
these presuppositions themselves have been decontextualized to the point that they have 
become a sham. They may appear dogmatic and reductive in the eyes of their opponents. 
However, we should not ignore that the old criticism of the art-or-propaganda dichotomy can 
carelessly devolve into a cycle of dichotomy if the critic is too complacent to look for their 
opponent’s beliefs, and, rather is faithful to the concept of either art or society. Surely, 
scientific discipline, which implicitly possesses its own theory of language, has been 
influential enough to expel aesthetics from the realm of the factual and the descriptive. Any 
effort to restore the validity of aesthetics through “empirical” description paradoxically falls 
into further criticism of “objectivity.” Instead we need to examine concentrated aesthetic 
attentions to “faith” in the thirties as Richards’ emphasis on “emotive belief” indicates.  
 
4. The Aesthetic and Aesthetics  
 As suggested by Richards’ distinction between emotive and scientific uses of 
language, a shift in the concept of aesthetics has gradually prevailed in our modern sensibility. 
Critical opinions of the doctrine of “art for art’s sake” often imply that the doctrine has 
situated the purpose of “fine” arts in the trinity of Truth, Beauty, and Good. Although some 
art critics may use this Trinitarian class analogy to restore arts to their proper place in 
civilization, few critics can deny outright that what has sustained beauty was founded on very 
shaky ground. The thirties is an important period when aesthetics were distanced from 
substances of “beauty” to reconstruct a blueprint of perception for art and literary works. In 
terms borrowed from Thierry de Duve, it is a shifting period of aesthetic judgment from “this 
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is beautiful” to “this is art.” Criticizing “the theory of art these last twenty years, especially 
Anglo-Saxon theory, that claims we are done with aesthetics...and has replaced it with a 
conceptual, pragmatic or institutional analysis” (15), de Duve argues that the word “art” in 
the modern sense does not involve criteria for determining aesthetic judgment. When I say, 
“this is art,” it does not matter what criteria this judgment implies: I simply declare my 
opinion. The base of aesthetic judgment is either too individual to be shared with others or 
too naturalized through capitalist consumerism to keep its arbitrary nature in mind. This 
modern aesthetic judgment without criteria may avoid the classic aesthetics of the trinity and 
kick Beauty out from the throne of Truth. Yet, before renouncing criteria altogether, we 
should pay attention to the shifting period when the aesthetic split itself up into various 
discourses from art to science.    
 The thirties witnessed the revision of aesthetics through a focus on “social” 
dimensions in restructuring perception through language, images, and sound. In his 
discussion of New Deal aesthetics, Michal Szalay considers the importance of the audience in 
the formation of literary works even though he is more interested in awareness of the risk that 
audiences misunderstand authorial intentions. Walter Benjamin famously regards this shift 
from “beauty” to “social” dimensions as a loss of aura that has sustained in art-work a sense 
of distance from observers. With the loss of aura, every perceptual experience seems to be 
lined up in the “sense of the universal equality of things” (223). Even though aura may be 
illusory in the sense that it attaches secondary qualities to art-work, the loss of aura enforces 
the different perceptual attitudes of audiences. Obviously, technological development in mass 
reproduction and media has something to do with the changes in perception. But, it was not 
easy for art critics or scientists in the humanities to identify the cause of this change or to 
theorize the aesthetic. Thierry de Duve touches on these changes when he declares, 
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“[m]odernity, in art, begins when one no longer knows who is making the pact with whom” 
(24). The loss of the pact seems to coincide with the loss of aura since representational 
conventions did not meet the demands of modernity and preserve the autonomous field of art 
from the “degrading” influences of social practices.    
 Because concerns over aesthetic judgment have receded into the background of 
literary debates, it is necessary to consider anti-aesthetic criticism in our discussion before we 
can begin appropriate scrutiny. First of all, the discussion of aesthetics in this dissertation 
does not engage itself in the analysis of beauty alone. The term “aesthetics” designates any 
discourse related to perception in my argument. Beauty is no longer a single criterion to 
determine the value of art. Aesthetics, in the plural, are not limited to fine arts, visions, or 
intuitive pleasure for their theoretical growth: popular arts, linguistic texture, or disgusting 
displeasure, for example, are recognized as new elements in the aesthetic domain. I refer to 
this aesthetic domain as “the aesthetic” which aesthetics or aesthetic discourses endeavor to 
fix within a concept, scheme, metaphor or narrative. Imperfection of any aesthetic discourse 
might hint at the general idea of “the aesthetic” in conclusion. Still, it would be more valuable 
to understand why and how particular aesthetic discourses tackle the slippery and extensive 
domain of the aesthetic. The significance of aesthetics lies in the approach to the problem of 
“faith,” which both reproduces and derails conduct. Each aesthetic discourse implicitly 
gropes for understanding of the fundamental conditions for both spontaneous and mechanical 
actions whose motives seem to elude cognition.  
 Secondly, reclaiming aesthetics from denunciation of false consciousness does not 
necessarily revive the esoteric or enigmatic properties in concepts of art. While not every 
aesthetic judgment can be regarded as equivalent in value, this dissertation declines to 
promote a particular taste as a perfect instance of perception. This treatment of aesthetics 
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inevitably leads a critic to take a stance recommending a particular aesthetic discourse. 
Having said this, my research is an attempt to propose the possibility that in understanding a 
variety of aesthetic discourses, we can delineate “the aesthetic” through gaps and connections 
among those discourses. My usage of “the aesthetic” itself might indicate an idealist 
conception of aesthetic substance as something petrified in the ancient stratum without 
change. While it is not logically possible to affirm or deny such an idealist substance of 
perception completely, it is not my intention to preserve “the aesthetic” in an unreachable 
place that can only be excavated by academicians or monks. It is too hasty to assume that 
aesthetics is the elitist’s secular attempt to replace religion. Michèle Barrett, who noted the 
marginalization of aesthetics in Marxist criticism of the eighties, defends the viability of 
aesthetic analysis: 
Perhaps the most important theoretical-political danger of ignoring questions of 
aesthetic pleasure and value is that we give up ground to a mystificatory view of 
art….Paradoxically, it is through a consideration of skill, technique, and formal 
properties of art that we can escape mystical and mystificatory assumptions about art 
and move toward a more democratic understanding. (702)   
Though Barrett only mentions aesthetics as virtuosity involving art-work, his point suggests 
that various approaches to the aesthetic may lead to the unveiling of the process of perception. 
Also, the emphasis on various approaches is effective in reifying categories of senses to 
construct an abstract entity called “humanity.” An aesthetic discourse can determine a 
minimum of constituents and then construct a system of perception. Or, an aesthetic discourse 
can dialectically connect different senses to express the dynamic flow of perception. 
Demonstrating several processes for establishing aesthetics contributes to a newer and better 
understanding of literary problems of the 1930s and our time as well as their solution.  
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 Thirdly, although aesthetic criteria may be said to have been socially, historically, 
and institutionally constructed, the refusal of the aesthetic still obscures the dimension of 
politics by returning to the culture-and-politics dichotomy. The broader perspective of 
cultural studies has made us critical of the privilege that a canon of fictional or poetic works 
has enjoyed above all other art forms. Within the larger domain of culture, the effects of 
“literary” works on society as a whole are so meager that the value of literature seems to be 
nothing but “symbolic capital” reproduced through social hierarchy and academic institutions. 
Ian Hunter, for example, considers aesthetics a disciplinary mode of the self to adjust to 
social contradiction while the mode is contingent on historical and cultural circumstances. 
While careful practitioners of cultural studies did not reject aesthetics outright, the call for 
politicization of any discourse, including aesthetics, unintentionally and paradoxically lessens 
the strategic value of such politicization. As Raymond Williams’ “structures of feeling” 
echoes Burke’s “symbolic action” and Jameson’s “ideology of form” discussed above, some 
strain of cultural criticism breaks up and revises the tradition of aesthetic theories without 
simply applying a formalist analysis to popular cultural works and cultural “texts”. According 
to Williams, aesthetics historically cries “a protest against forcing of all experience into 
instrumentality (‘utility’), and of all things into commodities,” even though we tend to 
emphasize that aesthetics possess “the form of this protest…which led almost inevitably to 
new kinds of privileged instrumentality and specialized commodity” (151). Aesthetics share 
with cultural studies their critical attitude toward the norm of utility, but in countering 
reduction, they end up reinforcing the measure of utility by monopolizing the instrumentality 
of uselessness. One way out might be to stress the democratizing instrumentality of cultural 
products in a social arena and to create many contesting standards of utility. Another way out, 
and this may be more important, is to contemplate this unwilling consequence of uselessness 
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turning into an instrument without reliance on institutional or sociological explanation if we 
wish our cultural criticism to be much more than the easing of our boredom and to actually 
have meaning. We must examine a variety of aesthetics to approach the process we have gone 
through to determine the usefulness of certain goods and actions. As mentioned above, the 
logical presupposition of interests extends the range of interests in “use” to its farthest limits.  
 Examining and understanding aesthetics in this way, therefore, not only prevents us 
from perpetuating the cycle of aesthetics and politics or of domination and resistance, but 
also allows us to elucidate the nature of internal contradictions which propel that perpetuation. 
Scholarly works of the nineties, such as Terry Eagleton’s The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990), 
George Levine’s edited collection Aesthetics and Ideology (1994), and Elaine Scarry’s On 
Beauty and Being Just (1999), attempted to dissolve the cycle by reappraising aesthetics and 
resetting the disciplinary ground of literary studies amid globally intensified competition 
among disciplines and universities. Two major currents of studies employ this thesis. One is 
the analysis of literary and academic treatment of the aesthetic in the 1930s. The other is the 
enrichment of our contemporary aesthetic discourses by accentuating theoretical views 
toward social aspects of the aesthetic. As Eagleton examines the characteristics of each 
aesthetic discourse by embedding theorists of the aesthetic in a historical moment,14 I would 
like to probe the aesthetics of the thirties by focusing on theoreticians’ or writers’ grasps of 
the relationship between faith and conduct. Aesthetic concerns over political and social 
aspects of art were not limited to literary works and criticisms which willingly or unwillingly 
admitted taking responsibility for providing a rationale for making art during the Great 
Depression. Interdisciplinary movements, which transgressed and merged into existent 
disciplines, were due to not only financial crisis or imminent international war, but also to the 
emergence of problems that existent disciplines failed to address. These problems partly 
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accrue from the supposed intersection of faith and conduct, and while conventional aesthetics 
left them unanswered, other disciplines developed their own lexicons to develop theories 
without referring directly to aesthetics. Communication studies, the history of science, and 
above all literary criticism are interdisciplinary approaches founded on the issues of the 
aesthetic.    
 By revealing aesthetic apprehensions, especially those which give rise to the 
formulation of theories of perception leading to action through artistic or political maneuvers, 
this dissertation argues that the legacy of the thirties is to signal the constituents of faith—or 
(non-)thought which elicits the efficacy of social conduct—and contribute to our 
understanding of the aesthetic in a wide range of disciplines. The issue of the aesthetic cannot 
be dissociated from ethical dimensions unless perception is premised to relate closely to 
action. Or, more precisely, critics, theorists, and writers in the thirties were so mindful of this 
interconnection that they represented a certain mode to apprehend the process of belief. 
Whereas it is inaccurate to emphasize the sense that many individuals believed in false 
promises during the thirties, it is also wrong that close reading or organicist assumptions in 
New Criticism are two sins committed by “aestheticians” of the thirties. The thirties 
witnessed not the spreading of false faith in dogmatism, but an aesthetic-theoretical 
consideration of faith in order to apprehend the makings of social practices. When there are 
various ways to interpret text or the world, how can we, with our limited individual 
perspective, possibly take collective action to achieve something that transcends individual?  
 In Chapter 1, “Cultural History of Informational Genres in John Dos Passos’ U.S.A.,” 
I argue that Dos Passos’ trilogy emphasized the mediating function of a new class, which 
social functions developed along with the emergence of new communication technology. As 
Dos Passos was aware of the importance of audience in literary works, his incorporation of 
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informational genres in his writing indicates Dos Passos’ effort to establish literary 
disciplines in the era of mass communication, rather than to prescribe what to believe and 
what sort of action to take. New communication technologies promoted informational genres 
which not only organized large and extensive human relationships such as companies, states, 
and militaries, but also influenced our concept and use of language. His “behavioristic” form 
of writing challenges the reader to confront cultural environments affected by informational 
genres, and then trains their literary sensibility to grasp the insides of human characters. The 
literary form of the trilogy encourages the reader to pay attention to their position in 
signification and to acknowledge what characters fail to observe in their relationships.  
 Chapter 2, “Middle Ground in Civilization: The Challenges of Humanizing Science 
after Objectivity,” argues for the need of the reexamination of 1930s literary issues together 
with theoretical frameworks after objectivity. In so doing, we can have a better understanding 
of the significance of interdisciplinary forces, which emerged as an attempt to bridge a gap 
between subject and object—the gap that has been bridged by traditional aesthetics, which no 
longer hide its rent in the face of modernity. New Humanism, which was a generic name of 
intellectual attempts to restore order, balance, and logic to temporal and social phenomena, 
posited a middle ground and theorized laws of civilization. Even though New Humanism of 
Irving Babbitt and George Sarton was unconvincing to many intellectuals of the 1930s, their 
New Humanistic awareness of modernization and supposition of middle ground was the 
source of creating an interdisciplinary project to clarify the making of “scientific” civilization. 
Arthur Lovejoy’s discussion of epistemology allows us to understand his thoughts behind 
taking a socio-historical approach to science. Opposing any epistemology which supposes the 
ultimate structure of reality in human mind or material reality, Lovejoy’s dualist 
epistemology does not exclude imagination or dream from knowledge production. Robert 
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Merton, influenced by Sarton, Burke and the continental sociologists, including Max Weber 
and Karl Mannheim, considered the cultural effects of knowledge on society and illustrated 
the unanticipated consequences of making knowledge in order to show the complex shift in 
knowledge. While Lovejoy’s idea and Merton’s institution were theorized to explicate the 
middle ground, their new disciplines, such as the history of idea and communication studies, 
endeavor to strengthen the possibility of knowing humanity as temporal and thus fallible 
existence.   
 While Dos Passos incorporated informational genres in his trilogy to represent the 
United States of America and to inaugurate a literary discipline, Ernest Hemingway in his 
works employed several media, including oral speech, film, play, and dispatch, to represent 
the Spanish Civil War. In Chapter 3, “Voices of Disinformation; Newness of Spanish Civil 
War in Ernest Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls,” the comparison of Hemingway’s uses 
of different media clarify the importance of each representational strategy, including an 
interior soliloquy of Robert Jordan in For Whom the Bell Tolls, one of the most important and 
problematic literary representations. Regarding the Spanish Civil War as an example of 
modern warfare which obscured the boundary between civilians and soldiers, enemy and foe, 
and truth and falsity, this chapter explores what Hemingway thought peculiar in the civil war 
and discusses the difficulty of representing “truth” in the situations of propaganda and 
espionage. It was a challenge for intellectuals like Merton and Hemingway to establish the 
ways to withhold erosive influences of lies. His portrayal of the Spanish Civil War does not 
allow readers to reduce the novel’s characters to a simple dichotomy between good 
Comintern and evil Fascism, and the war produces the chain of violent actions even though 
the participants of the war do not believe in any political cause. The separation of belief and 
action is embodied as the uncanny voice which derides a gap between belief and action.  
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 Appropriating other genres, including autobiography, fable, and self-help book, to 
his comedy, James Thurber also draws the reader’s attention to temporality and fallibility 
which indicate the physical limits of human existence. In Chapter 4, “The Physics of 
Laughter: Comic Methods in James Thurber,” demonstrates how Thurber’s comedy translates 
deplorable experiences into shareable human characteristics by eliciting laughter. While 
Hemingway struggled with an irreducible gap between faith and action under a war situation, 
Thurber exploited the same sort of gap for comedy. In his works, any action fails to meet the 
expectation. Just like Lovejoy postulating dualism in human understanding, Thurber 
acknowledges two different forces which alternately appear to disturb identification, causal 
reasoning, and moral imperative. In his works, however paradoxical, Thurber shows an 
individual’s failure of grasping the consequences of one’s own action implicitly unleashes a 
motivation to have trust in others.    
 Chapter 5, “Aesthetics of Medium in Literary Criticism: Close Reading as a 
Collaborative Strategy,” examines the interdisciplinary traces of literary studies in the 
formations of literary and social criticism. The discussion of Kenneth Burke and Allen Tate 
reveals their shared interest in various ways to read and interpret literary as well as social 
“texts.” While they were concerned about the cultural influence of science on language 
usages, they attempted to elucidate the creativity of (poetic) language and to transform 
aesthetics into something which can recreate a communal sense. Their critical theories 
function to locate social and historical elements in the occurrence of mistakes rather than to 
eradicate the causes of mistakes. Their criticisms may not restore a correspondence of belief 
with action; however, they connect many different ways of interpretation and explain why 
one interpretation seems inadequate in another interpretation.   
 As the historiography of the 1930s in this dissertation includes the premise that it can 
30 
 
present a radical shift in literary and intellectual history in the United States, it is necessary to 
emphasize the elements of continuity that drive this research as well as its objects. A part of 
the aim of this dissertation is to connect what has escaped from attention to what we think 
today. But we have to be very careful with the privilege of our retrospective views. The 
failure is not due to the fallacy of people in the past. And, another part of the aim is to recover 
the ways to grasp a gap between belief and action. The writers and thinkers in this 
dissertation strived to invent the ways to understand that gap caused by temporality. As 
Yoichiro Miyamoto discussed how the periodization of the 1930s involves a danger of 
constructing another narrative of “modernist” break,15 I propose in this dissertation that the 
aesthetics are rehabilitated to meet temporality. I may rephrase this proposal as “Aestheticize 
history.” This dissertation will show the aesthetic is not limited to the categories of pleasure 
and beauty, but only with the impact of time, the aesthetic is on the line for revision.  
 
Notes for Introduction 
 
1 Susman demonstrated the cultural significance of the middle class during the Depression 
era when it was customary to emphasize the proletarian literary movements in the 1930s.  
    
2 For a detailed discussion of “Art and Propaganda,” see Foley’s Radical Representation, 
especially Chapter 4. 
 
3 Writers in Crisis was considered to determine literary values in terms of social function. 
Even though Geismar’s literary history is neglected in the canonization of the 1930s, I think 
he made a good point when he claims that literature becomes critical of being critical during 
the 1930s (Geismar “Naturalism”).  
 
4 Geraldine Murphy, "Romancing the Center: Cold War Politics and Classic American 
Literature," Poetics Today 9.4 (1988): 737-47. Lawrence H. Schwartz, Creating Faulkner's 
Reputation: The Politics of Modern Literary Criticism. (Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1988 
(1990).  
 
5 Alan Wald, “The 1930s Left in U.S. Literature Reconsidered” in Radical Revisions.   
6 See Green, “Back to Bigger,” for Gold’s self-censorship.   
 
7 See Schiappa and Keehner for Burke’s self-censorship of Permanence and Change, and 
Peck for Wilson’ works. The original epilogue of Cowley’s Exile’s Return is included in the 
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latest version.    
 
8  This discussion moderated by Daniel Aaron was published “In Thirty Years Later: 
Memories of the First American Writers’ Congress.”  
 
9 Aaron and Frank Lentricchia refer to “factual” accounts of this episode. A few months after 
Burke’s speech, the Comintern headquartered in Russia officially announced its Popular 
Front strategy which aimed at collaboration between workers and intellectuals and inclusion 
of “people” in social movements.  
 
10 For example, Gene Wise argues the weakness of New Criticism.  
 
11 Certainly, ideology does not have to be equal to false consciousness. As Terry Eagleton 
discusses in Ideology, there were many definitions of ideology, and the argument of “false 
consciousness” is the least productive concept in the sense that it connects “true” 
consciousness. Even though Burkes acknowledges this, he avoided using the word “ideology” 
probably because the word itself has a negative connotation which might distract the 
attentions of some readers. Eagleton’s historical treatment of that concept is another strategy 
to refine the critical value of the concept.    
 
12 Here, Burke restated the last of his seven definitions of “ideology” in A Rhetoric of Motives 
(104).  
 
13 See Foley’s Radical Representation and Karanikas’ Tiller of Myth. 
 
14 For Eagleton’s historical treatment of aesthetic discourses, see The Ideology of the 
Aesthetic. 
 
15 See Miyamoto, The Twilight of the Modern.  
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Chapter 1 
Cultural History of Informational Genres in John Dos Passos’ U.S.A. 
 
Art is an adjective not a noun  
---John Dos Passos, “Whither the American Writer”1 
1. Technology as American Art 
The United States of America has had meager resources to create fine arts to represent its 
particularity according to the European standard, which distinguishes fine arts from mechanical arts. 
Defined as “science applied to practical art” by Jacob Bigelow in 1826, technology, a fusion of 
scientific discoveries and mechanical arts, has been a decisive characteristic of American civilization 
along with democracy. Therefore, the representative art form of the USA is technology. Throughout 
the 19th century, technology played a significant role in expansion and construction of the American 
nation.2 Technological inventions are recognized as landmarks of American civilization, especially 
since the USA became the major world power. In the 1948 book originally titled Made in America, 
John A. Kouwenhoven, for example, makes a counterargument against art critics who imposed “old” 
European standards on the “new” world whose art forms were uniquely produced “under democratic 
institutions in an expanding machine economy” (13). He explains that “[s]o irreconcilable have art 
and technology seemed that many who believe in the creative discipline of form still cut themselves 
off deliberately from important areas of contemporary experience” (11).3 Leo Marx, who examines a 
cultural concept of machine in the mid-nineteenth-century America, points out that “American have 
seized upon the machine as their birthright….What is more, the agent [machine] has appeared at a 
providential moment” (205). Technology took a significant role in the material as well as symbolic 
characterization of American nationalism. David E. Nye also asserts that the importance of 
technology in American culture was related to the experience of the natural sublime in American 
landscape, and the sublime, both natural and technological, “represents a way to reinvest the 
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landscape and the works of men with transcendent significance” (xiii).       
The prominence of technology in American civilization is undeniable in John Dos Passos’ 
U.S.A. (1938) trilogy—The 42nd Parallel (1930), 1919 (1932), and The Big Money (1936). Yet, its 
treatment of technology is obscure and controversial. For those who place his novels within the 
naturalist tradition colored by mechanical metaphors, his characters are typical of a group and, in the 
words of T. K. Whipple, “devoid of will or purpose” (150).4 His narratives, according to Matthew 
Josephson, avoid “all rhetorical elegance, [and adhere] only to bare, factual chronicle [sic] of 
outward movements” (108). Designating one of Dos Passos’ novels a “News Novel” in 1932, John 
Chamberlain points to the relationship between the characters and mass communication such as 
news: “Because of their living in and by the headlines, Mr. Dos Passos’s characters are, sometimes, 
very flat and transparent” (104). Chamberlain understood the flatness of characters as a product of 
mass communication. In contrast to these comments, which denounce his characters as a sign of Dos 
Passos’ weakness, other critics accepted the flatness or willlessness of his characters as a 
representational strategy to achieve a sense of irony, and interpreted it as a condemnation of the 
machine age. Donald Pizer appraises his narrative techniques as “free indirect discourse” which 
identifies the personality of each character with narrative style and also conveys a tone of “ironic” 
detachment from him/her. Pizer claims that Dos Passos “concentrates rather on an effort to render the 
stereotyped in thought and feeling through stereotypes of language—through the platitudes and 
clichés, the commonplace evasions and half-truths” (Critical 67). What looks flat or “stereotyped” to 
some critics is Dos Passos’ ironic distance toward stereotyping influences of mass communication 
technology. From a slightly different angle, Cecelia Tichi argues that “in a world from which an 
omniscient God was thought to have disappeared,” Dos Passos has been “trying to widen the scope 
of each novel with enriching artifacts of culture and history” (196-97). Technology for Dos Passos, 
according to Tichi, is both what he utilizes to describe the secular world and what he criticizes as an 
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incarnation of modern problems. Tichi summarizes that “[l]ike many of his generation, Dos Passos 
had a love-hate relation to the machine” (202). Because any fictional or biographical character in the 
trilogy embodies the virulent influences of modern technologies rather than an ideal vision of social 
change, it is not very hard to detect a “vulgar” correspondence between group psychology and mass 
communication.  
However, what unsettles critics, and what incites Tichi to observe “a love-hate relation,” is a 
formal, technical, or, on a deeper level, ideological similarity between communication technology 
and his novels. As repeatedly pointed out, the trilogy has four different literary modes: “fictional 
narrative” surrounded by “newsreel,” “biography,” and “the camera eye.” The terms “newsreel” and 
“the camera eye” have captured critics’ attentions in deciphering a connection between visual and 
verbal representations. “Newsreel” is a miscellany of fragmented words, phrases, and sentences from 
songs, slogans, news headlines, statistics, and so on while “the camera eye” produce unpunctuated 
sentences. Donald Pizer, a leading critic of Dos Passos, judges it as “a free-association 
stream-of-consciousness memory act” (Critical 57).5 Dos Passos’ “introductory note” in the 
republication of his first novel in 1937 reinforced these views: “Newsreel” is a literary point of view 
used to “give an inkling of the common mind of the epoch,” and “the camera eye” is used “to 
indicate the position of observer” (Pizer, John 179). His note may indicate his concern that the reader 
may become confused over these two techniques or by the interrelation of all four modes. At least 
these are two extreme points of the subjective-objective spectrum or aesthetic-social spectrum. On 
the one side, “the camera eye” is too subjective and narrow to obtain a meaning.6 On the other side, 
“newsreel” is objective and extensive to the point of losing meaning. The difficulty of articulating the 
purpose of Dos Passos’ transcription of vision to language pushes critics to see beyond his 
“mechanical” records of events, especially when a representation of masses is, whether formally or 
historically, inseparable from political dimension.7 Whereas the trilogy seems to criticize 
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communication technology, thee hypnotizing impacts of which endanger democratic society, the 
unique literary strategies of the author make such technologies the central to the representation of 
American nation.  
In the same “introductory note” where the author explains the functions of each narrative 
mode, Dos Passos brusquely delineates his intention to find a pattern in difference and to dislocate 
that pattern:  
If several people describe the same scene, say a man and a woman sitting at a table in a 
room and talking, the results are sure to be very different. Through a bunch of such 
descriptions a number of identical stereotypes will appear which will reveal the 
commonplace attitudes and the common grounds of the human group the narrators belong to. 
But there will also be found here and there in the accounts an occasional phrase or mental 
slant that tends to break the stereotype and to give some added insight or breadth to the 
event and to relate it in some new or fresh way to the experience of the group. (Pizer 179) 
His novel is meant to represent both a personal view and the group pattern as well as to break and 
recreate stereotypes. Dos Passos shares with Walter Lippmann an ontological view that due to 
physical limitations, stereotypes are necessary preconceptions for every individual to perceive a 
world exceeding an individual perspective. After the First World War, Lippmann noted, “[w]e are 
told about the world before we see it….And those preconceptions, unless education has made us 
acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception” (64). While many critics point to such 
patterned thoughts and attribute them to an invisible and obscure force of History and Capital,8 I 
would like to draw attention to stereotypes stamped by the development of communication 
technology, especially to stereotyped notions of language. Dos Passos gains insight into the aesthetic 
of the novelistic form itself, recognizing that new communication technologies have induced changes 
in the linguistic functions of transmission, dissemination and materialization. It is not enough for him, 
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as well as us as his readers to unmask stereotypes if the notion of stereotype does not suppose a 
stereotype-free mind. Through his peculiar literary forms, Dos Passos attempts to establish literary 
discipline among his middle-class audience. Examining the writer’s concern over correlations 
between communication technology and artistic form, this chapter discusses how the trilogy explores 
linguistic and conceptual changes brought by new informational genres. First, the thematic 
contextual examination of Dos Passos’ historiography clarifies his view toward both communication 
technology and his audience. And second, his writing style and story can be recognized as breaking 
and recreating stereotypes toward language. Through his treatment of communication technology 
and informational genres, I will show Dos Passos’ literary discipline rather than his attempt to 
produce class consciousness.     
 
2. A Cultural History of Communication  
 There are two frequently quoted passages that confirm Dos Passos’ emphasis on the 
significance of language in the U.S.A. trilogy. One is an introductory section of the trilogy, “U. S. A.,” 
which ends with “mostly U. S. A. is the speech of the people” (3). The other is a description in “The 
Camera Eye (50)” after the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti, which critics have considered Dos 
Passos’ incentive for writing the trilogy: “America our nation has been beaten by strangers who have 
turned our language inside out who have taken the clean words our fathers spoke and made them 
slimy and foul” (1157). What these two passages tell the reader is that language is what represents 
the USA and what divides the USA. Even though the terms “the camera eye” and “newsreel” may 
seem to favor the visual, the trilogy examines language in terms of the cultural history of 
communication technology. The cultural history of communication technology in this chapter 
suggests the trilogy’s concern over how communication technology historically affected cultural 
dimension, particularly in symbolic domains. In order to clarify his attitudes toward language, this 
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section situates the trilogy in a historical context by referring to Dos Passos’ essays and illuminates 
the marks of technology in the theme and style of his trilogy.  
 First, communication in the trilogy is not limited to mass communication: rather, the trilogy 
is written amid a transitional period when the development of mass or distant communication 
changed the meaning of the word “communication.” Identifying several branches of meaning of 
communication for the word—including “imparting” “physical/spiritual transfer” and 
“exchange”—John Durham Peters, a contemporary scholar of communication studies, reminds us 
that it is comparatively new for the word “communication” to be used as a term for “various modes 
of symbolic interaction” (Speaking 9). Before “symbolic” aspects of communication became 
prominent, communication had not been separated from physical institutions necessary for 
transporting messages.9 Therefore, it is not strange, for example, that the report by The President’s 
Research Committee on Social Trends in 1933 devoted one half of the chapter called “The Agencies 
of Communication” to transportation rather than point-to-point communication, such as telegraph 
and telephone, and mass communication media including newspaper, radio, and motion pictures. One 
of the early critics of the trilogy, Marshall McLuhan, explains that the term communication “has had 
an extensive use in connection with roads and bridges, sea routes, rivers, and canals, even before it 
became transformed” (Understanding Media 89). This shift in meaning is, of course, inseparable 
from technological advancement. James Carey argues that the invention of telegraphy enforced a 
symbolic/physical distinction in the meaning of communication: “Before the telegraph, 
‘communication’ was used to describe transportation as well as message transmittal for the simple 
reason that the movement of messages was dependent on their being carried on foot or horseback or 
by rail. The telegraph, by ending the identity, allowed symbols to move independently of and faster 
than transportation” (203-04). The less materiality a message assumes, the more its symbolic aspects 
become salient.10  
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 As biographies of Dos Passos affirm that he worked on the trilogy from 1927 to 1936 and 
wrote mostly about a period from the beginning of the twentieth century to Sacco and Vanzetti’s 
1927 death penalty, the trilogy’s treatment of communication on the content level reflects a transition 
period in the definition of communication which includes telephone, radio as well as traffic-related 
technologies such as trains, automobiles, and airplanes. In the first novel of the trilogy, for example, 
the first job of Fainy (Mac) McCreary, a fictional character, is to physically visit the Michigan 
country-side by train and wagon selling pamphlets and books with Doc Bingham. Similarly, J. 
(Johnny) Ward Moorehouse,11 who will become the head of a public relations company, also starts 
his job like Mac as he “went round Delaware, Maryland and Pennsylvania as agent for a 
bookdistributing firm” (156-57). He then gets jobs marketing real estate (158), advertising vacation 
houses (171), as “a reporter on The Times Dispatch” (215) and as a “temporary general manager” 
promoting hardware products. Even though Moorehouse is often contrasted with Mac in terms of 
economic class, their characteristics are related to the narrative background of technological 
developments in communication. As Moorehouse changes jobs, the message he must convey through 
his work is further and further detached from his physical body. With the real-estate job, his body is a 
part of the message attracting buyers: “he found out that he had a pair of bright blue eyes and that he 
could put on an engaging boyish look that people liked” (158).  
When Moorehouse became a general manager and his name in the narrative shifted from 
Johnny to Ward, implying his administrative status as well as punning on “word,” he perceives 
himself as a part of an engine, which is a metaphor for “American industry:” “He forgot everything 
in his own words…American industry like a steamengine, like a highpower locomotive on a great 
express train charging through the night of old individualistic methods….What does a steamengine 
require? Coöperation, coördination of the inventor’s brain, the promoter’s brain that made the 
development of these high power products possible” (234; ellipses in orig.). The metaphor of 
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“steamengine” refers to an abstract term of “American industry” in contrast to “old individualistic 
methods,” which suggests small and traditional craftsmanship. In this image of steam engines, the 
contribution of an intellectual worker like J. Ward Moorehouse is invisible and symbolic, and only 
leaves marks on products as part of the design or template. His job is not making but arranging or 
“coördinating” material parts. His intellectual work as a symbolic coöperator disembodies and 
dematerializes him in exchange for his becoming a blueprint of “American industry.” As he works as 
a PR man, his name is reduced to the initials J.W., which indicates Moorehouse is further 
dematerialized. Around the end of the trilogy, Richard Ellsworth Savage’s subordinate Reggie Talbot 
complains that “J. Ward Moorehouse isn’t a man…it’s a name….You can’t feel sorry when a name 
gets sick” (1199; ellipses in orig.). Savage defends Moorehouse’s contribution by saying “[w]hether 
you like it or not the molding of the public mind is one of the most important things that goes on in 
this country” (1199). Moorehouse is a mere name without a body as he becomes a “mold” which 
connotes the original sense of “stereotype” which refers to a “printing plate” as if he impresses a 
language upon the public mind.   
 Not only is Dos Passos aware of the importance of audience in the communicative process, 
but his nonfiction prose and his fictional characters hint of middle-class white-collar workers as his 
intended audience. The fictional characters in the trilogy are engaged in communication-related work. 
They are what Dos Passos designates “technicians” in his essays and what we call the 
“professional-managerial class.” Michael Denning rightly points out that “U.S.A. is not a story of 
robber barons and proletarians, nor even of engineers and profiteers, but a tale of journalists, 
advertisers, and songwriters. Characters who seem unconnected are united by the ‘trades that deal 
with words’” (Cultural Front 178). The fictional characters in the trilogy are in a generation 
influenced by products of inventors and engineers introduced in biographical sections. The fictional 
characters and biographical figures are mostly born in families that migrated from Europe to the 
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American provinces, and they move to the cities to be involved in the “trades that deal with words.” 
As we will see in our discussion of the historiography of civilization in the next chapter, Dos Passos’ 
attention to jobs in communication technologies corresponds to contemporary efforts to analyze 
civilization in terms of cultural aspects.  
 To understand how new communication technologies and a new type of class struggle 
intersect and are represented in U.S.A., we need to examine Dos Passos’ constant emphasis on the 
audience of artistic works. It is fair to say that the burst of social issues arising during the Great 
Depression was not the first inspiration for his aesthetic conception that art needs to be social in the 
sense that it affects general readers and society. He had already recognized that the audience is a 
constitutive part of art work. His participation in the New Playwright Theater during the 1920s 
fostered his concern over an inseparable relationship between a work and its audience. In 1927, for 
example, Dos Passos defines a theater as “a group of people, preferably a huge group of people; part 
of the group puts on plays and the rest forms the audience, an active working audience” (Pizer, John 
101). Here the process of signification was presupposed as unilateral. Or, his experience with the 
Sacco and Vanzetti incident helped him enhance his theory of audience. In an article “The Lesson of 
It for Liberals” in the magazine the New Republic to which Dos Passos often contributed, an 
anonymous writer drew a lesson from the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti: the liberals’ cause to save 
them “aroused no positive interest or conviction among the middle-minded people who fill important 
administrative positions in American political, professional and business life; and these are the 
people who not only conduct the activities of the country but determine its immediately effective 
state of mind” (138). This author was disappointed with the indifference of the middle class to unfair 
treatment of immigrants as well as the liberals’ impotence to provoke public attention.  
Dos Passos probably shared a similar sentiment as he constantly mentioned the importance 
of a “new” class and carefully thought over appropriate approaches to the middle-class audience. 
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Two articles published in 1930 in the New Republic and New Masses asked the same question about 
the audience. His article “Whom Can We Appeal To?” in New Masses urged the reader to convince 
those who were not convinced. He claims that writers should “convince the technicians and white 
collar workers that they have nothing to lose and that they can at least afford to be neutral,” and 
technicians here include “engineers, scientists, independent manual craftsmen, writers, artists, actors” 
(Pizer, John 132). Even though these “technicians” of the middle class may not be directly related to 
a class struggle, they as “handlers of ideas” or “molders of ideas” can at least “color events” (Pizer, 
John 132; “Wanted” 372). To Dos Passos, “coloring” is to “make [the class war] more humane” 
(Pizer, 132) or “to mitigate the bitterness of the class struggle in this country” (“Wanted” 372). In 
both articles, Dos Passos argued that a technical education ineluctably engendered certain political 
attitudes that made technicians indifferent to class struggle. Therefore, evoking the names of PR men 
such as Edward Bernays and Ivy Lee, Dos Passos asserted that the PR-like emphasis on neutrality for 
the technicians could motivate them to hold back a tendency to use violence in a class war. In 1932, 
he also signed his name to the pamphlet Culture and the Crisis which tried to convince technicians 
and white-collar workers to support William Z. Foster and James W. Ford of the American 
Communist Party for a presidential campaign. Said to be written mostly by Lewis Corey, the 
pamphlet shares Dos Passos’ aim to appeal to a “new” middle class (Denning, Cultural Front 98-99). 
Therefore, his choice of technician-related jobs for fictional characters reflects his intended audience 
and their social function in a class struggle. If these insights are the backbone of his trilogy, it is 
important to note the trilogy’s efforts to dissolve political attitudes learned from a technical education 
and to resituate them in a neutral position in order to “color” events. 
 Dos Passos’ emphasis on a new class suggests that advancement in technological 
communications complicated the social struggle between labor and capital and signaled a new type 
of capitalistic order. Malcolm Cowley read The Big Money as an indication that [c]ompetitive 
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capitalism has been transformed into monopoly capitalism” (Maine 138). Dos Passos also asserts in a 
personal letter his interests in monopoly capitalism.12 The tendency for monopolization and the 
absence of popular reactions to it alarmed intellectuals around Cowley and Dos Passos. Dos Passos 
perceptively detects that the new class of “technicians” is a symptom of monopoly capitalism. His 
notion of “technicians” is similar to the concept of “Professional-Managerial Class”(hereafter 
PMC)—a term coined by Barbara and John Ehrenreich. The Ehrenreichs theorized that two 
conditions were necessary for a new class to emerge in monopoly capitalism:  
1) that the social surplus has developed to a point sufficient to sustain the PMC in addition 
to the bourgeoisie, for the PMC is essentially non-productive; and 2) that the relationship 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has developed to the point that a class 
specializing in the reproduction of capitalist class relationships becomes a necessity to the 
capitalist class. That is, the maintenance of order can no longer be left to episodic police 
violence. (14)   
Technological inventions had surely facilitated an accumulation of surplus in exchange for 
worsening class antagonism between the working class and the capitalist class. The new PMC was 
expected to manage a stable production process under unstable conditions using 
technical-professional means. The aim of the PMC is clearly echoed by Dos Passos’ trilogy when 
Moorehouse unofficially intercedes with investor-judge Bowie C. Planet and labor leader G. H. 
Barrow. He describes the function of public relations to them:  
Capital and labor, those two great forces of our national life neither of which can exist 
without the other are growing further and further apart….Well, it has occurred to me that 
one reason for this unfortunate state of affairs has been the lack of any private agency that 
might fairly present the situation to the public. The lack of properly distributed information 
is the cause of most of the misunderstandings in this world. (236) 
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The mission of public relations is the elimination of misunderstanding through the distribution of 
information, and the intervention of “technicians” like Moorehouse may reduce the risk of violent 
confrontations between “capital and labor.” The ideal may be sound, but in the trilogy the mediating 
function of the new class blurs the line between the exploiter and the exploited.13   
Not only social and labor issues, but also changes in the publishing industry convinced Dos 
Passos that novelists had a mission to target middle-class white-collar workers as their audience. He 
was aware of the close connection between technological advancement and the social value of the 
written word. To the reprinted 1932 edition of Three Soldiers, he added an introduction in which he 
recommends that writers take a certain attitude.     
The trouble is that mass production involves a change in the commodities produced that 
hasn’t been worked out yet. In the middleages the mere setting down of the written word 
was a marvel, something of that marvel got into the words set down; in the renaissance the 
printing press suddenly opened up a continent more tremendous than America, sixteenth and 
seventeenth writers are all on fire with it; now we have linotype, automatic typesetting 
machines, phototype processes that plaster the world from end to end with print. (vi)  
This brief historical view of communication technology indicates that a change in communication 
technology enforces a change in the quality of words.14 The more people are exposed to words, the 
less authority the words assume. In this situation, Dos Passos demands that writers turn down writing 
for “money” and “self-expression” and organize “history” by capturing spoken words in printed 
words. This introduction echoes the introductory section of the trilogy I mentioned at the beginning 
of this section: “The mind of a generation is its speech. A writer makes aspects of that speech 
enduring by putting them in print. He whittles at the words and phrases of today and makes of them 
forms to set the mind of tomorrow’s generation. That’s history. A writer who writes straight is the 
architect of history” (vii-viii). In other words, writers should enfold evanescent, ordinary speech into 
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writing that constructs “forms to set the mind of tomorrow’s generation” because even the written 
words are bewilderingly ephemeral in the publishing industry. Like an architect, a writer is expected 
to create something enduring out of something evanescent. And, clearly organized words should 
become a form or a mold for the thoughts of the next generation. To Dos Passos, the aim of writers is 
to make a literary discipline workable in the time of automatic printing systems under the dwindling 
influences of the Bible: “We write today for the first American generation not brought up on the 
Bible, and nothings as yet has taken its place as a literary discipline” (viii). In short, writing can 
produce a kind of “literary discipline” or “mold” for an audience that has not acquired such 
discipline from the Bible. Dos Passos’ motivation is sound, but the only problem is that he seems like 
Moorehouse who has done most “to form the public mind in this country” (U.S.A. 1199).   
The argument in the introduction of Three Soldiers grows into “The Writer as Technician” 
which was written for the American Writers’ Congress, an anti-fascist Communist-sponsored group 
of intellectuals. In this paper, he again refers to the connection between mind and language.  
The professional writer discovers some aspect of the world and invents out of the speech of 
his time some particularly apt and original way of putting it down on paper. If the product is 
compelling, and important enough, it molds and influences ways of thinking to the point of 
changing and rebuilding the language, which is the mind of group. (“The Writer as 
Technician” 79)  
Here, Dos Passos suggests that the words of writers may provide a certain framework for the 
thinking process of people. Interestingly, what he proposes is easily comparable to the strategy of a 
propagandist. It is ideal, for propagandists, that writers are able to utilize art products for political 
gain. Dos Passos sounds as if he is justifying the social function of writer-as-technician for the 
maintenance of a liberal society. Yet, he takes great pains to separate technicians from office workers 
and bureaucrats. “The dilemma that faces honest technicians all over the world to-day is how to 
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combat the imperial and bureaucratic tendencies of the groups whose aims they believe in, without 
giving aid and comfort to the enemy” (81). His concern about appropriate writing shifts from his 
denouncement of “self-expression” and “money-making” to that of “organizations” and their 
bureaucratic administrators. The dilemma here is that technicians and administrators share the same 
objectives such as working with a collective to organize society. The only measures that enable 
technicians to distinguish themselves from administrators are concepts, such as “liberty, fraternity, 
and humanity” (82) which are too abstract to determine how these concepts can “mold and influence 
ways of thinking.”  
 
3. Informational Genres  
 As explained above, the introduction of Three Soldiers and its development into “The Writer 
as Technician” reveal how Dos Passos was conscious of his audience. The trilogy was written for and 
about the social stratum of his audience, or what he called “technicians,” who were both the products 
and producers of new communication technologies. The fictional characters are in one way or 
another engaged in publishing activities, whether commercial or political. If they reflect opinions 
expressed in the author’s essays about the elements of literary works, it is comprehensible that the 
trilogy depicts a split within the middle class rather than a class struggle between the bourgeoisie and 
proletariat. The middle-class split into technicians and bureaucrats indicated that technological 
development, particularly in the domain of organizational control, had altered the dynamics of 
economic process and produced new conflicting functions in the middle class. Like communication 
which comes to reconcile machine and spirit, the middle class is a mediator between owner and 
laborer in social organizations. In these historical and conceptual situations, Dos Passos incorporated 
informational genres—genres familiar to the PMC—rather than trying to directly persuade readers 
align with the labor side. The trilogy illustrates cultural aspects of the incipient PMC while adapting 
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generic norms of information technology in order to generate post-Bible literary discipline in the age 
of documents.15  
 Development in communication technology had nourished systematic management, 
sustaining massive and extensive business organizations through the smooth transmission of 
information.16 Communication technology had materially and conceptually affected interpersonal 
relationships by forming new writing techniques. For example, systematic management inaugurated 
a particular writing style that targeted the efficiency of message transmission and the elimination of 
rhetorical styles. JoAnne Yates, a historian of business writing, argues that internal correspondence in 
several departments within a company were systematized through the standardization of “documents” 
with manuals, typists, carbon copies, and vertical filing cabinets. John Guillory detects a close 
relationship between modernity and a sudden rise of “documents.” Documents like memorandums or 
reports became “a means of transmitting information within the larger bureaucratic structures 
organizing virtually all work in modernity” (“Memo” 112). Because of their occupations, many 
fictional characters in the trilogy rely on “documents” or standardized sets of writing. The 
standardization of documents for effective transmission of information produced a genre with some 
formal patterns, such as precision, concision and clarity, in an effort to avoid verbosity, variety and 
ambiguity. The trilogy itself is full of shortened remarks as if experiential data are quickly translated 
into words without much intervention of preconception. Cowley once described Dos Passos’ writing 
as “the most effective way of recording a particular series of words and action” (“Poet” 305), and 
critics have argued that his writing styles are indebted to a mechanical reproduction with camera, 
particularly the montage technique. I agree that mechanical representations affected his 
representational style, but too much emphasis on technological accuracy can cause us to lose sight of, 
rather than supplementing our perception of, changes in cultural attitudes toward language through 
the development of communication technology. In a world stuffed with documents designed to 
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materialize monopoly capitalism, Dos Passos’ choice of informational writing reveals and breaks our 
stereotypes toward language in order to structure a new literary discipline.  
Before discussing Dos Passos’ notion of new language education, it is necessary to analyze 
his representation of language on the level of content and form. A good example is the stenographer 
character, Janey, who has a closed connection to informational genres such as reports, memorandums, 
and internal correspondence: “the typewriters would trill and jingle and all the girls’ fingers would go 
like mad typing briefs, manuscripts of undelivered speeches by lobbyists, occasional overflow from a 
newspaperman or a scientist, or prospectuses from realestate offices or patent promoters, dunning 
letters for dentists and doctors” (133). The prominent style of writing in modernity is informational 
in a sense that it is modified to facilitate transmission and rooted in a widespread range of private 
domains. Stenographer is a new-class job or professional-managerial job, which functions as a 
medium in institutions through symbolic reproduction. The enumeration of kinds of documents, such 
as briefs, manuscripts and so on, in the citation provides informational detail, but at the same time 
such details do not add much to the reader’s impression of the passage. Dos Passos prefers 
enumeration in short phrases to long, eloquent sentences. When Janey wants to tell her friend Alice 
about her feelings for Moorehouse, Dos Passos packs her supposedly verbose stories into short 
topical phrases:  
Alice wanted to go to sleep, but Janey chattered like a magpie about Mr. Barrow and labor 
troubles and J. Ward Moorehouse and what a fine man he was, and so kind and friendly and 
had such interesting ideas for collaboration between capital and labor, and spoke so 
familiarly about what the President thought and what Andrew Carnegie thought and what 
the Rockefeller interests or Mr. Schick or Senator LaFollette intended, and had such 
handsome boyish blue eyes, and was so nice, and the silver teaservice, and how young he 
looked in spite of his prematurely gray hair, and the open fire and the silver cocktail shaker 
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and the crystal glasses. (254)   
This long, hanging sentence demonstrates the fragmentation of Janey’s story into phrases and 
reduces her love for Moorehouse to a list of topics related to what she sees and hears. Language is 
employed for the description of experiences.  
In contrast to Janey, her brother Joe William is a victim of the modern writing system. 
Because he does not have a passport (387) or a registration card (494) to prove his identity, he is 
twice arrested as an alleged spy. The fact that personal testimony is not enough to prove identity 
suggests a decline in the value of verbal evidence. The working class organization also demands “a 
red card” for “a classconscious worker” (504). Even though Joe represents those who could not join 
the ranks of the PMC, he participates in a network of communication in an older and physical sense, 
such as ships and sexually transmitted diseases, where symbolic and physical aspects of transmission 
coexist.17 In a historical context where documents are used to manage the masses, Joe encounters 
obstacles that keep him going on board ships. He cannot have a stable life with Della Matthews, his 
wife who works as a stenographer. Despite ideological differences between pro-war patriots and 
anti-war socialists, documents identify individuals: in other words, an individual’s particularities are 
relegated into information in documents.  
In the last two biographical sections of 1919, “Paul Bunyan” and “The Body of an 
American,” information is used for identification. Wesley Everest in “Paul Bunyan” is brutally 
lynched by “patriots” because he is a member of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.). Even 
though both “reds” and “patriots” are “ex-soldiers,” a difference in political affiliation leads them to 
kill each other. Without directly referring to the brutality, Dos Passos refers to a coroner’s inquest 
which illuminates both Everest’s similarity to the mythical figure of Paul Bunyan and the 
untrustworthiness of official information: 
[The coroner] reported that Wesley Everest had broken out of jail and run to the Chehalis 
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River bridge and tied a rope around his neck and jumped off, finding the rope too short he’d 
climbed back and fastened on a longer one, had jumped off again, broke his neck and shot 
himself full of holes. (750) 
The professional coroner’s “unprofessional” identification is limited to motion and appearance 
without any concern for sensation or emotion. Everest is reduced to a “the mangled wreckage” (750) 
while Dos Passos’ narrative, which uses repetition to represent each biographical character, captures 
Everest’s character with the phrase “[n]ot a thing in this world Paul Bunyan’s ascared of” (748).18 
“The Body of an American,” which commemorates unknown soldiers buried at Arlington National 
Cemetery, also shows how documents materialize living bodies. The narrator describes the process of 
enlistment. After “they weighted you, measured you, looked for flat feet, squeezed your penis to see 
if you had clap…[they] gave you a service record for a future (imperishable soul) and an 
identification tag stamped with your serial number to hang around your neck…” (758). As if his 
existence is fitted into a fill-out form, the “service record” and “serial number” documents are 
compared to an “imperishable soul.” However, documents are, of course, not impervious to damage, 
loss and alteration: soldiers’ bodies become anonymous when “[t]he service record dropped out of 
the filing cabinet” and “[t]he identification tag was in the bottom of the Marne” (760). While 
information is not enough to capture an individual, the loss of information is equal to anonymity.  
 While control by documents is presented as a significant feature of modernity or monopoly 
capitalism, physical domination over the channels of communication is the most visible effort for the 
maintenance of authority. An increase in the efficiency of accumulating and processing information 
creates a tendency to endow authority to documented information. For example, Richard Savage, 
who volunteered for military service, is discharged when the letter censorship detects his doubt about 
the ongoing war (535-37). Any anti-war or pro-labor message is an object of suppression, and 
characters are convicted for protesting activities; Ben Compton in a fictional narrative and Gene 
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Debs and Big Bill Haywood in biographical sections are notable examples of these situations. In 
contrast to those minor voices, which are censored and suppressed, the government takes the 
initiative to publicity disseminate information. Propaganda is the clearest example of such publicity.  
What is important to notice here in terms of understanding the new class is that government 
propaganda incorporates the language of the working class and masses. Those in power grasp 
symbolic authority through the incorporation of popular language into their discourse. For instance, 
books by Thorstein Veblen, who possessed an “unnatural tendency to feel with workingclass instead 
of with the profittakers,” are criticized and simultaneously appropriated for war propaganda: “the 
postoffice was forbidding the mails to Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution while 
propaganda agencies were sending it out to make people hate the Huns. Educators were denouncing 
the Nature of Peace while Washington experts were clipping phrases out of it to add to the Wilsonian 
smokescreen” (852). While intellectuals discredited books that were written in the hope that “the 
workingclass would take over the machine of production,” (852) they rearranged Veblen’s argument 
to fit into the anti-revolutionary and pro-war messages of Woodrow Wilson. In Dos Passos’ 
biography, Wilson is illustrated as a person whose words contradict his deeds, which indicates a 
moral wrongness in Wilson for some critics. The biography quotes Wilson’s speech in italics that 
“the Unites States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest,” and refers to 
the fact that “he landed the marines at Vera Cruz” (567). Furthermore, a fictional labor leader, G. H. 
Barrow, “talked beautifully about Labor’s faith in Mr. Wilson” and explained to Mary French that 
“[l]abor was going to get on its feet all over the world and start cleaning up the mess the old order 
had made, not by violence but by peaceful methods, Wilsonian methods” (866). By these strategies 
of persuasion and management with a wartime economic boom, “every day new friends were going 
around to Wilson’s way of looking at things” and “laughed or got sore at any walk of protests strikes 
or revolutionary movements” (734). From perspectives of labor, like those held by Ben Compton, the 
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war was a “capitalist war” and “the workers’ll see that they were being deceived by false good times, 
that the war’s really at them” (735). Even though Compton insists on the falsity of the war, their 
language is so similar that it is hard to distinguish the discourse of “dominant class” from that of 
working class in the trilogy.   
 This blurring of language boundaries between the exploiter and the exploited is not always 
beneficial to those in power. For those who know Dos Passos’ political affiliation during the 1930s, 
Moorehouse and Wilson are ill-intentioned manipulators of language wishing to produce their own 
desired effects. Yet, control over information was not necessarily a successful or predictable method 
for managing social organizations by those in power. In 1919, the pacifist attitude is common among 
people regardless of class, but it is suddenly transformed into belligerent patriotism: one fictional 
character, Donald Stevens, complains that a “pacifist could be a better patriot than a staff officer in a 
soft job and that patriotism was a crime against humanity anyway” (553). This pacifism turned 
belligerence can be understood as being a result of the propaganda efforts of the US government with 
the help of Moorehouse. In The Big Money, however, those in power cannot command information to 
achieve a desired consequence. Henry Ford who could heroically defy the pressures of the market, 
fails to prevent the war.  
He hired a steamboat, the Oscar II, and filled it up with pacifists and socialworkers,  
to go over to explain to the princeling of Europe 
that what they were doing was vicious and silly.  
It wasn’t his fault that Poor Richard’s commonsense no longer rules the world and that most 
of the pacifists were nuts,  
goofy with headlines. (810-11) 
Even though the novel is critical of Hearst’s newspaper companies for their agitating tones, it 
suggests that Hearst’s failure to stop the war is more problematic: “Sometimes he was high enough 
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above the battle to see clear. He threw all the power of his papers, all his brilliance as a publisher into 
an effort to keep the country sane and neutral during the first world war” (1167). Hearst changed his 
position and tried to show his patriotism, but without success: “In spite of enormous expenditures on 
forged documents he failed to bring about war with Mexico” (1168). Despite their intentions, 
information was mobilized to so many people that its effects could not remain under their control.  
The proliferation of documents has an impact on forms of social organization and generates 
an anonymous “superpower” that obscures class struggles and exceeds human control. Even though 
great figures like Taylor and Ford dominate modes of production, the trilogy does not place their 
power over the whole society into the foreground. The problems are more deep-seated. On the 
surface, there seems no specific consciousness shared by most of the fictional and biographical 
characters. Their economic statuses or family backgrounds are merely two elements among many 
that give individuality to characters. Both fictional and biographical accounts illustrate the social 
mobility of some characters. They do not remain in the same class, and not many characters are 
financially and intellectually privileged from the very beginning of life. As the emergence of a new 
class indicates, the capitalistic disruption of social order, ranging from Taylorism to war, means new 
opportunities for the underprivileged.19   
The most vigorous and prevailing undercurrent encompassing the characters is the decline in 
ownership of private property and traditional capitalist ethics. The biography of Samuel Insull in 
“Power Superpower” reveals invisible forces that tear down private ownership and obscure the class 
struggle. Insull “came of temperance smallshopkeeper stock; already he was butting his bullethead 
against the harsh structure of caste that doomed boys of his class to a life of alpaca jacket, 
penmanship, subordination” (1210). The loss of small private-property ownership fosters a move to 
white-collar jobs that are vulnerable to exploitation. Insull’s success is due to his life experiences 
cultivated through the small property ownership and the loss of that ownership. Furthermore, it is 
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paradoxical that his success produces the disintegration of property ownerships and results in similar 
experiences for other people. Therefore, even when Insull leads a failed investment that has wrecked 
lives of other investors and workers, his life experiences immunize him from harsh denouncement 
and evoke sympathy that obliterates his financial responsibility and the current economic situation.  
Old Samuel Insull rambled amiably on the stand, told his lifestory: from officeboy to 
powermagnate, his struggle to make good, his love for his home and the kiddies. He didn’t 
deny he’d made mistakes; who hadn’t, but they were honest errors. Samuel Insull wept. 
Brother Martin wept. The lawyers wept…..There wasn’t a dry eye in the jury….Thousands 
of ruined investors, at least so the newspapers said, who had lost their life saving sat crying 
over the home editions at the thought of how Mr. Insull had suffered. (1215-16) 
Insull’s plea could be easily dismissed as the sentimental excuses of an irresponsible man and 
debunked as hiding self-interest under humanistic rhetoric. However, it is not his “power” that 
releases him from his crime. Insull’s experience is comprehensible for many people because they 
have been in the same sorts of situations, and Insull recognizes that affinity between him and his 
audience. With Samuel Insull, Dos Passos captures the invisible Superpower in words and reveals the 
Superpower as paradoxical elements that destroy and reproduce the economic foundation. By 
reducing personal experiences to a series of information points, the Superpower derives its power 
from a narrative of collective experiences.  
 What Dos Passos aims to represent is not a rigid boundary between the bourgeois and 
proletariat but rather a dynamism in class boundaries that reproduces a social structure that is 
constantly changing. The supposition that the two distinct discourses of labor and management seem 
to compete to attract the attention of the masses is the very element that blinds the characters in the 
trilogy. These two discourses show similarity in the contents of information, but they preserve 
differences in political stance. For example, the narrative structure of both classes is logically 
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similar: it presumes that there is an enemy group (Red, Trooper, German, Patriot, Capitalist) who 
utilizes violence in opposition to an ally group, which wishes for peace and betterment. The point is 
that there is little difference between the working class and the upper class: it is workers who suffer 
from indifference. Indeed, an unequal class relationship between two is preserved in the 
presupposition of a narrative structure that distorts the shared foundation of both classes. Thus, 
though it may seem paradoxical, Dos Passos is careful to neither establish a superior viewpoint over 
others nor introduce a clear division between good and evil. In other words, we should not 
presuppose Dos Passos’ sympathy toward working-class point of view in our reading because his 
formal juxtaposition techniques leave several discourses comparable without privileging one over 
another.20 When we consider our previous argument that Dos Passos pays attention to the PMC 
audience, which may not be sympathetic to the working class, it is clearer that the political stance of 
the author should not be considered as grounds for finding meanings in the trilogy. More precisely, 
his choice of formal structure strives to break down the narrative structure preserving the dynamism 
of class boundaries.    
 
4. From Class Consciousness to Radical Interpretation in Formation 
 As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the introductory note in the republication of 
The 42nd Parallel gives the gist of Dos Passos’ penchant for involving his audience and restructuring 
stereotypes. He appreciates individual perception and simultaneously exhibits the patterns in the 
actions or thoughts of people. Yet, he complains that “no such breaking of stereotypes occurs and 
time-honored attitudes and phrases take on a liturgical insignificance and the standard of excellence 
becomes the exactness with which the stereotypes are repeated” (Pizer, John 179). The author’s own 
comment on his work has motivated critics to locate those patterns and Dos Passos’ dislocation of 
them. The motif of “two nations,” derived from an oft-quoted passage “all right we are two nations,” 
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has been observed in various dichotomies such as bourgeois-proletariat, ally-enemy, speech-writing, 
fixity-fluidity, individual-society, totality-variety, leisure-unemployment, appearance-depth, 
propaganda-fact, and so on. Reacting to two nations within a nation, any critical comment would 
discourage dominant values as patterned stereotypes and bolster underprivileged values. However, 
Dos Passos must know that this sort of rhetorical strategy is not especially attractive to his 
middle-class audience whom writers failed to convince in the Sacco and Vanzetti case.21 It is not 
simply that the new class refused to see the truth conveyed by radical writers, but rather that their 
ways of reading and interpreting were patterned, not specific to particular themes or contents. From 
different perspective, even when informational genres employ a style or mold that builds up patterns 
or stereotypes in the lives of characters, but the information alone does not break stereotypes; only 
Dos Passos’ strategic treatment of informational genres can interfere with the patterns. Dos Passos is 
aware of how the proliferation of documents affected the public’s understanding of language. His 
narrative forms employed informational genres to make “identical stereotypes” of information 
intelligible and to transpose information into different types.  
 Critics have struggled to theorize a relationship between Dos Passos’ form and its effects. 
Even though they have not directly scrutinized his discussion of “a literary discipline” for a 
generation “not brought up on the Bible,” as I do here, we cannot neglect to touch upon the question 
of how to read the texts and the importance of such reading in an era of social and economic 
instability. Since the first publication of the trilogy, many have not failed to recognize Dos Passos’ 
writing forms, whose peculiarities would be torturous and monotonous if they are not meant to 
represent “society” or “Marx’s materialist conception of history” (Josephson 107). Michael Gold is a 
good example in this respect. Gold, whose name Dos Passos used as pseudonym for his 
working-class character Ben Compton in 1919, admired the achievement of Dos Passos’ narrative 
form with the metaphor of architecture: “The architecture of these novels is masterly, and has 
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provoked discussion among the critics….Dos Passos has written one of the first collective novels” 
(“Education” 115). But after the publication of The Big Money and Dos Passos’ antipathy toward the 
Communist party, Gold criticized his works: “He takes a dull, sadistic joy in showing human beings 
at their filthiest, meanest, most degraded moments. They have no will power; they are amoeba, 
moved by chemistry” (“The Keynote” 153). While the change in Gold’s reaction to these literary 
works may be viewed as an effect of extra-literary, political concern on literary judgment, I do not 
think Gold’s opinion is incoherent or groundless in terms of the paradox inherent in a “collective 
novel.” Barbara Foley pointed out three generic characteristics of the collective novel. First, the 
collective novel treats “the group as a phenomenon greater than—and different from—the sum of 
individuals who constitute it,” and second, it uses “experimental devices that break up the narrative 
and rupture the illusion of seamless transparency” (Radical 400, 401). On the one hand, these two 
techniques allow writers to represent historical forces without depending on a single perspective or a 
chronological causality. Theoretically, these techniques can build a structure and withhold the 
concrete that flows among diverse elements as Gold’s architectural metaphor suggests. On the other 
hand, the representation of historical forces can reach a tipping point, moving toward a determinism 
which binds individuals to a law of arbitrariness, not a certain causal determinant. Like the amoeba 
in Gold’s metaphor, any character seems powerless and inconsistent when s/he is situated in the 
vastness of history. The collective novel faces the danger of effacing the fact that human beings are 
the agents of their own history. Thus, also significant is Foley’s third generic characteristic—the 
collective novel deals with “factual” references in order for the reader to observe “discursive 
practices through which [historical processes and forces] are known” (402).  
 Just as Foley relies on her own analysis of Dos Passos’ trilogy to characterize this new genre, 
the collective novel, Dos Passos’ novels transform readers from receivers of messages into active 
participants in a process of signification. For those who are familiar with theories about the negative 
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influence of mass culture, the society represented in the trilogy is replete with sins of technological 
and capitalistic development, which provoke violence, poverty, and indifference in exchange for 
material wealth and immediate pleasure for the rich. The “hollowness” of fictional characters is a 
symptom of this troubled society, and the knowledge of this frees Dos Passos and the reader from the 
seductive traps of mass culture. Thus, the trilogy implicitly advises readers to avoid the toxic 
influences of mass communication and to struggle for an alternative society in their living world.22 
Though a critical approach toward society may be a part of Dos Passos’ works, it is overtly reductive 
to interpret characters as mere products molded by mass culture. Thomas Strychacz rightly pointed 
out that a debunking interpretation of mass culture structurally depends on a distinction between 
professionals and amateurs. The critical discourse against mass culture “consolidates the boundaries 
of the institutionalized discourses that it pretends to disturb” and “perpetuate[s] the organizing 
principle that allows writers of and about literature to fence off a special terrain of discourse” (142). 
The value of “professionalism” relies on its opposition to the nonprofessional interpretation 
attributed to the anonymous entity called “mass.” While I am not convinced of Strychacz’s 
conclusion that Dos Passos implies his desire for “communities of expert readers whose criteria for 
literary writing are virtually indistinguishable from Dos Passos’s” (160), Strychacz’s remark alerts us 
to literary critics’ assumption that Dos Passos’ work is literature while the writings of fictional 
characters like Moorehouse or Compton and the fragmented information in the Newsreel are not. 
There may not be a way to pin down exactly what reading techniques Dos Passos want readers to 
employ.23 Still, Dos Passos’ texts awaken our sensitivity to language as a media rather than call for 
the neutral objectivity of scientists and technicians.  
The fact that his literary forms demand the participation of readers in creating textual 
meaning by erasing the privileged position of the author does not mean that any interpretation is 
valid. Rather, Dos Passos’ novels train our sensibility to endure the complexity of a modern world. 
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What makes the argument about the trilogy difficult is that it cannot stand by itself: its forms which 
blur the boundary between fact and fiction, force readers to go to extra-literary sources to explain the 
phenomenon of the texts. While readers can find clues in actual events, the author’s background and 
essays, sociological insights, and so on to make the trilogy more intelligible, not even Dos Passos has 
an authority to impose a definite meaning. The structural paradox here is inherent in any narrative 
mode when narrative inevitably privileges some statement or sentence over others in the process of 
signification, even from the stance that Dos Passos did not deliberately privilege any one meaning 
over others. Therefore, my argument sounds very peculiar as I assert certain texts’ support for 
multiple meanings and simultaneously situate a particular sentence over others to prove this point. 
Admitting that this sort of reading relies on an assumption of “professional” readers who privilege 
coherence over incoherence, and looks for a principle that can explain as many aspects as possible, I 
would like to highlight Dos Passos’ formal structure, meant to create a literary discipline without the 
Bible. His efforts to renounce the authorial privilege over the meanings of texts reveal his effort to 
break the reader’s stereotypes in supposing the final arbiter of historical and literary signification. 
From Dos Passos’ perspective, people in his generation may not share a notion of the Bible as a 
guide to the meanings of other texts, but their attitudes toward language are not changed. As they 
would if they were reading the Bible, readers attempt to settle into a single and definite meaning. 
Increased channels of communication made this kind of biblical-style reading hard to maintain 
because technology, as a representation of the young man listening to a radio in “U.S.A.” at the very 
beginning of the trilogy suggests, can present many conflicting messages to readers.  
Dos Passos’ “behavioristic” writing style also functions to attract and repeal our 
expectations of the final arbiter. Gold’s disappointment with The Big Money is evidence of Gold’s 
aversion toward his opponent as well as of Gold’s betrayed expectations of an arbiter that would 
guarantee the historical significance of the revolutionary movement and of revolutionary subjectivity. 
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Dos Passos’ behavioristic writing style contains a touch of anti-metaphysical positivism as well as 
anti-humanistic scientism. This behavioristic writings bothered Edmund Wilson, who was a literary 
critic and a close friend of Dos Passos. In a personal letter to Wilson, Dos Passos called his own 
method “behavioristic” and described it as “the method of generating the insides of characters by 
external description” (Ludington, Fourteenth 522). This may be a surprise for many critics who 
consider characters as a symptom of mass culture: they are not devoid of inner emotions or 
thoughts.24 It would be more profitable to understand the historical context that generated 
behaviorism rather than to start from the identification of behaviorism as a cult of technological and 
mechanical discourse. Behaviorism owes its emergence to the inability of conventional 
psychological discourses to explain mental processes. Introspection is not sufficient for 
understanding everything about the human mind. Kenneth Burke half-jokingly explained how 
behaviorism was culturally and historically embedded in the US:  
America is precisely the place where, on looking into one’s head, one is least likely to find a 
vast store of regular, stabilized, recurrent experiences imbedded there, except for a few 
simple groups of stimuli, not highly complex at all, such as the lure of a new refrigerator, the 
fear of losing one’s job, the distinction of smoking a certain brand of cigarette, etc. 
(Permanence 33)    
The point is that new technologies and an overabundance of information made it hard to determine 
the motives behind actions. Behaviorism as a psychological discipline tries to skip this problem by 
observing actions as effects rather than consulting with the inner mind. Dos Passos’ behavioristic 
writings suspend our proclivity for direct access to the internal minds of characters. The reader 
cannot rely on the author’s or the characters’ internality to derive the meanings of actions and events. 
While behaviorism tends to narrow the focus to some general (often biological) principles hidden in 
particular examples, Dos Passos’ writings leave some space for the coexistence of conflicting 
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motives in each action. Thus we are left with the problem of why Dos Passos resorts to informational 
descriptions of events and actions and yet confides to Wilson that he is writing “the insides of 
characters.” 
 Again, Kenneth Burke’s insight, from which he develops behaviorist logic into his 
epistemological theories, deserves some attention to understand Dos Passos. Just like Dos Passos, 
Burke attempted to articulate characteristic patterns of readings in the twentieth century. Burke 
asserted that his “contemporary audience hears the lines of a play or novel with the same equipment 
as it brings to reading the line of its daily paper. It is content to have facts placed before it in some 
more or less adequate sequence” (Counterstatement 37). Because of informational genres, the reader 
is used to perceiving the novel as a piece of information, and s/he forgets the function of form in the 
signifying process. For Burke, every symbolic product is communicative, socializing, and strategic. 
Burke had deep concern that the domination of informational genres would wither concerns over 
forms whose functions were to motivate the reader to reflect upon stereotypes. By reversing the 
effects of informational genres on novels, Dos Passos blended forms of informational genres to 
highlight formal qualities or the “psychology of audience” in the process of constructing meaning.     
 The importance of the trilogy resides in Dos Passos’ purpose in establishing literary 
discipline in the audience rather than merely conveying useful information. The simple 
correspondence between the text and its audience, which readers in the 1930s (and even we 
ourselves) carelessly took for granted, is not possible in the age of the document. In order to 
represent the age of the post-Bible reading and to make readers aware of their (in)ability to 
communicate, the trilogy disrupts a hypothetical cognitive process which presupposes a simple 
correspondence between stimulus and response. This disruption at least makes it obvious that class 
consciousness, which should be clear and comprehensive to those in the same class, indeed is not 
itself communicated in the desired way. The presence of consciousness is proved only when intention 
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and action are correlated and when cause and method are consistent. In the trilogy, the advertising 
campaign of both Moorehouse for the war and Ben Compton for the strike aim at forming 
“consciousness” to provoke a specific action desired by them. The words, which are fragmented and 
removed from the context of utterance, are utilized for political purposes, as we saw in the example 
of Veblen. But the narrative form of documents shows that individual consciousness cannot 
adequately represent collective consciousness in society. Even though the advertisers and activists 
believe that the masses can act collectively only when the same information is shared, the trilogy 
evinces the contrary: collective consciousness never appears unified or consistent. The narrative form 
of documents allows the audience to reach an aesthetic appreciation that language can be meaningful 
only if it is in a form. Language is not a neutral medium that transmits raw materials to the audience. 
Dos Passos realizes that communication technologies give us a strong sense of the form or the 
medium that affects signification. Therefore, class consciousness cannot be reduced to a set of 
characteristics or “information.” What Dos Passos tries to impart to readers is the formal process of 
change in these characteristics. Information is not meaningful in and of itself. Only when there is 
some form to give shape to information does it become meaningful and useful. Informing always 
involves more than mere information. Therefore, conflicting references can happen. In this sense, 
Dos Passos attempts to demonstrate recognition of the residual and polymorphic formal properties 
excessive to information in the trilogy as class consciousness in the “form” of an information society. 
 Progress in communication technology does not necessarily improve the quality of 
communication for the characters in the trilogy. Dos Passos uses the failure of transmission as a 
symbol of the infertility of humans. A child of Ben Compton and Mary French is aborted because “it 
would spoil [Mary’s] usefulness” and “they had to sacrifice their personal feelings for the 
workingclass” (1144). Ben, separated from Mary and later expelled from the party, falteringly talks 
to her:  
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“A party of yesmen….that’ll be great…But, Mary, I had to see you…I feel so lonely 
suddenly…you know, cut off from everything….You know if we hadn’t been fools we’d 
have had that baby that time…we’d still love each other….Mary, you were very lovely to 
me when I first got out of jail….Say, where’s your friend Ada, the musician who had that 
fancy apartment?” (1222; ellipses in orig.)  
Mary cut off the conversation by saying “what’s the use of raking all this old stuff up” (1222). What 
Ben tries to communicate to Mary is a good example of what the trilogy takes up as a problematic 
situation in the 1930s. The breaks in his speech imply his hesitation. His words may be construed as 
asking to get back together with her or to give him a job, and Mary and the reader never know which. 
As the conversation becomes entangled, Mary leaves after calling him “a stoolpigeon as well as a 
disrupter,” but comes back to withdraw the remarks that she just made. Here it is more important to 
consider contradictory behaviors than to determine the real intention behind the utterances: an 
utterance is not accompanied by a form for understanding another’s real intention. Each utterance is 
limited to a single meaning. The audience needs to realize that the form makes words excessive, but 
it is in this excessiveness that the attraction and repulsion of the human relationship reside. The 
trilogy combines two arts, literature and technology, not only to define American-ness but also to 
define a new aesthetics involving a polymorph of language. The proliferation of documents generates 
an ideology that gives authority to information. At the same time, the development of informational 
genres allows technicians, including novelists, to realize the importance of form and to construct new 
aesthetics.  
 
Notes on Chapter 1 
 
1 From Dos Passos’ answer to interview questionnaire in Modern Quarterly. The title is from the magazine. See 
Pizer’s John Dos Passos: The Major Nonfictional Prose (150). 
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2 A concise history of the interrelation between technological development and American culture can be found in 
Washizu. Also, the early sociology of science for the American contexts is established by Dirk Struik, a 
Dutch-immigrant mathematician. According to Struik, the success in the application of scientific knowledge for 
efficiency enabled Benjamin Thompson to contribute money to Harvard University for “a professorship of the 
application of science to the art of living.” The first recipient was Jacob Bigelow (86-91).     
 
3 Made in America was renamed The Arts in Modern American Civilization. Here Kouwenhoven cites Kenneth 
Burke as an example of the critics who ignore the “practical” influences of technology on American civilization. 
This revision of cultural criticism in the 1930s is possible on the premise that the antagonism between the aesthetic 
and the practical has dominated the discussion of the arts. However, the following chapters will reveal that many 
literary critics and writers including Burke, were far from ignoring the cultural effects of technology. For 
Kouwenhoven’s brief biography, see Kerber.  
 
4 Several earlier criticisms of Dos Passos are quoted from a collection of criticism edited by Barry Maine.  
 
5 I am indebted to Pizer’s consolidated study of Dos Passos’ U.S.A. in his John Dos Passos’s U.S.A.: A 
Documentary Volume (2003) for a general view. Also, he compiled some of Dos Passos’ prose into the book John 
Dos Passos: The Major Nonfictional Prose (1988). I cite the name Pizer for some parenthetical documentation 
even though the citation is originally from Dos Passos’ prose.    
 
6 Making a comment on 1919, Malcolm Cowley observed a vestige of aesthete’s attitude in “the camera eye” point 
of view, and hoped for a change in the style. Because of his expectation of “the camera eye” as a device to 
connecting different narrative sequences in the next novel, he could only say that it “has been an element of 
disunity, a survival of the art novel in the midst of a different type of writing” (“The Poet” 305). After reading The 
Big Money, Cowley revised his opinion, arguing that “the camera eye” point of view is “to supply the ‘inwardness’ 
that is lacking in [Dos Passos’] general narrative” (“Afterthought” 134).   
 
7 For the relationship between film theory, especially montage, and Dos Passos’ writing, see Murray, Foster, and 
Miyamoto. 
 
8 For critics who observes Dos Passos’ confrontation of anonymous superpower, such as History, Capital, and mass 
culture, it is possible to interpret his trilogy either as critical of their repressive forces on individuality or as 
pessimistic about the inevitability of larger forces. Usually, Dos Passos’ political affiliation is employed as a key to 
understand his attitude to the superpower. For pessimistic accounts, see Trilling (in Maine), Colley and Ludington’s 
John Dos Passos. For critical accounts, Foley’s “The Treatment of Time” and “History, Fiction and Satirical Form,” 
and Corkin.   
 
9 Irr explains a correspondence between the cultural change caused by technology and Dos Passos’ narrative modes 
in terms of “speed.” The development of communication technology surely has contributed to our sense of ratio 
between distance and time. Because each new transportation and telecommunication innovation creates its own 
relation between space and time, new technologies may have broken a singular timeline and generated a diverse 
sense of time. It is like a machine, the velocity of each part is repetitious but inconsistent. Irr argues, “American 
history comes to resemble precisely the type of organized machine that he had hoped to write against; lacking a 
single speed, embodying the process of negotiation between different speeds, history becomes a reified concept” 
(61). Even though Dos Passos may renounce an absolute linear timeline to illustrate the history of the US, the 
assumption of difference in temporal endurance, according to Irr, resulted in a more disorganized sense of history 
replete with collisions.  
 
10 John Guillory made an interesting remark on the connection between technological development and Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s theory of sign. “Saussure’s inaugural Course in General Linguistics depicts communication in its 
starkest form, as two talking heads whose mouths, ears, and brains are linked together by lines composed of dots 
and dashes. However firmly this picture insists on the speech scenario, its slackly suspended lines hint at the 
telegraph or telephone, a visual pun that Saussure probably did not intend” (“Genesis” 349). For Guillory, who 
sought a convergence of “meditation” and “mediation” or internal contemplation and external technology, the 
twentieth century witnessed the ubiquity of “media” which intervened in the subject-object relationship. 
Lippmann’s popularization of the concept of “stereotype” can be seen as an example of this recognition of ubiquity.  
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11 Moorehouse is based on the real figure Ivy Lee who worked as a public relations agent (Strychacz 126). I agree 
with Strychacz analysis that Moorehouse’s role is that of “medium” rather than “orator.” Here I want to discuss the 
development of Moorehouse’s characteristics.   
 
12 In a personal letter to Malcolm Cowley, Dos Passos considers the 1930s as a transition period from “competitive 
capitalism” to “monopoly capitalism,” a transition Dos Passos says he did not see when he was writing The 42nd 
Parallel (Ludington, Fourteenth 404).   
 
13 For two different examinations of the conjecture of the middle class and culture, see Strychacz, Seguin, Hoberek 
and Schryer.  
 
14 Also, in the 1932 report of political campaigns, Dos Passos juxtaposes the Bonus Army in Washington and the 
presidential campaign in Chicago Stadium. While “worry and hunger and humiliation” moved the war veterans, 
people were mostly affected by “power of technicians who tune the loudspeakers and handle the lights” behind the 
scenes (“Washington” 177-179). There is a contrast in the quality of language.      
 
15 The historical background of characters in U.S.A. is contemporary with the actual development of public 
relations. The public relations as part of corporate practice emerged around the turn of the twentieth century, and its 
term was widely known by the 1930s. For the historical development of public relations, see Cheney and Vibbert, 
and Ewen.  
 
16 It was important for large companies to “co-ordinate” or “integrate” divisions of labor to increase efficiency and 
lower costs. To maintain a large system, jobs specifically collecting information became necessary (Litterer).  
 
17 John Durham Peters points out “communication could also mean coitus. Curiously, ‘communication’ once meant 
what we now call intercourse, while ‘intercourse’ once meant what we now call communication (the varieties of 
human dealings)” (Speaking 8)  
 
18 For a discussion of auditory culture and Dos Passos’ concern on the reader, see Frattarola (99).  
 
19 The evidence of social mobility and the absence of a tradition of social classes in the US are two main reasons 
for American exceptionalism, which supported capitalist ideologies during the Cold War (Wilentz, Foner). Here, I 
am not taking the stance of American exceptionalism. Capitalistic process is an uneven development, peculiar to 
each nation. Dos Passos also tried to show the complexities of capitalistic forces, which make different classes 
seem both similar and different.     
 
20 The critics have recognized the absence of class antagonism in the story as either a positive or negative sign. 
Lionel Trilling, for example, asserted that Dos Passos “does not write of a class struggle….[H]e is almost alone of 
the novelists of the Left…in saying that the creeds and idealisms of the Left may bring corruption quite as well as 
the greeds and cynicisms of the established order” (Maine 156). For Trilling, Dos Passos who is an American 
individualist against capitalism and leftism does not use language to elicit physical confrontations between the 
bourgeois and proletariat. Dos Passos’ antipathy against Communism was recognized around 1938 when Michael 
Gold noted that after visiting Spain, Dos Passos returns, not hating the fascism that has committed this crime 
against the people, but hating Communism” (“Keynote” 152). This was before the German-Soviet Nonaggression 
Pact. Some biographies attribute his breakaway to the assassination of Jose Roble, his friend and translator of his 
book. See Ludington’s biography of Dos Passos and Koch for more details.    
 
21 Michael E. Staub argues that Dos Passos’ representational strategy of Sacco and Vanzetti case shows Dos Passos’ 
moving away from the muckraking strategy (22-32).  
 
22 This view that the trilogy directs readers to diagnose a disease of society is applied to the explanation that Dos 
Passos was a defender of individual liberty against all social and organizational forces especially after he was 
known to criticize the Communist party. In “The Writer as Technician,” Dos Passos emphasized the importance of 
liberty in any social organization.   
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23 Fred Pfeil refers to historical contexts of the 1930s and the reading habit of the middle class and explains why 
Dos Passos’ trilogy sold fairly well. Supposing that literary tastes are rhetorically and socially constructed, Pfeil 
argues that Dos Passos’ trilogy constructs a “coalition readership” whose ranks include a sizeable number of 
readers from the old—properly speaking, petit bourgeois—and new—that is, professional-managerila—“middle 
class” (160).   
 
24 For example, in “John Dos Passos: Technique vs. Sensibility,” Marshall McLuhan regards Dos Passos’ 
description of “behavioristic” patterns as his social criticism of the rich.   
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Chapter 2 
Middle Ground in Civilization:  
The Challenges of Humanizing Science after Objectivity 
 
The more you press in towards the heart of a narrowly bounded historical problem,  
the more likely you are to encounter in the problem itself a pressure  
which drives you outward beyond those bounds  
---Arthur Lovejoy, “Historiography of Ideas”  
 
1. The Dispersion of Objectivity  
 Just as Dos Passos was alert to the influences of technological mediations over 
democratic society, his contemporaries did not expect that scientific knowledge could 
spontaneously serve the material or spiritual wellbeing of society. The First World War 
especially made this fact evident. It was an urgent task for many intellectuals to clarify the 
fundamental relationship between human civilization and science in order to master science 
and technology. Also, when the emergence of new media, ranging from information 
technologies to laboratory instruments, raised an awareness in individuals like Dos Passos 
that differences in media altered the contents of the mediated, it became necessary for 
scientific knowledge to take account of the different layers in knowledge. The cultural 
aspects of science, whether or not scientists acknowledged them, were not negligible after 
the horrifying consequences of the war. While pure art was considered either solipsist or 
irresponsible, pure science which aimed to follow after the truth, became implausible.  
When professionalism and specialization added to the creation of new disciplines 
in the fields of social and natural science, scientific knowledge needed a unifying thread 
that would string those divided disciplines together. Among several approaches for unifying 
divided knowledge, a prominent example was the science of history. According to Arnold 
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Thackray, “The history of science could, among other things, serve to unite the timeless 
laws of nature and the historical idea of progress” (458). Nathan Reingold also emphasizes 
that the historical treatment of science reflected historians’ confidence in their works to 
prove “Progress” in human knowledge or intellect: “Even after the Depression, it was 
assumed that Progress would restart if only the right minds took control. That is, Progress 
was no longer an inevitable forward thrust” (357). While this quotation highlights 
Reingold’s proposition that some historians subscribed to the idea of “Progress” as a 
historical narrative, it secretly refers to the wavering of the historians’ confidence in the 
1930s. The technocratic assumption that “the right minds” are necessary to control society 
might have been dominant in the minds of many intellectuals as previous studies on the 
cultural history of the 1930s have shown. However, in order to acknowledge the 
intellectual atmosphere of the time, it is important to take into account disturbances in the 
unity of scientific knowledge and reactions to the residue of a “progressive” narrative. 
French philosopher and physician George Canguilhem reminds us that under the influential 
theories of thermodynamics, the process of progress cannot be meant to be a continuous 
supplement to deficiency. Since thermodynamics insists on a principle of dispersion, any 
progress in a social aspect inevitably concurs with a regress in some other aspect.   
 The reliance on history indicates that scientific knowledge failed to maintain 
objectivity, which created the potential for an immediate and disinterested perception of 
reality. Although scientific objectivity strove to exclude “arbitrary” and personal factors 
from observations and representations of reality, constant changes in scientific knowledge 
had cast doubts on scientific objectivity. Once the necessity of subjective observation can 
no longer be ignored, subjectivity becomes the basis rather than an obstacle for the 
production of knowledge. Writing a history of objectivity through their analysis of atlas 
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images, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison illustrate this shift as what they call a transition 
from “mechanical objectivity” to “trained judgment.” It is suggested that the virtue of 
“trained judgement” is that “[o]nly images interpreted through creative assessment—often 
intuitive (but trained) pattern recognition, guided experience, or holistic perception—could 
be made to signify” (Objectivity 344). Objectivity alone cannot establish a meaningful 
system of knowledge. An objectivity achieved by mathematical theorem can calculate the 
objective world, but this would be divorced from our everyday experiences. Arthur 
Lovejoy summarized the problem that arises with the loss of objectivity: “The question…is 
no longer whether everything we perceptually experience is ‘objective’ and ‘physical,’ but 
whether anything we experience is objective and revelatory of the nature of the physical 
world” (Revolt 265). Furthermore, the demolition of objectivity in knowledge production 
also enforces a change in the historiography of past reality. Peter Novick, a historian of 
historiography, argued that one of the influential elements of the modification of 
historiography in the interwar period was a theory of relativity in natural science rather 
than a modernist vision of arts. Through the popular press, the idea of relativity was 
disseminated. After scientific support of relativity, historiography takes account of the fact 
that “historical interpretations always had been, and for various technical reasons always 
would be, ‘relative’ to the historian’s time, place, values, and purposes” (166). If 
historiography cannot avoid incorporating the position of the historian into a representation 
of the past, any historical knowledge might appear to possess the possibility of arbitrary 
distortion.   
 Unsatisfied with the ideas of progress and relativity—especially historical 
relativism whose functions simply “debunk” a bias in scientific knowledge—the 
historiography of science in the 1930s carefully explored an epistemology which allowed 
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the admission of the impossibility of definite knowledge without eradicating the possibility 
of common knowledge. This chapter first takes a brief look into the significance of Irving 
Babbitt and George Sarton’s “new humanism” in the development of the history of science, 
and then moves on to the historical methods and the epistemological discussion of two 
intellectuals, Arthur Lovejoy and Robert Merton. Lovejoy and Merton inherited some 
humanistic concerns from Babbitt and Sarton and considered the recurrent instabilities of 
scientific knowledge rather than its progress. Lovejoy’s dualist epistemology, which may 
be construed as a more detailed illustration of new-humanist Babbitt’s 
mediation-meditation fusion, enhances our understanding of his project for the history of 
ideas. Merton reforms Sarton’s positivistic tree narrative of scientific development with the 
theoretical insights of the sociology of knowledge and reconfirms the strength of scientific 
rationality by revealing a process of unanticipated consequence. Both writers renounced the 
assumption of scientific knowledge as an autonomous unit which possesses an immanent 
law and inherited goodness, and instead make non-rational or irrational factors in the 
production of knowledge intelligible.   
 
2. Humanizing Science with History 
Around the interwar period, many academic intellectuals still asserted that history 
could play a vital role in redefining scientific knowledge through recourse to a humanistic 
tradition. One of the most prominent approaches was taken under the banner of “new 
humanism,” which implied the humanism of the Renaissance era when the ancient 
civilizations of Greece and Rome were re-examined to reconstruct a comprehensive view 
of humanity. Similar to the Renaissance era, “new humanism” in the twentieth century also 
called for historical points of view to redefine humanity. Irving Babbitt, one of the most 
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outspoken and influential advocates for new humanism, pointed out both specific and 
general meanings of humanism: the former is “an historical meaning in its application to 
the scholars who turned away from the Middle Ages to the Greeks and Romans,” and the 
latter is “psychological meanings” applied to those “who, in any age, aim at 
proportionateness through a cultivation of the law of measure” (“Humanism” 30).1 In the 
eyes of Babbitt, power and speed in modern technological society made human values 
disparate, relative, and arbitrary without providing any sense of direction or center. The 
Romantic concept of self was insufficient to withhold the flux of modernity for the 
humanist.2 Therefore, Babbitt advocated “the law of measure” to avoid going to two 
“humanitarian” extremes, which “lay stress almost solely upon breadth of knowledge and 
sympathy” (Literature 7), and to restrain imperialistic temper to expand physically and 
mentally. There is a scientific rationality to the accumulation of knowledge on the one side 
of the humanitarian extremes and a Romanticistic sentimentality on the other side.   
Classics professors like Babbitt seem particularly regressive only when we hear 
them professing a return to traditional values.3 Some researchers have concluded that 
Babbitt’s new humanism was the swan song of the conservative mind, which merely 
repeated the old forms of law and order. Yet, what we should not ignore in his “law of 
measure” is that his “law” can be “intuited” or perceived in continuity from ancient 
traditions to the modern condition.4 A careful reading of Babbitt allows us to notice that he 
defines humanism as the balanced middle ground that “mediates” dichotomous concepts 
such as present-past, one-many, general-particular and natural forces from within and 
without the human being. Babbitt connects religious thoughts to modern humanistic 
thoughts by punning upon the etymologically different words mediate and meditate: “The 
energy of soul that has served on the humanistic level for mediation appears on the 
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religious level in the form of meditation….Mediation and meditation are after all only 
different stages in the same ascending “path” and should not be arbitrarily separated” 
(“Humanism”41). His conceptual, if not arbitrary, association between mediation and 
meditation does seem charge us to “contemplate but do not act,” a position denounced by 
some critics. Yet, it is significant for our purpose to confirm that new humanism strives for 
the mediating role. 
When we look at this from a different angle, Babbitt’s defense of the classics may 
be understood as a sign of his concern over the position of the classics in American 
education where new “scientific” disciplines organized by “modern” languages and 
research were increasingly displacing the humanities. Some intellectuals, who wished to 
secure the academic status of science in universities, felt that scientific discourse needed to 
take into account humanist concerns and overcome the division between humanism and 
science. George Sarton, the Belgian historian who migrated to the US in 1915 and 
established the discipline of the history of science, emphasized the importance of historical 
perspectives toward science. Against criticism claiming that specialization in scientific 
fields aggravated the fragmentation of knowledge, Sarton argued that the history of science 
showed continuity surpassing temporal and national boundaries and allowed the divided 
disciplines to be organized into a logical development of human knowledge. Using the old 
analogy of the tree of knowledge5, Sarton asserts that the history of science can prepare one 
for both diachronic and synchronic approaches to science: “one may study transversal 
sections of the tree….Or else, one may study the development of a branch or group of 
branches from its roots to its youngest twigs” (“New Humanism” 30). Each new discipline 
or piece of scientific research establishes its own history. What made Sarton’s history of 
science different from those of anteceded historians was his new humanistic project to 
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reconciling science with other aspects of human life by restoring unity to fragmented 
knowledge in the twentieth century.  
In the same essay, Sarton differentiated general history from the history of science: 
the history of science can contribute to our understanding of institutions because “the 
development of institutions is obviously a function of the progress of knowledge” (32). 
Though his description of the tree of knowledge was not particularly successful in mapping 
the development of human rationality in each civilization, his encyclopedic view 
acknowledges that science is not the work of individual genius or the steady unfolding of 
general truth. Instead, in an effort to stress the importance of institutional elements in the 
production and reproduction of knowledge, he tries to situate scientific scholarship within 
the university in relation to other disciplines. Despite the mildly progressive view toward 
science, his argument points to a middle ground that connects human knowledge with the 
physical world. It is essential for Sarton’s history of science to be interdisciplinary and 
international in order to establish the visibility of institutional roles, “the skeleton of the 
history of civilization” (28).  
 Under the pressures of relativistic views, it was difficult for the new humanistic 
project favored by Irving Babbitt and George Sarton to win support. Babbitt’s attempt to 
intuit “the law of measure” between dichotomous elements and Sarton’s attempt to 
delineate “progress” in human rationality were often the focuses of criticism. Babbitt’s 
“law of measure” is confusing because it refers to “a free will which is at once selective 
(and not causally determined) and a mechanism of ethical control” (Grattan 15). Sarton was 
“above all a man of the nineteenth century” who attempts to capture “the universal history” 
through progressivist and positivist approaches (Thackray and Merton 476). However, the 
theoretical problems that their attempts tackled are neither outmoded nor trivial. The loss of 
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theoretical confidence in objectivity disturbs the possible correspondence between the 
realm of objects and that of mind, and it is very difficult to mend the gap in that 
correspondence without falling into a solipsistic worldview where individual perspective 
and previous experiences determine every bit of empirical reality. In short, relativism, 
however self-contradictory the term itself may be, endangers the possibility that knowledge 
is shareable for the cooperative advancement of human civilization. Even though there are 
differences in Babbitt’s and Sarton’s definitions of new humanism, they share a common 
interest in a historical approach, through the introduction of mediating functions, to 
compensate for the lack of a comprehensive view of humanity. From the turn of the century 
to the 1930s, this sense of lacking a comprehensive view of humanity emerged, and history 
as a discipline was employed to seek the core of humanity in a time of drastic changes. 
 
3. Arthur O. Lovejoy: Ideas as Media in Epistemological Dualism  
 Known as the advocate of a new discipline, the history of ideas, and as the founder 
of the Journal of the History of Ideas, Arthur O. Lovejoy is an often misunderstood 
philosopher whose works play up not only the historicity of philosophical concepts but also 
philosophical importance in history.6 His most famous work, The Great Chain of Being, 
has been interpreted as a historical study of the mutability of philosophical concepts which 
their creators believe to be accurate and unchangeable. Historical analysis routinely shows 
that every concept is bound to presumption at any given time or place of an individual or a 
group to which he or she belongs. However, as we have seen in the purpose of Sarton’s 
history of science, history can also allow us to establish a synthetic view that may detect 
something continuous and thus permanent in a lapse of time and in different disciplines. 
This dialectic of change and permanence confounds the reader of Lovejoy. In the process of 
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proving the transition of ideas, Lovejoy’s historiography seemed to some readers to repeat 
the fallacy of presupposing immutability of “his” ideas. However, our focus on his 
historiography of ideas allows us to perceive that his epistemological discussion aims to 
solve the epistemological difficulty in scientific knowledge, and the solution comes from 
historicizing ideas. This closer examination of Lovejoy’s writings from the 1930s allows us 
to understand the importance of ideas in his defense of epistemology. The particularity of 
his epistemological dualism is that it gives priority to limitation, impossibility, and absence 
in cognition. Lovejoy’s intention to establish a history of ideas was deeply connected to this 
era’s discussion on the relation between history and science. While previous studies on 
Lovejoy’s philosophical standing have probed his polemics against other schools of 
thought,7 I focus on Lovejoy’s epistemological discussion, which implicitly incorporates 
the aesthetic function of imagination in the process of knowledge. The strength of 
Lovejoy’s argument resides in his refusal of the often conflicting relation between history 
and science, and this is our discussion’s point of departure. 
Since the publication of The Great Chain of Being, Lovejoy’s historiography and 
his categorization of “idea” are points of controversy. For some, Lovejoy’s history relies on 
the presumption of certain intellectual or cognitive components which resist historical 
transition and cultural particularity. William J. Bouwsma, for example, criticized Lovejoy 
for the “detachment of his ‘unit ideas’ from a larger context of changing human needs and 
conditions” and for his theoretical dependence on “mysterious psychological impulses, 
inexplicable cravings for simplicity or complexity” (282). In contrast to this sort of 
prevailing misunderstanding of Lovejoy, Daniel Wickberg recently asserted that criticisms 
toward Lovejoy’s decontextualization and essentialization tendencies in his analysis of 
ideas had been inherited from the theoretical debates between Lovejoy and Leo Spitzer 
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during the Second World War. Furthermore, Wickberg reframed Lovejoy’s ideas in the 
structuralist terms: his ideas are “not only the picture, but also the frame; Lovejoy solved 
the text/context conundrum by making ideas the context in which texts were written and 
received” (450). Ideas are not only historical objects that historical studies revive from the 
past but also analytical tools of the present to explore the past. Lovejoy’s historiography 
and concepts are, just like any historiography including “new historicism” after a cultural 
or linguistic turn, confined to time and place or to culture and language. Besides, it should 
not be forgotten that his historiography was founded on his epistemological discussion of 
the processes of human cognition and knowledge production.  
 Foremost, the most important aspect of Lovejoy’s epistemology is his emphasis on 
the possibility of human fallibility in his theories of cognition and knowledge. His theory of 
knowledge confronts irrational elements in the process of knowledge production and 
questions a concept of knowledge which accepts the premise that empirical findings will 
achieve the objective and eternal truth. Defending his epistemological dualism from the 
attacks of contemporary philosophical thinkers, he approaches the traditional debate on 
dualism in two ways. In The Revolt against Dualism (1930), Lovejoy theorizes the logical 
and historical development of the “epistemological” dualism and the “psychophysical” 
dualism. With epistemological dualism, he claims that knowledge is founded on a certain 
ignorance of logical contradiction or on the faith of the knowers. There is the knower’s 
“two-fold belief that he is on the one hand…in a world which transcends the narrow 
confines of his own transient being; on the other hand, that he can somehow reach beyond 
those confines and bring these external existences within the compass of his own life yet 
without annulment of their transcendence” (11). The knower believes that the world 
exceeds his comprehension but that he can have some relationship with the world. This 
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“two-fold” belief sets up a series of epistemological questions which urges philosophers to 
elucidate a correct way to bridge the gap between the knower and the known. 
Epistemological dualism may become an acceptable thesis for thinkers when they can 
acknowledge the gap forever separating perceived qualities from sensible qualities of the 
reality—or, using Lovejoy’s terminology, the gap separating datum from cognoscendum. 
Within the assumption of epistemological dualism, there is always the potential for 
misrecognition produced by the gap between subject and object.  
In his argument of “psychophysical,” not “epistemological,” dualism, Lovejoy 
again regards this sense of a gap as the possibility to acknowledge a distinction between the 
psychical and physical. He hypothesizes the mythical experiences of cavemen who had no 
a priori knowledge of distinguishing psychical from physical phenomena. However 
awkward this supposition sounds, he makes an important point that dreams, hallucinations, 
errors, and imagination are not psychological obstacles to the cognition of physical 
phenomena, but necessary “discoveries” dividing a mental world from a physical universe. 
In other words, errors and imaginings, rather than spontaneous or disinterested “intuition,” 
paradoxically authorize physical science by taking charge of what physical science has to 
throw away to establish its system:   
The world of “mental” entities served as an isolation-camp for all the “wild data,” 
the refractory and anomalous facts, which would have disturbed the tidiness and 
good order of the physical universe; and it left the theorist, primitive or modern, 
free to remold the scheme of things nearer, not to his heart’s desire, but to the 
demands of his intellect. (29)  
Mental phenomena like dream or hallucination cannot be reduced to “mere appearance”. 
The formal difference between a dream and perception, or more precisely a formalization 
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of experiences under two different spheres, can make knowledge of physical science 
possible. Neither epistemological nor psychophysical dualism opposes knowledge with 
ignorance or rationality with irrationality, but rather they situate these dichotomies in a 
dialectical relation. In Lovejoy’s epistemology, it is mandatory for knowledge to rely on its 
twin, that is nonknowledge. Lovejoy would not state that errors and dreams are the causes 
of knowledge, but he is confident that historical observation of failures or gaps in 
knowledge can tell much more about the nature of knowledge than the analysis of scientific 
methods does.  
 His appraisal of what is usually excluded from the domain of rational or scientific 
knowledge alerts us to our careless handling of Lovejoy’s notion of “ideas.” Without his 
discussion of dualistic worldviews, we cannot even halfway comprehend his tenacity in 
writing a history of ideas. Lovejoy observed that the two dualisms mentioned above had 
different origins but “converged in seventeenth-century philosophy in the hypothesis of 
‘ideas’ (in the Cartesian and Lockian sense)” (26). Dualism, or the supposition of two sorts 
of existence, requires the theoretical notion of an idea as an agent connecting two realms. 
Lovejoy’s notion of ideas is neither as substances of objects nor as abstract products of 
minds. The dualistic notion of ideas is a medium irreducible to either the internal mind or 
external reality.   
The datum, once distinguished from the cognoscendum, and finding no other local 
habitation in the physical world, fell into that “inner” world of “appearances” 
which had long since been discovered by man through his experiences of illusion 
and phantasy and dream and error; but by virtue of the cognitive function ascribed 
to it, it assumed in the latter world a place of special dignity, as a (more or less) 
“true” appearance, a “representative idea.” (32) 
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Lovejoy here admits that we cannot directly cognize the cognoscendum, or the referent of 
objects in the external world. At the same time, the cognition of datum may be in the “inner” 
world of the perceiver, but not be identical to the perceiver’s thoughts. Although his strange 
wording such as “by virtue of the cognitive function ascribed to [the datum],” obscures the 
dualist as the ascriber, Lovejoy strives to show that the datum attains the paradox of 
“representative idea” or a mixture of the opposites “truth” and “appearance”.8  
It is paradoxical because the very notion of “representative idea” as a medium 
implies self-contradictory accounts that “the object is not directly known” and “it 
nevertheless is known” (309). Lovejoy does not suppose all individuals should endeavor to 
acquire knowledge copying the “objective” world. He presupposes the particularity of an 
individual’s perception and the knowledge derived from perceptual experiences. What 
makes critics of dualism too stubborn to understand a dualist worldview is the absence of a 
causal explanation of knowledge production. Dualists cannot precisely describe a uniform 
set of causes of perception. Or rather, dualists posit a complex interaction between matter 
and mind as the cause of perception. Lovejoy explains that in perception, it is difficult to 
discriminate “those features of the datum which can be taken as reporting characters 
possessed by the external existent at the locus of reference, and those which are to be taken 
as additions or modifications due to the cognitive event” (317). Lovejoy claims that the 
dual nature of cause in perception is not evidence of a defect in dualism, but rather the 
validity of the postulate of an agent. In short, Lovejoy not only holds up his idea of dual 
existence in the process of knowing, but also points out the genesis of ideas in the very gap 
separating the datum from the referent.9  
For a dualist like Lovejoy, as long as human knowledge depends on two kinds of 
existence, an idea contributes to knowledge production by introducing “relational” 
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categories into the two sorts of existence. In a response to one of his critics, he provides an 
analogy of an individual within an enclosure to explain the paradoxical features of 
cognition. According to his critic, Lovejoy’s theory suggests that “we can see beyond the 
fences which surround every finite cognitive event without jumping over the fences, and 
points out the way in which this is, and the only way in which it could be, accomplished 
[italics added]” (“Dualism” 593). This rather negative criticism misleads us into believing 
that Lovejoy’s theory pretends to know “the only way” to present the objects outside the 
fence. However, Lovejoy’s epistemological dualism implies that an idea itself is the very 
“way” to “see beyond the fences…without jumping over the fences.” In the essay in 
questions, he calls this “way” or idea “a conceptual schema of relations of mutual 
existential externality” (594, 598). Idea in Lovejoy’s epistemology does not reflect 
characteristics of the referent. Rather, idea is a schema which disposes the perceptual 
content to have some sort of relation to the perceived object as well as entities that do not 
coexist with the perceiving individual. A particular cognitive event is possible only when a 
schema relates the event to something other than a present personal experience. In other 
words, the schema in an individual’s mind organizes logical, temporal and spatial 
differences into perceived contents to structure the experience of physical reality. At the 
end of the essay, Lovejoy summarizes his epistemology as follows:  
knowing, in so far as it is “something more” than the blank awareness of 
sense-data or imagery, is made possible solely by the fact that there is given in any 
cognitive experience the idea of a realm or realms of being not therein given, that 
we are provided with means of referring to regions lying beyond that experience 
without reaching them. (605-06) 
The schema, which represents “the idea of a realm…being not therein given,” is “given in 
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any cognitive experience;” only by incorporating the traces of past experience into present 
cognition, can knowing be achieved. 
One of the fundamental differences that a schema provides for experience—and 
probably the most significant aspect of Lovejoy’s epistemology—is the temporal. In his 
epistemology, temporality is not something to be suppressed or surpassed for an abstract 
system of thoughts, but is rather a key aspect that led him to become a strong supporter of 
dualism.10 When he stresses epistemology, he submits remembrance or memory as 
examples in postulating epistemological dualism: “to remember is to be aware of a contrast 
between the image presented and the event recalled” (Revolt 305). He further asserts that 
any form of knowledge, including that of physical or empirical science, depends on 
retrospection which involves the objects not perceived for the present and transfers what is 
spatially or temporally absent to the present in the thinking mind. Therefore, science 
“always consists in beliefs about objects which are not now present to us, and remain, 
indeed, in their own individual being, forever inaccessible” (308). While this conclusion 
sounds tremendously offensive to scientists, who claim objectivity and impartiality in 
knowledge production, his emphasis on duality indicates that beliefs are not obstacles to 
the possibility of knowledge. The belief in objects is not a subjective illusion of perceivers. 
Rather, these beliefs verify the existence of objects independent of perceivers’ minds 
through their persistence across a period of time, or through “their filling the temporal gaps 
between actual perceptions” (267). The temporality here provides an opportunity for the 
internal mind to recognize itself in the connection between the present experience and the 
past experience, also referred to as the absent experience. And this connection cannot be 
solely attributed to the mental functions of the perceivers. Nor can it be solely attributed to 
objective reality. Temporality demands that a human make a connection to the objective 
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world by introducing intervals even though that connection does not exist objectively. And 
alleviating the tension between the two realms by connecting them is what Lovejoy 
supposes as a function of idea in his epistemology.    
The epistemological importance of temporality as a precondition for recognizing 
the divisions between subject and object, and external and internal is transferred to the 
theoretical foundation of Lovejoy’s historiography. Although there is no explicit discussion 
about the epistemological dualism in The Great Chain of Being, we should not overlook the 
possibility that Lovejoy’s establishment of the history of ideas cannot be detached from his 
previous discussion on dualism. In order to acknowledge Lovejoy’s ingenious approach to 
historiography, it is essential for us to remember that he undertakes a history of ideas, not a 
history of philosophy or a literary history. By emphasizing “ideas” in his historiography, 
Lovejoy not only traces the vicissitude of human thought but also scrutinizes the operations 
of various representative ideas. Many critics have tried to abstract the history of ideas from 
Lovejoy’s explanation of the “unit-idea” and his practice in The Great Chain of Being.11 
Those critics ended up separating his epistemology from his historiography and construing 
Lovejoy’s “idea” as another name for an immutable and determinant element of human 
cognition. Their views toward Lovejoy’s ideas were not completely off the mark because 
Lovejoy is, as we discussed above, confident in postulating the existence of ideas which fill 
the gap between the psychical and the physical. However, he does not define the 
characteristics of the idea in general.12 He asserts that “unit-ideas” are “rather 
heterogeneous” (Great 7) and points out four different factors— “unconscious mental 
habit,” “dialectical motive,” “metaphysical pathos,” and “philosophical semantics”—that 
orient the mediating functions of ideas. While the history of ideas is meant to address 
assumptions or beliefs (“unconscious mental habit”), other factors suggest that we can 
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approach ideas through the analysis of logical (“dialectical motive”), aesthetic 
(“metaphysical pathos”), and linguistic (“philosophical semantics”) aspects, and especially 
the aspects which have been excluded from a rational and static system of philosophy.  
Of course, the main argument in The Great Chain of Being is the persistent 
influences of the three “unit-ideas”—plentitude, continuity and gradation—in Occidental 
thought. If we consider Lovejoy’s discussion in The Revolt against Dualism, unit-ideas can 
be seen as an attempt to “see beyond the fences without jumping over the fences.” 
Unit-ideas mediate between what is inside the fence and what is outside the fence, between 
“this-worldliness” and “other-worldliness.” The implicit assumptions of plentitude, 
continuity, and gradation are attributed to the finite ability of human beings to know the 
self and its place in the outside world. These unit-ideas are “relational” in the sense that 
they distribute individual entities, which are mutually external to each other, to a particular 
schema of relations. No idea is objective, and so no idea can endure over the time even if 
one attempts to stabilize some of its attributes by enclosing them within the unreachable 
“otherworldliness” in a Platonic sense. Therefore, Lovejoy concludes that “[t]he history of 
the idea of the Chain of Being—in so far as that idea presupposed such a complete rational 
intelligibility of the world—is the history of a failure” (329). Ideas fail to grasp the 
universal characteristic of objects and to convey them to human intellect. Moreover, he 
draws another conclusion from his historical inquiry: “rationality, when conceived as 
complete, as excluding all arbitrariness, becomes itself a kind of irrationality” (331). Unless 
ideas are heterogeneous, it is too limiting to impose a rationally consistent order to the 
relation between the subject and the object. A historical context allows Lovejoy to analyze 
how these unit-ideas behave either without or beyond the intentionality of perceivers and 
how they affect thoughts through time.    
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The history of ideas was Lovejoy’s efforts to remodel humanity when the 
emphasis on temporality disparaged the idea of absolute and statistical order in the world 
and contaminated the realm of objective knowledge with subjective perspective or 
prejudice. Knowing through ideas as the medium between the present and non-present and 
between the internal and external is crucial in his epistemology and historiography. 
Because there is also no direct way to know ideas, Lovejoy has to rely on history for the 
many experiences of his antecedents and their ideas in order to know the function of an 
idea, or what Lovejoy calls “particular go.” But as the indirect nature of any knowledge is 
evident, the purpose of historical knowledge is reduced to its utility for the solution of the 
present problem. Lovejoy cannot accept this pragmatic treatment of history. Indeed, he 
refuses the logical priority of the present over the past and acknowledges that no history is 
possible without the present explanatory hypothesis and also that no hypothetical 
knowledge is possible without transcending the present. Even though reason would not 
achieve comprehension of an objective world in flux, Lovejoy abandons not human 
rationality but “the dogma of the internality of all relations” (“Present Standpoints” 485). 
Each mutually external thing does not internally possess a relatedness to others; it is idea 
that transforms the referent into the datum in the process of relating. This is why the 
criticism of Lovejoy’s “idea” as a decontextualized element of an object is inappropriate. 
Lovejoy is comfortable with the fact that “any entity…may actually have one set of 
properties which are relevant to one context, and others which are relevant to other contexts, 
and that, in attending to one of these sets, you do not thereby alter either it or the others” 
(485). Lovejoy is not blind to the contexts in which “ideas” are articulated and effectual. 
“Ideas” contextualize an entity by making “one set of properties…relevant to one context” 
without confining the entity to that set of properties. This insight allows us to avoid falling 
84 
 
into solipsism, which counts on the particularity of an individual perspective and insists on 
the incommunicability of one’s experiences to others. Lovejoy’s conceptual schema does 
not authorize a perceiver to manipulate his/her empirical world, but his notion of idea 
leaves some space for us to permit a variety of individual experiences in an event. At the 
very end of his essay in the first issue of the Journal of the History of Ideas, he defines an 
idea as follows: 
An idea, in short, is after all not only a potent but a stubborn thing; it commonly 
has its own “particular go;” and the history of thought is a bilateral affair—the 
story of the traffic and interaction between human nature, amid the exigencies and 
vicissitudes of physical experience, on the one hand, and on the other, the specific 
natures and pressures of the ideas which men have, from very various promptings, 
admitted to their minds. (“Reflections” 23)  
Only through history can we know how ideas are “potent” and “stubborn” things, which are 
both independent of perceivers and effectual to them. Therefore, he laid claim to the 
necessity of a new academic journal which could promote interdisciplinary, inter-lingual, 
and international approaches to various ideas. In this way, Lovejoy’s works touched the 
core of intellectual argument in the 1930s.  
 
4. Robert K. Merton: The Unanticipated Consequences of Science  
 While Lovejoy developed his history of ideas based on his own epistemology, 
Robert K. Merton initiated historical research to develop a system of sociological thought. 
Even though his studies have influenced at least the two different fields, the history of 
science and communication studies, scholars in these fields have limited their attention to 
those of Merton’s thoughts that are congenial to their interests rather than attempting to see 
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their continuity. In the history of science, the hypothetical relationship between Puritan 
ethos and modern science found in his first book, Science, Technology and Society in 
Seventeenth-Century England (1938)13, known as the “Merton thesis,” is a much debated 
issue.14 Thomas Kuhn, for example, in his writing of a history of the history of science, 
indicated how his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was based on “remarks about the 
Merton thesis” to maintain the importance of social and cultural factors in incipiency of 
new fields (80). Merton also worked with Paul F. Lazarsfeld at the Bureau of Applied 
Social Research at Columbia University and contributed to a theoretical foundation of the 
yet-to-be-defined discipline of communication studies. In order to determine causes of 
actions, Merton contrived methods of empirical research to meet theoretical demands, as 
seen in his second book Mass Persuasion (1946).15 Certainly, it is much easier to claim 
that Merton’s specialty is “sociology,” and thus that he treats both history and 
communication from a sociological perspective. Yet, his intellectual works go beyond one 
academic discipline. Merton reminisces in his new edition of his first book that his 
approach to “the remarkable efflorescence of science” starts from a sociological premise 
that “various institutions in the society are variously interdependent so that what happens in 
the economic or religious realm is apt to have some perceptible connection with some of 
what happens in the realm of science, and conversely” (xvii). If what Merton meant by 
“sociology” is an abstract presupposition of interrelations among particular realms or 
institutions in society, it is profitable for us to analyze his thought process in regard to the 
history of science and communication, which would render the interrelations more detailed 
and intelligible. To disentangle the infinite complexity of social interrelations, which do not 
correspond with the law of cause and effect, Merton assesses the meditative functions of 
institution, which reproduce both human collective actions and their unanticipated 
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consequences. There are two separate but closely related ways to see his concept of 
“unanticipated consequence:” first, the concept developed as he probed the discourses of 
natural philosophers in the seventeenth century, or second the concept provides much more 
than an historical narrative of secularization and reveals Merton’s hope in sociology. 
 Starting from the contemporary sociological assumption that any scientific 
knowledge is not absolute and pure but is rather inseparable “from its social and cultural 
context” (xxxi), Merton indicates the contextuality of knowledge in the phenomena of 
“unanticipated consequences.” In Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century 
England, Merton tackled the question of why science undermined theology despite the 
purpose of natural philosophers to uphold God’s works and their religious commitments. 
With the cooperation of his mentor, George Sarton, who introduced him to the history of 
science in his doctorial program at Harvard, Merton reached the conclusion that 
“[p]uritanism inadvertently contributed to the legitimacy of science as an emerging social 
institution” (xvi). This sentence epitomizes the overall argument of the book. The word 
“inadvertently” imitates a paucity of planning or intention, and the specification of “an 
emerging social institution” emphasizes a process of translating Puritan words into actual 
practices embodied by social institutions, including the Royal Society. As suggested in the 
sentence, Merton doubts the correspondence between intention and action, that is, between 
theological doctrine and religious ethos, and attributes this slippage to contexts in which 
the action is performed and interpreted. Puritan natural philosophers did not at first intend 
to promote science in opposition to religious teachings. When natural philosophers turned 
religious teachings into actions or institutionalized activities, there appeared “unanticipated 
consequences” from Puritanism through influences of other fields in society. He argues 
that: 
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with the complex interaction which society constitutes, the effects of action ramify. 
They are not restricted to the specific area in which the values were originally 
centered, occurring in interrelated fields specifically ignored at the outset….It is 
this usually unlooked-for reaction which constitutes a most important factor in the 
process of secularization, of the transformation or breakdown of value-system. 
This is the essential paradox of social action— the “realization” of values may 
lead to their renunciation. (101)  
When new doctrines are actualized in actions, the meanings of actions acquire an 
“unlooked-for” or social effect and exceed the original intention of the actors. This is not 
idealistic historiography where the transition of one value system to another is done as a 
conscious transformation in a human mind. Since “effects of action ramify,” actions might 
defeat their own purposes.  
 Merton’s sociological approach especially endeavors to establish a system of 
thoughts to comprehend this enigmatic emergence of “unanticipated consequences.” 
Merton’s sociological inquiry is related to a specific field called the sociology of 
knowledge or Wissenssoziologie. Merton was one of the intellectuals who brought the 
sociology of knowledge from Germany and France into US academic discourse, and his 
studies specified the importance of unanticipated consequences in relation to the sociology 
of knowledge. Before the publication of his first book, Merton admitted in the article “The 
Unanticipated Consequence of Purposive Social Action” that social thought has 
recognizable consequences, unexpected by actors or deviated from purposes. Unless such 
unanticipated-ness could be attributed to “the inscrutable will of God or Providence or Fate” 
(894), an unanticipated consequence was considered a mistake in comprehension rather 
than a socio-cultural by-product of knowledge production. Merton thought it problematic 
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that a “lack of adequate knowledge” is “the sole barrier to a correct anticipation” (898). 
There could not be enough knowledge to foresee the exact consequences, but our 
disappointment with a failed expectation implies our blind faith in the possibility of enough 
knowledge. In the essay, Merton enumerates five possible causes of unanticipated 
consequences—ignorance, error, “imperious immediacy of interest,” basic value, and 
shared future prediction.16 Although he tries to categorize the “causes” of the gap between 
intentions and consequences of actions, they are closely related to each other. What 
fascinates Merton most was a process of cultural changes, as he describes in his first book: 
“activities oriented toward certain values release processes which so react as to change the 
very scale of values which precipitated them….Here is the essential paradox of social 
action—the ‘realization’ of values may lead to their renunciation” (903). It is important to 
realize that Merton pays attention, though not as strongly as Lovejoy does, to temporality, 
which allows actions to embed in different contexts and to ramify effects throughout 
society. Temporality dislocates a familiar relationship between knowledge and action. We 
will be never able to know a consequence and act to achieve that consequence. Action 
cannot be a direct expression of knowledge while knowledge is unable to guarantee the 
results of action. Merton’s sociology of knowledge, therefore, should compensate for the 
gap between knowledge and action.   
 The sociology of knowledge does not overlook irrational and sentimental elements 
of knowledge. In his 1937 article, “The Sociology of Knowledge,” Merton explained about 
two-way method of knowledge: the sociology of knowledge needs to show that “in certain 
realms knowledge does not develop according to immanent laws of growth (based on 
observation and logic) and that, at certain junctures, extra-theoretical factors of various 
sorts…determine the appearance, form, and in some instances, even the content and logical 
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structure of this knowledge” (494).17 In the case of secularization of science in the 
seventeenth-century, Merton emphasizes the absence of a logical development from 
religious bias to scientific truth and simultaneously enumerates a variety of 
“extra-theoretical factors” to delineate the dynamic relations between sentiment, action, 
and institution. He acknowledges both the internal influences and external influences on 
human knowledge and action: internal factors such as interests, impulses and emotions, and 
external factors including economic situation, social prestige, and interpersonal relations. 
“The religious component of thought, belief and action becomes effective only when it is 
reinforced by strong sentiments which lend meaning to certain forms of conduct….And, as 
we shall see, behavior in its turn reacts upon the sentiments, re-enforcing, moulding, at 
times altering them so that the whole process is one of incessant interaction” (56). Here, 
action is split into conduct and behavior: the former implies the actor’s conscious motive 
and a choice of means; the latter connotes a not-so-conscious routine or naturalistic 
response.18 Without sentiment, thought or action seems sporadic and meaningless.  
Furthermore, sentiments cannot accidentally transform themselves to encourage 
different thoughts and actions. For instance, “One formula which…became the focus of the 
strong sentiments among Puritans is “the glorification of God” as the end and all of 
existence….God must be glorified but institutional controls canalized this glorification in 
particular directions, with a variety of social effects (60-61). Merton does not clarify how a 
set of conducts is converted to institutions or how effects of (religious) conduct ramify into 
other institutions, yet behaviors structured by institutions react with sentiments to trigger 
changes in values. The purpose of conduct for the natural philosophers of seventeenth 
century-England was “the glorification of God,” and this was supported by their sentiments. 
When this thought was implemented into an institution to establish scientific ethos, 
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scientific conducts for “the glorification of God” achieved social prestige and ritual 
function, which affect other conducts or behaviors and eventually reach out to sentiment. 
Institutionalization endows conduct with social meaning that is not included in the original 
purpose. “Once science has become firmly institutionalized, its attractions…are those of all 
elaborated and established social activities…Institutionalized values are conceived as 
self-evident and require no vindication” (83). As soon as scientific actions became too 
self-evident to need a discursive defense, religious doctrines were examined according to 
scientific rationality. Also, institutionalization enabled scientific behaviors to interact with 
economic, military, and distribution institutions whose technological and material needs 
propelled motivations other than “the glorification of God.”    
 Merton’s reliance on an obscure historiography and a specific subject 
demonstrates that his insistence on these “interactivities” between the socio-economic 
factors and the psycho-empirical factors realizes the approaches of the sociology of 
knowledge and confronts the challenges that such approaches happen to produce. Karl 
Mannheim, whom Merton scrutinizes to advance his analytical style, argues that “only 
empirical investigation will show us how strict is the correlation between life-situation and 
thought-process, or what scope exists for variation in the correlation” (Ideology and Utopia 
267). By empirically investigating a particular knowledge production and transformation, 
Mannheim and Merton refrain from enacting their own epistemological standard that 
presupposes the determinants of the mental process. Merton focuses on a system of 
thoughts and its development at a certain time and place, though without starting from the 
epistemological discussion of how people “actually” perceive the outside world and acquire 
knowledge. This is partly why Merton’s historiography attempts to reveal complex 
interactions between a thought and a situation but sounds arbitrary and inconsistent. He 
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does not specify a certain correspondence, for example, between social norms and 
individual attitudes. On the contrary, he makes a case for empirical-textual investigation to 
compare differences and similarities between the precedent and antecedent systems of 
values in order to hypothesize the influences of social interactions on knowledge. Therefore, 
even on an ideological level, there are no objective interactions that determine the 
characteristics of a new value system: “the acceptance of every great change of belief 
depends less upon the intrinsic force of doctrines or the personal capabilities of its 
proponents than upon the previous social changes which are seen—a posteriori, it is 
true—to have brought the new doctrines into congruence with the dominant values of the 
period” (104-05). His method shows the reconciliation between “old” dominant values and 
“new” views, and unfolds a social and discursive context for the transitional period.  
Although it is not clear who the interpreter or seer of the “previous social changes” 
is, old values and new doctrines merge to produce unanticipated consequences. There 
would be no complete cleavage between the old and the new, but the new doctrine would 
not maintain logical and conceptual purity if it made itself intelligible to those under the 
influences of the “old” value system. However, the difficulty with Merton’s historiography 
is that it derives both the conscious and unconscious process of people in the past only 
from textual evidence without relying on his contemporary presumption of mental function. 
Proving irrational sentimentality was especially difficult: “Puritan advocacy of 
experimental science was not, however, the result of a reasoned process. Rather it was the 
inevitable outcome of an emotionally consistent circle of sentiments and beliefs linking 
into a chain of non-logic various designated activities which satisfied these sentiments” 
(115). Merton argues that experiments were not rational consequences of Puritan teachings 
or scientific knowledge placed before empirical science.19 Even though he seems to point 
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to irrational elements such as sentiments and beliefs in the Puritan insistence upon 
experiments, his visual evocation of “circle” and “chain” in the preceding citation does not 
tell us much about mental process. He reaches for evidence that there were some 
“extra-theoretical factors” which affect any theorization. It may be easy to find some stains 
contaminating the (presupposed) purity of scientific thought. However, it is hard to point to 
the causes of such stains by referring to socio-historical factors without an epistemological 
foundation.  
Since Merton assigned to the sociology of knowledge the task of explicating 
unanticipated consequences, he had to go further to reflect his own insight. He, therefore, 
tried to anticipate the unanticipated consequences of the sociology of knowledge and 
prepare for subversive reactions to sociological discourses. This theoretical reflection is not 
an academician’s tedious erudition. It is burdened with a political implication. As Merton 
demonstrates the unanticipated consequences of socio-economic forces and ideological 
transitions in the natural philosophers of seventeenth-century England, he shifts his 
attention to his time and observes the contemporary relationship between society and 
knowledge. Citing Max Weber’s dictum at the turn of the twentieth century, “the belief in 
the value of scientific truth is not derived from nature but is a product of definite culture,” 
Merton claims that “this belief is readily transmuted into doubt or disbelief” (“Science and 
the Social Order” 321). His theoretical insight, which is derived from society losing faith in 
religion in the seventeenth century, is applied to society losing faith in science. He situates 
the sociology of knowledge within the cultural context of his time. The sociology of 
knowledge is not a flawless description of the relationship between society and knowledge: 
it has to generate its own unanticipated consequences through circulation and translation of 
its doctrine into everyday practice.  
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The major unanticipated consequence for Merton was Nazi theorists’ employment 
of the sociology of knowledge to criticize science and to reinforce their nationalistic view: 
“totalitarian theorists have adopted the radical relativistic doctrines of Wissenssoziologie as 
a political expedient for discrediting ‘liberal’ or ‘bourgeois’ or ‘non-Aryan’ science” (328). 
To refute this relativistic proposition, he did not think it appropriate to return to the 
doctrines of “pure” science because the insistence on purity neglects the social and 
economic influences on science. Instead, he analyzes the unanticipated consequences of 
science whose “[o]rganized scepticism involves a latent questioning of certain bases of 
established routine, authority, vested procedures and the realm of ‘sacred’ generally” (334). 
Unless skepticism as an institutionalized attitude of science destabilizes other institutions, 
science produces its resistance from them. At this point, Merton tries to distinguish 
“totalitarian” society from liberal society in terms of its relation to scientific ethos, however 
unsuccessfully. Contrary to a centralization of institutional control in the totalitarian 
society,“[i]n liberal structures the absence of such centralization permits the necessary 
degree of insulation by guaranteeing to each sphere restricted rights of autonomy and thus 
enables the gradual integration of temporarily inconsistent elements [italics added]” (336). 
The italicized phrases obscure the element of limitation or control on “insulation,” 
“autonomy” or “integration.” This sentence indicates Merton’s hesitation to completely set 
democratic freedom against totalitarian control.  
Without accepting the presupposition that democracy and science go against 
totalitarianism, Merton had to perform difficult theoretical maneuvering to justify a place 
for science in society. Merton explains the possible paradoxes inherent in social structure in 
terms of cultural goals and institutionalized means.20 With the means-ends discourse, 
Merton asserts that we need social structure to organize a means to make our collective 
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lives meaningful and purposeful. Without such organization, social life would be subject to 
anomie: “Insofar as one of the most general functions of social organization is to provide a 
basis for calculability and regularity of behavior, it is increasingly limited in effectiveness 
as these elements of the structure become dissociated” (“Social Structure and Anomie” 
682). As long as people behave according to mutual expectations and get expected results 
from doing so, social structure can formally sustain cultural values. However, if the mutual 
expectation is betrayed, and the means to an end does not lead executers of the means to 
the end, anomie presides over the society. Too much emphasis on the end destroys the 
appropriate means to achieve it. “‘The-end-justifies-the-means’ doctrine becomes a guiding 
tenet for action when the cultural structure unduly exalts the end and the social organization 
unduly limits possible recourse to approved means” (681). He also extends this discussion 
of the unbalance between means and end to describe international conflicts whose goal is to 
seize dominant power throughout the world by any means necessary.   
Certainly, too much emphasis on means is also problematic. Merton does not 
overlook the fact that adherence to the status quo through organizational means may 
maintain the calculability of human interactions but not necessarily meet social demands. 
In this case which he observes in bureaucracy, “an instrumental value becomes a terminal 
value” (“Bureaucratic Structure” 563). That a means becomes an end is another example of 
unanticipated consequences. An outright elimination of bureaucratic structure would not 
solve the problem which bureaucracy unintentionally produced because the original 
purpose of bureaucracy was, according to Max Weber, to attain “precision, reliability, 
efficiency” (562) through “the complete elimination of personalized relationships and of 
nonrational considerations (hostility, anxiety, affectual involvements, etc.)” (561). 
Bureaucracy comprises “clearly defined patterns of activity in which, ideally, every series 
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of actions is functionally related to the purposes of the organization” (560). The concept of 
organism, where parts are meaningfully related to the whole, is evident in the blueprint of 
modern bureaucracy. However, rationalized organizations such as bureaucracy demonstrate 
that social structure cannot function without “infusing group participants with appropriate 
attitudes and sentiments” (562). Even though the rationality of bureaucracy undertakes to 
restrain non-rational, sentimental consideration and to solve a problem that personalized 
relationships cannot solve, its structure depends on sentiment which has the potential to 
transform a means into a goal. With the means-end discourse, Merton shows how 
unanticipated consequences occur by analyzing what he abstractly calls “social structure.” 
His attention to social structure allows us the benefit of assuming that a bureaucrat is not 
necessarily a conscious agent who says one thing and does another. Rather, the very efforts 
to utilize rationality to renounce nonrational consideration or to comply with specific 
functions of bureaucracy to serve social purposes are bound to sentiments. This view 
toward the social structure does not presume human action to be subject to a definite cause, 
such as a private desire or economic force. Although his essay does not clarify how to 
achieve a balance between a means and an end, his theory of social structure does not 
necessarily exert an irresistible force upon individuals. Merton assumes that rationality is 
inseparable to its opposite in the sense that our rational thoughts and actions are 
emotionally elicited. Admitting this inseparability, he both criticizes and refines the cultural 
values of social structures like bureaucracy.  
When his corroboration with Lazarsfeld at Columbia University prompted 
Merton’s shift from the sociology of knowledge to communication studies, Merton 
examined the theoretical and institutional consequences of the sociology of knowledge, and 
gave prominence to the position of audience in the process of knowledge production. In his 
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1941 essay “Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge,” he again takes up a more 
detailed analysis of Karl Mannheim and, this time focuses on the theoretical weakness. His 
criticism of Mannheim and other of Marxist theories of ideology would seem disloyal to 
the theoretical foundation on which Merton had previously depended. As Merton began 
weighing empirical methods of social science against more “speculative” continental 
theories around the 1940s, his shift from ideology to positive evidence may be one example 
of the large current of American-dominant post-war media studies, which Stuart Hall later 
disputes.21 Despite Merton keeping his distance from the concept of ideology and 
European theories, I argue that he is loyal to the insights of the sociology of knowledge, 
and unsatisfied with Mannheim’s solution to relativism. Mannheim’s solution was 
unexpectedly produced from the sociology of knowledge, which the Nazis exploited for 
their theoretical arguments. Merton cannot dismiss the Nazis’ discourse as irrational. 
Mannheim’s argument about the historicity of knowledge implicitly invokes a logical 
extension which tolerates the possibility that any validity of knowledge is historical and 
thus temporal and dismissible. For Merton, Mannheim has left this paradox unsolved. 
Particularly, Merton does not like the fact that Mannheim gives a “classless position” to the 
“the socially unattached intellectual” (263).22  
Instead of being disappointed with the sociology of knowledge, he applies its own 
methods to the sociology of knowledge itself: he places the sociology of knowledge within 
a specific context to evaluate its findings and its “paradigm.” While he inspects the social 
context and logical development that led Mannheim to demand a privileged position for 
intellectuals, Merton refers to relationships between intellectuals and bureaucracy to 
demonstrate that the neutrality and objectivity of intellectuals are hardly possible.23 
Through all these empirical and theoretical maneuvers, Merton realizes the importance of 
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creating an audience-centered model of knowledge production. At this point, he achieves a 
logical reversal of unanticipated consequences. This is not the model where intellectuals 
produce knowledge and disseminate it to a public that always misunderstands it, and 
generating consequences unanticipated by originators of knowledge. On the contrary, 
intellectuals or “men of knowledge do not orient themselves exclusively toward their data 
nor toward the total society, but to special segments of that society with their special 
demands, criteria of validity, of significant knowledge, of pertinent problems, and so on” 
(34). In short, intellectuals need to be aware of their contexuality by listening to the various 
demands of diverse audiences in order to produce knowledge.24 His emphasis on the 
intellectual’s responsibility to audiences brings us back to his doctoral thesis: “The 
scientists in seventeenth-century England and France who were organized in newly 
established scientific societies addressed themselves to audiences very different from those 
of the savants who remained exclusively in the traditional universities” (34). It is his and 
our challenge to be able to address ourselves to audiences and anticipate their demands.   
 
5. Temporality and Fallibility in Epistemology 
 Without presupposing rigid categories for the foundation of knowledge, Merton 
and Lovejoy strove to articulate a process of knowledge production which could withstand 
temporal flux. Their arguments do not oppose permanence to temporality, universality to 
particularity, or natural philosophy to instrumentality. Rather, they are more apt to 
determine the conditions of our perception, or of our sense of time, without relying on 
visual or spatial abstractions. An event, for example, can be confined neither to a singular 
place of occurrence nor to a specific place in the brain. Even though Lovejoy invokes a 
visual metaphor with his use of the term “schema” in his epistemology, he redefines the 
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characteristics of idea as a medium by dissociating ideas from visual images. If our spatial 
conception of time makes us presuppose the irreversibility of time and the singularity of a 
time-line, it is hard to conceive why Merton and Lovejoy advocate epistemological dualism. 
Time is not something that they have to dismiss as “mere appearance” in order to name 
every mental as well as physical element generating human experiences. Time is an 
inevitable condition that complicates—or enriches—the significance of events and our 
experiences. Therefore, they put forth epistemological arguments pertaining to the temporal 
domain.    
 When Lovejoy and Merton accentuate time without spatial metaphors, they resort 
to discussions of things that are usually excluded from knowledge such as errors, 
misunderstandings, and dreams. Of course, humanistic arguments, including those of 
Babbitt and Sarton, are based on the acceptance of human fallibility. Even though 
humanists have attempted to concede human fallibility without religious assumptions, they 
often end up being trapped into the pitfall of division between the physical and the 
metaphysical. In this division, there are repetitive denouncements of culpability in 
smuggling the metaphysical “prejudice” back into the description of the physical 
phenomena. Lovejoy and Merton’s historiographies are also considered culpable in 
privileging certain words or assumptions. Yet, as we have seen above, close examination of 
their works from the 1930s reveals that they were fully aware of the logical consequence of 
assuming human fallibility and careful to not plunge into a cycle of denouncements. In 
particular, Merton had to contrive a solution to indeterminacy in the sociology of 
knowledge because Hitler exploited that sociological reasoning for the purpose of political 
persuasion. A more detailed analysis of fallibility, in terms of unanticipated consequences 
and epistemological gaps between subject and object in a temporal domain, is what roused 
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both Merton and Lovejoy into departing from New Humanism.     
 As their epistemologies are coordinated with a temporal dimension that generates 
unanticipated consequence or failures, their mediating concepts, such as idea and institution, 
reveal their efforts to communicate the importance of temporality and fallibility. Their 
history of science is not a demonstration of the gradual development of scientific and 
human knowledge. Neither is the history of science a set of examples to persuade the 
reader to give up scientific inquiries. Even though they point to the necessity of assuming a 
“medium” that affects the relationship between the knower and the known, only specific 
examples of historical events (mostly errors) can partially express the qualities of media 
like “idea” and “institution.” Although their vocabularies refer to “subject-oriented” ideas 
and “object-oriented” institutions, their terminologies do not limit function to one side or 
the other of individual/society dichotomy. Their medium concepts are meant to provoke in 
us an awareness of the inevitability of failure and the ways in which some thoughts or 
actions are transformed into mistakes. Works by Lovejoy and Merton, thus, suggest an 
important aspect of the intellectual discussion of the 1930s in terms of temporality and 
value shift, and this supplies a constructive perspective from which to examine the 
literature and literary criticism of that time.  
 
 
Notes on Chapter 2 
 
1 The article “Humanism: An Essay at Definition” is included in Humanism and America edited by 
Norman Foerster. In response to this book, articles by non-academic intellectuals including Allen Tate 
and Kenneth Burke, whom I will discuss in Chapter 5, are published in Grattan’s The Critique of 
Humanism.    
 
2 See Hoeveler’s account of Babbitt.   
 
3 For instance, Vanderbilt. Also some critics in Grattan’s The Critique of Humanism.  
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4 In The Revival of Humanities in American Education (1940), it is noteworthy that the “new humanist” 
movement was never homogeneous, and each scholar expressed the importance of humanism in his own 
way. Without the conflicting interpretations of humanism of the time, Babbitt would not have labored 
over his own argument to distinguish his definition from other definitions. See the first chapter of 
Babbitt’s Literature and the American College (1908). 
 
5 The tree is illustrated as a visual metaphor for the genealogy of knowledge. See Lima for a more 
detailed history of tree metaphors.  
 
6 For a concise summary of Lovejoy’s works and his critics, see Grafton.  
 
7 On Lovejoy’s relation to other schools of thought, see Feuer, Diggins and Wickberg. 
 
8 For more precise accounts of Lovejoy’s complex epistemology, see his “Dualisms Good and Bad.” 
 
9 For additional details about Lovejoy’s conception of emergence in a sense of results exceeding their 
causes, see his “The Meanings of ‘Emergence’ and its Modes” and Kathleen E. Duffin’s “Arthur O. 
Lovejoy and the Emergence of Novelty.”   
 
10 Lovejoy’s discussion on the importance of temporality in his philosophical thoughts; see “A 
Temporalistic Realism”.    
 
11 For criticisms of Lovejoy’s methodology, see Daniel J. Wilson’s “Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of 
Being after Fifty Years.”   
 
12 Lovejoy can enumerate the sources of ideas or unit-ideas: for example, “types of categories, thoughts 
concerning particular aspects of common experience, implicit or explicit presuppositions, sacred 
formulas and catchwords, specific philosophic theorems, or the larger hypotheses, generalizations or 
methodological assumptions of various sciences” (“The Historiography of Ideas” 538). However, he 
does not give a common characteristic among these. Rather, ideas seem to be a synthesis of 
communality and variety. On the one hand, they are “to be found at work in the most various regions of 
the history of human thinking and feeling” (538). On the other hand, the prevalence of certain ideas does 
not create the uniformity of opinions: “the intellectual and affective ‘reactions’ of men—individuals and 
masses—have been highly diverse” (538). It is possible to argue that Lovejoy tries to find the hidden 
structure which binds Occidental thought. However, it needs to be emphasized that ideas also generate 
diversity and various ways to confront problems of the day.   
 
13 This was originally Merton’s 1936 doctoral thesis. It was published in 1938 in Osiris, (4, 360-632), 
one of the two academic journals founded by George Sarton. Every citation of the book is from the 1970 
reprinted version.  
 
14 On Merton thesis, see Hall’s “Merton Revisited,” and Abraham’s “Misunderstanding the Merton 
Thesis.” 
 
15 See Coser, and especially Lazarsfeld’s “Working with Merton” (35-67).  
 
16 “Imperious immediacy of interest” means an unintended result of a careless judgement caused by 
strong interests in immediate gains. Basic values are social norms people follow without much intention. 
Merton takes Weber’s discussion of the Protestant ethic as an example of basic values, which eventually 
cause unintended consequences in conventional practices. Prediction is supposed to reflect the future, 
but the announcement of prediction affects the present condition whose change may not result in what is 
predicted.  
 
17 Merton did not refer to Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia in his doctoral dissertation, but did in 
“The Sociology of Knowledge.” This citation corresponds to Mannheim’s point. 
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18 It is doubtful he distinguishes behavior from conduct in Science, Technology and Society. But he 
makes the distinction in “The Unanticipated Consequence of Purposive Social Action.”  
 
19 Merton explains that “[t]he Puritan insistence upon empiricism, upon the experimental approach, was 
intimately connected with the identification of contemplation with idleness, of the expenditure of 
physical energy and the handling of material objects with industry. Experiment was the scientific 
expression of the practical, active and methodical bents of the Puritan” (93). In short, experiment is 
derived from translating process from religious teaching to scientific practice, but it cannot be reduced to 
either.   
 
20 In “Social Structure and Anomie,” Merton creates five modes of social structure in terms of the 
relation between means and ends. They are conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion. 
Conformity is the ideal correspondence of a means to an end. He especially focuses on innovation and 
ritualism, that is, ends-oriented and means-oriented respectively. For a more detailed discussion of this 
schema, see page 676 of “Social Structure and Anomie.”    
 
21 Stuart Hall, in “The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology’,” may be right to point out that the American 
“mainstream” media studies are oriented to positivist social science. But, my discussion of Merton 
allows us to see why he ended up realizing the importance of interviews.  
 
22 The citation from “Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge” comes from the 1949 version 
of Social Theory and Social Structure.  
 
23 For a close examination of the sociology of knowledge, see “The Sociology of Knowledge,” 
published in Twentieth Century Sociology (1945), and republished as “Paradigm for the Sociology of 
Knowledge” in The Sociology of Science (1973). For Merton’s discussion of bureaucracy and 
intellectualism, see “Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy,” originally published in the journal 
Social Forces (23 (1945): 405-15), and reprinted in Social Theory and Social Structure.  
 
24 It should not be ignored that Merton’s trust in audiences leads to his insistence on sharing knowledge 
in scientific communities.  
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Chapter 3 
Voices of Disinformation: Newness of Spanish Civil War  
in Ernest Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls (1940) 
 
For your information in stories about the war I try to show all the different sides of it,  
taking it slowly and honestly and examining it from many ways.  
So never think one story represents my viewpoint because it is much too complicated for that. 
---Ernest Hemingway, A Letter to Ivan Kashkin1 
 
1. Which Contexts?  
 For Whom the Bell Tolls (hereafter FWTBT), of which Ernest Hemingway made the 
Spanish Civil War the subject matter, begins with an epigraph cited from some verses of a John 
Donne poem. The epigraph first challenges the notion of a unique individuality separated from any 
external environment by saying that “no man is an Iland, intire of it selfe.” Because there is no 
individuality without collectivity, the demise of other people can be rethought as a loss to any living 
person or “Mankind.” The sounds of the bell in the poem symbolize collective identity and the 
indivisibility of a people, both the living and the dead, in a community. This epigraph has 
functioned as a nodal point that is significant in determining the meanings of the novel as well as 
the political stance of the celebrated author Hemingway. On the premise that the protagonist Robert 
Jordan is a self-projection of Hemingway, the most controversial issue among critics is whether or 
not the author is committed to the cause of the Comintern-supported Spanish Republic. By 
comparing the novel with the author’s personal letters, facts pertaining to the Spanish Civil War, 
gossip, and biographies of the author, critics have scoured every corner for evidence to verify 
Hemingway’s political intentions behind writing the novel.2 The bell described at the beginning 
strikes some critics as a warning against all totalitarianism, including both fascism and communism, 
and others as a humanistic figure which goes beyond any partisan interests.  
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 The problem with criticism that focuses on authorial belief is that it necessarily treats 
particular passages as references to Hemingway’s actual experiences in the civil war. This critical 
approach analyzes statements by the narrator and characters, and seeks correspondence between 
their words in the novel and factual events in order to judge the values of statements. Hemingway’s 
actual political stance is evaluated according to the degree of negativity expressed in the novel in 
regard the reputation of the Comintern to which he openly declared his support.3 For early critics, 
such as Edmund Wilson, Lionel Trilling, and Alvah Bessie, the novel’s references to deceits and 
brutalities on the side of the Republic evince the author’s disillusionment over the cause of the 
Comintern and his intention to move from political commitment to private-artistic salvation. 
Throughout Hemingway studies during and even after the Cold War, a liberal-democratic view of 
aesthetics repeatedly proposes that the source of Hemingway’s art dwells in an individuality 
irrelevant to (collective) politics. From this view, Hemingway is disillusioned and recoiled from 
politics.4 In opposition to this view, some critics, such as Cary Nelson and Ryoichi Funayama, 
recollected Hemingway’s personal letters, which prove his commitment to the cause of the Republic, 
had not been interrupted. In a recent critical essay about FWTBT, Ichiro Takayoshi argues that what 
seems to be a “non-political” stance of the protagonist Robert is actually a parallel to the political 
stance of the Comintern whose “propaganda campaign…advertised the republican cause as the 
defense of bourgeois democracy…[and] touted its pragmatic prioritization of war over social 
revolution” (120). Because these critical approaches presume the literary work to be an expression 
of the authorial stance toward politics, or more specifically toward party and ideology, they fail to 
recognize that criticism based on a comparison between the explicit contents of the novel and the 
actual lines of political camps could also result in a certain political configuration.5     
 The presumption that the novel realistically reflects what Hemingway experienced in Spain 
undermines the novel as a literary genre and the monologue as a literary style of the novel. Why did 
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Hemingway choose a novel and monologue as his means to describe the Spanish Civil War? He 
worked as a war correspondent and wrote some journalistic articles. He also made a public speech at 
the American Writers’ Congress, wrote a play, The Fifth Column, and participated in the making of 
the film The Spanish Earth. Hemingway’s attempt to reach his audience through different genres 
and media is significant in terms of construing what the novel tries to convey. As Dos Passos 
integrated different media into a single work to represent the USA, Hemingway used different 
channels to represent the Spanish Civil War with awareness that every medium has its particular 
advantages and disadvantages. Analyzing the different media of Hemingway’s works, this chapter 
demonstrates that the Spanish Civil War provided a medium through which to expose the problems 
of language in an era of propaganda, and that the style of monologue employed in the novel is an 
effective tool for addressing these problems. The novelistic technique of protagonist monologue 
functions as a description of a paradoxical situation destabilizing the enunciated statement rather 
than as an expression of a character’s personal feelings or truth. In the end, it is revealed that For 
Whom the Bell Tolls tackles the political dimension in signifying the meaning of death in war.   
 
2. A New Kind of War  
 According to Paul Preston, a historian of the Spanish Civil War, there is as much scholarly 
research on the Spanish Civil War as there is on the Second World War, despite its comparatively 
limited scale and size. This fact indicates situations of domestic warfare much more complex than 
fighting between the Franco-led nationalists and the Republicans alone. From even before the 
beginning of the war, the determination of what was and was not fact had been a matter of politics. 
There were so many fabrications and deceptions that it was and is very difficult to judge with 
certainty what is true and false. Hemingway’s work is not exceptional in this. Even though FWTBT 
is a fictional account of the war, its valuation has exclusively relied on its accordance with historical 
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facts. For example, Alvah Bessie, a veteran of the Lincoln Battalion, criticized the novel for 
attacking Andre Marty, “the organizer of the International Brigades,” “with the very terms that have 
been leveled at him by the French fascists” (28). While I will argue later in this chapter that the 
function of Marty in the novel cannot be reduced to Hemingway’s acceptance of fascist “facts,” here 
I will demonstrate that Bessie’s criticism represents an interpretation of the propagandist elements in 
the novel by identifying correspondences between discourses in and outside the novel. While 
admitting that the war is wrong and inhumane, Hemingway wrote in his personal letters that there is 
a war necessary to be fought and won.6 In the novel, the protagonist persuades himself that there 
are murders to be executed in war situations, as if he were tracing the views expressed by 
Hemingway in his letters. Yet, it is quite precipitate to point out the similarities between the 
protagonist’s inner voice and the author’s private letters, and therefore conclude that the novel is a 
statement of authorial intention in the form of fiction. Indeed, these similarities show the difficulties 
in grasping the connection between Hemingway’s anti-fascist stance in his public speeches and his 
slighting of fascist ferocity in the novel. His slighting of the fascist side indicates to some readers 
the betrayal of his original commitment to the cause of the Republic and Comintern.      
 It is, in general, problematic to lightly read the political stance of an author into the 
contents of his/her story, especially when the ubiquity of propaganda complicates the audience’s and 
author’s attitudes toward language. As discussed in Chapter 1, the smooth transmission of facts to 
the masses grew much more difficult as the masses were aware of propagandist elements in mass 
communication. Some critics, particularly those who denounce propaganda in preference to art, 
interpret Hemingway’s work as propaganda, the manifest contents of which reflect the author’s 
political beliefs. Thus, for example, Erik Nakjavani interprets Hemingway’s The Fifth Colum as 
“propaganda…to influence the attitude of those who chose to see it on the state…in favor of the 
supporters of the Spanish Republic” (85). It is, however, very hard to imagine that Hemingway 
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chose a realistic style to tell the story of actual events of the Spanish Civil War objectively in effort 
to affect the reader. This is because Hemingway acknowledges the influences of war instruments, 
such as propaganda and spies, which significantly modify discursive situations to create a “new” 
kind of war. This newness demonstrates not a rise of “totalitarian” fascism and communism but that 
of what we now call a “total war.”7    
 Going to Spain as a correspondent from March 1937, Hemingway declared his feelings of 
discomfort toward the civil war in a dispatch called “A New Kind of War,” and sent it to his 
publisher in April 14th. This dispatch is not a third-person, objective, journalistic description of 
events. Rather, it occasionally takes the form of a short story with a second-person narrative to 
allow the reader to experience the events vicariously. The narrative form does not specify why the 
events relayed gave Hemingway a new impression of then “modern” warfare. There are two main 
events depicted. The first is the routinized aerial bombings of civilian areas of Madrid: “in the 
morning, before your call comes from the desk, the roaring burst of a high explosive shell wakes 
you” (By-Line 262). Although at this point, air raids are not total and massive, the indiscriminate 
attacks indicate an erosion of the boundary between civilians and soldiers. (Several days after the 
bombing referring to here, the infamous massive air raid occurred in Guernica.)  
 The second event is Hemingway’s meeting with J. Robert Raven, a critically injured soldier 
of the Lincoln Battalion. When Hemingway listens to Raven’s story of his heroic struggle and injury, 
he firmly believes that Raven’s story is not true because it was “the sort of way everyone would like 
to have been wounded” (By-Line 265). Hemingway confides his own opinion in the dispatch: “In 
the war that I had known, men often lied about the manner of their wounding. Not at first; but later. 
I’d lied a little myself in my time” (265). Hemingway scholars interpret this passage as evidence of 
his exaggeration of experiences in the First World War. Telling a lie about an injury is nothing new 
to Hemingway. But, in this case at the Spanish Civil War, Raven lied about his injuries from the 
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start. A captain of Raven’s battalion, Jock Cunningham, tells Hemingway a story slightly different 
from Raven’s, and the reader of the dispatch may hypothesize that Raven was actually telling the 
truth.  
He [Cunningham] told me [Hemingway], in military terms, the history of the attempt to 
rally retiring troops on his battalion’s right flank, of his bombing raid down a trench which 
was held at one end by the fascists and at the other end by the government troops, of the 
taking of this trench and, with six men and a Lewis gun, cutting off a group of some eighty 
fascists from their own lines, and of the final desperate defense of their impossible position 
his six men put up until the government troops came up and, attacking, straightened out the 
line again. (267)  
Hemingway gets a sense of clarity and cogency from Cunningham’s “history” as compared to 
Raven’s “story.” But, Cunningham’s explanation in “military terms” does not seem to contradict 
Raven’s account if Raven was in “a trench which was held at one end by the fascists and at the other 
end by the government troops” and part of “the final desperate defense.” It is possible that the 
grenade that critically injured Raven was thrown by the government troops who mistook their own 
soldiers for fascists. Nevertheless, the dispatch ends with the following strange passage:  
We [the captain and Hemingway] talked for a while and he told me many things. They were 
all important, but nothing was as important as what Jay Raven, the social worker from 
Pittsburgh with no military training, had told me was true. This is a strange new kind of 
war where you learn just as much as you are able to believe. (267)  
The ambiguity in the last sentence could be construed as an implication of fallacy in reports of any 
heroic acts or battle situations under censorship. Hemingway as a correspondent judges Raven’s 
story as neither true nor false but considers it “important.” But, in what sense was “what Jay 
Raven…had told me was true” important enough to make Hemingway realize this as “a strange new 
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kind of war”?8  
 The newness can be found in the nodal point which connects the two events told in the “A 
New Kind of War” dispatch—the bombing of civilians and the soldier’s lie. The Spanish Civil War 
has characteristics of both “modern war” and “total war.” According to Hew Strachan, “modern war” 
refers to “the means of fighting” developed through “the fruits of industrialization and technological 
innovation.” The term “total war,” which is derived from the definition of a German general, Erich 
Ludendorff, signifies “an observation about the power of the state, about its right to conscript its 
citizens not only for military service but also to mobilize the economy and society” (Strachan 351). 
Critics have noticed aspects of modern war described in Hemingway’s works—modern weapons 
such as warplanes, tanks, and automatic rifles and modern organizations such as military 
bureaucracy. Allen Guttmann argues that modern war technology such as “bombing planes and 
armored tanks should become, in the writings of Loyalist-sympathizers, symbols for the enemy; the 
symbols corresponded to the historical situation” (542). These aspects of the novel show both an 
increasing efficiency in murder and Hemingway’s critical stance toward inhumane warfare. But, 
these aspects overshadow the important but elusive undercurrent flowing through tone of the 
narrative. This undercurrent is the domain of language, with which the idea of “total war” is invoked 
because symbol changes in propaganda and the presence of spies obscure the distinctions between 
friend and foe, and between civilians and soldiers. 
 With both total and modern aspects of the war in mind, the Raven episode can be 
interpreted in several ways. It shows the gullibility of soldiers represented by Raven. In the 
conversation, Hemingway pretends to believe Raven’s story, and Hemingway “was glad he [Raven] 
thought I [Hemingway] believed it” (265).Because his injury required him to wear a bandage over 
his eyes, he must have been unsure whether his conversation partner was actually Hemingway. This 
episode also implies the possibility that Raven consciously pretends to believe in lies or not to know 
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anything because he assumes there may be military police or spies nearby. Outwardly, he does not 
insist upon his commitment to the Republic cause: he repeats, “I was always awfully interested in 
things and I really wouldn’t mind the pain at all” (264). In this respect, Hemingway’s prioritization 
of Raven’s story over the captain’s history is conceivable not because the matter involves a 
distinction between truth and lie, but because the problem is a disappearing gap between 
unintentional illusion and intentional subterfuge. It is impossible to know Raven’s true intentions 
while it is obvious and thus “important” that the war atmosphere suppresses expression of anything 
“true” such as true intentions and true situations. Therefore, by ending the dispatch with the 
sentence “you learn just as much as you are able to believe,” Hemingway declares the paradox of 
stating someone’s belief. In order to learn what others believe, the knower has to believe what he 
knows is others’ beliefs. On the surface, there seems to be a simple relationship between knower and 
believer in the sense that someone knows that the other believes something. The problem is that the 
other can also pretend to believe. In this case, the relationship between the knower and believer is 
reversed. The knower is only the believer who believes that the other believes something. In the last 
sentence, Hemingway breaks the simple dichotomy between truth and lie and between knowledge 
and belief by claiming a belief within knowledge. It may not be accidental that the protagonist in 
FTWBT shares his first name with Robert Raven. This dispatch is a symbolic episode that 
characterizes the newness of modern and total war, and probably leads Hemingway to employ 
different genres and styles.   
 
3. Hemingway’s Propaganda: Film, Speech, and Play  
 Facing this new kind of war, Hemingway tries to reach his audience through many 
channels of communication. It is undeniable that Hemingway took political action in contributing to 
the Popular Front and the International Brigades: he helped make a film, urged American writers to 
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be anti-fascist, and wrote a play and a novel whose profits went to supporting the writer-soldiers of 
the International Brigade. Widespread recognition of propaganda, censorships, and spies in the late 
1930s made it difficult both to present the truth and to obtain the truth through media.9 In the face 
of this, Hemingway seemed to be obsessed with knowing and writing the truth insofar as he himself 
went to Spain and urged other writers to do the same. Even though his dislike of “fascism” seems 
evident, “fascism” and “totalitarian war” are very complex process that Hemingway attempted to 
dissect through his many works and styles. In order to appreciate his techniques in his novelistic 
rendering of the new kind of war and his approaches to this newness and to fascism, close 
examinations of his other works, such as the speech, film, and play are needed. We might overlook 
the complexity of the novel if we presuppose, as Cary Nelson has done, that Hemingway “wrote 
about no devils on the fascist side…because he took the demonic quality of fascist ideology as a 
given” (Remembering 25). Hemingway is against fascism, but his strategy is neither demonizing the 
enemy nor drawing a clear division into guilty and innocent.    
Before writing the novel, Hemingway made a public speech and showed a film at the 
second American Writers’ Congress in June 1937. Hemingway’s speech emphasized new elements 
of the war that surpassed the opposition between truth and lie. His speech, “The Writer and War,” 
defines fascism as “a lie told by bullies” and asserts that “A writer who will not lie cannot live or 
work under fascism” (69). He persuades the audience with second-person narrative that “you learn, 
watching them live and fight and die, that there are worse things than war. Cowardice is worse, 
treachery is worse, and simple selfishness is worse” (70). After criticizing the “totalitarian war” of 
fascism, which attacks “unarmed citizens,” his speech becomes more belligerent at the end when he 
provokes writers who have “skillfully chosen positions with no risk involved in holding them. 
Positions to be held by the typewriter and consolidated with the fountain pen” (73). The speech 
seems to emphasize practice over theory, actions over words, and guns over pens. We should not 
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forget that the speech is about “The Writer and War” and that problems of fascism are not reduced to 
“fascist states” or particular nations but extended to writers’ attitudes such as cowardice, treachery 
and selfishness, in remaining in “positions to be held by the typewriter.”  
 Before Hemingway’s speech, Joris Iven, who filmed the civil war with him, showed the 
movie The Spanish Earth, which Hemingway narrated. Iven explained that the film “tried not 
merely to show people fighting, and the dead, but why the people were fighting” (Hart, Writer 207). 
The main purpose of the film is to reveal the intervention of German and Italian military in the civil 
war and the struggle of the Spanish people in both the country and the city against unofficial foreign 
invasion. Hemingway as narrator identifies the enemies as “professional soldiers fighting against a 
people in arm” “with the constant aid of Italy and Germany.” Germany and Italy did not officially 
admit their involvement in the civil war until an armistice during which members of the 
International Brigades were dismissed. Thus, the film was very important in telling the truth about 
German and Italian involvement. Also, the way this truth was presented is notable. The narrative of 
the film presents scenes from the perspectives of the Spanish Republic including villagers of 
Fuenteduena and townspeople of Madrid. However, the narrator implies that soldiers on the fascist 
side are not so different in term of social class from those on the Republican side. The narrator, for 
example, refers to prisoners’ statement that “they signed to work in Ethiopia” and claims with letters 
of enemy soldiers that “all the letters we read were sad.”10 This scene indicates that the Italian 
soldiers at the front were not in a position of knowing where or whom they were attacking. The film 
reinforces the similar circumstances faced by soldiers by showing a young solider named Julian, 
writing a letter at the front line early in the film. If we can admit that all art is propaganda, as we 
will discuss in Chapter 5, Hemingway’s speech and film are propaganda with anti-fascist messages. 
But, we must be aware that what he calls the truth is the complicated and difficult nature of the war 
and humanity, and compare this to what the political camp tried to publicize.11   
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 The problems of total war as it pertains to belief and lie are observable in Hemingway’s 
play, whose title, The Fifth Column, clearly signifies the presence of spies on both sides and the 
absence of a clear boundary separating foe from ally.12 The setting is Madrid under the Republican 
rule. There are spy-civilians inside Madrid who work with the Nationalists against the Republicans. 
Petra, a hotel servant in the play, explains, “they always shoot from windows at night during a 
bombardment. The fifth column people. The people who fight us from inside the city” (54). The 
protagonist Philip Rawlings is working in counter-espionage which detects Nationalist spies within 
the city. Even though the main plot is Philip’s struggle to arrest the members of the fifth column, the 
language the characters employ always contains an irresolvable tension produced by the invisible 
spies. The most distinct embodiment of this tension is Philip himself. Philip is split into two 
different personalities, which troubles his girlfriend Dorothy Bridges and himself. Dorothy asks 
Philip to stop acting as “A Madrid playboy” (26) and recommends that he write “[n]ovels and 
articles and a book on this war perhaps” (28) without knowing that Philip’s duties lie with 
counter-espionage. Philip hesitates to accept her suggestion and later asks her to move out of the 
hotel after the assassination of Philip’s subordinate, Wilkinson. Philip tells Dorothy “I can’t ever 
talk to any one” (28), which suggests he is unable to tell the truth, at least in this play. The only way 
to state the truth is a self-contradictory way: “Every night I ask her to marry me, and every morning 
I tell her I don’t mean it” (91-92). While his night-time personality craves to marry the heroine 
Dorothy, his other personality dismisses the proposal as impossible.   
 As the sense of duality or implicitness in the characters and their statements dominates the 
whole atmosphere of the play, Dorothy is suspected of being a spy. Dorothy buys a fur coat made of 
fox, which is metaphorically connected to slyness and thus spy activity. When Max, a German spy 
working with Philip, tells Philip “[t]his girl [Dorothy] is all right?...You must remember I have 
never seen so many foxes” (78), Max implies that Dorothy may be a spy. However, the play 
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concludes with the implication that the collaborator with the fifth column is Anita, another female 
character, a “Moorish tart,” who was Philip’s ex-girlfriend. Philip asks Anita “was the water hot?” 
(100), indicating that she was now in a difficult situation. And because Max, who cannot bear the 
scene of torture, begs Philip “I go. Please, please, please, I go” (100), the audience may anticipate 
that torture may follow the ending of the play. Even though Anita’s real identity is not verified 
explicitly—she only says to Philip that she thought he would “tell how you catch all the people of 
the Fifth Column” (92)—the play ends with Philip suspecting that she has blown his cover. The 
problem under total war is that the characters constantly lie in order to know the truth and thus 
expect that others are doing the same. Detecting a lie is never simple: undercover agents are never 
confident that their knowledge is really the truth. Philip confesses that he knows “a couple of 
definite people. I mean sort of by classes” (44). Just like the fifth column members who would shoot 
a man if “they could see he was a working man from his clothes” (54), Philip is unable to determine 
the definitely “fascist” spies except in terms of abstract categories of “classes.” The play does not 
portray people being too gullible to believe lies or enemy propaganda, but it portrays characters who 
are so obsessed with the detection of lies that the acts of detection paradoxically creates an 
atmosphere of pretention and deception.  
The most important paradox, and that which makes a love relationship between Philip and 
Dorothy is impossible, is that the more personal and intimate feelings language expresses, the 
further language deviates from the original intention. In military situations where unintentional 
failure to fulfill an obligation cannot be distinguished from deliberate treachery, statements of 
personal feelings or intentions are interpreted as nothing more than excuse or fabrication. As Philip 
states to his subordinate, “discipline is kindness” (21); any means to make people obey the rules is 
“kindness,” and “kindness” can be one of the ways to discipline others to follow orders. Once an 
intimate feeling such as “kindness” is expressed to other people, the expression assumes a surplus 
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meaning because of the covert atmosphere of spies and gains the potential to be misunderstood as 
something other than an intimate feeling. From the perspective of spies, the more intimate feelings 
the statement expresses, the more valuable and useful it becomes. However, from the perspective of 
lovers, these surplus meanings generate a suspicion that disturbs belief in an intimate relationship.  
This paradox in language usage is evident in the last scene, where Philip, who decided to 
leave Dorothy, remarks to a crying Dorothy that “[t]hat’s a commodity you shouldn’t pay too high a 
price for” (98). Dorothy interprets this remark as his pointing to her uselessness in war situations 
and reflects his question back to him: “Did it ever occur to you that you’re a commodity, too?” (98) 
Laughing, he replies that “No. But I see it the way you put it” (99). His reply connotes that Dorothy 
has misunderstood his statement in the sense that she thinks she is cheap and replaceable, while he 
has evaluated himself in the sense that he as a spy is worthless and replaceable. In spite of her 
response, Philip’s statement can be contrived as an expression of his intimate feelings. Because 
Philip has his true identity revealed, he has to “pay too high a price for” continuing the relationship 
with Dorothy. As long as he can decide not to act dutifully for “a commodity,” he paradoxically 
claims her worth to him: If he should pay too high a price for her, she is not different from other 
duties that he has to follow with superficial kindness. Dorothy somewhat realizes this paradox when 
she says to Philip, “[y]ou’re frightful when you’re kind. Only kind people should try being kind” 
(99). Dorothy does not interpret his expression of “kindness” as his love for her. We as readers 
cannot exactly determine what Philip’s real intension is, but Hemingway’s play does show that 
intimate connection through language is risky in the atmosphere of the fifth column which exploits 
intimacy for war maneuvers.   
 In dealing with the Spanish Civil War, Hemingway takes different approaches to the 
complex situations in the total war that eradicates a clear boundary between the true and the false. In 
particular, the roles of espionage are not limited to stealing useful information through deception: 
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deception affects the whole atmosphere of conversations and human relationships. In this 
atmosphere, it is difficult to describe the truth of an intention or experience because their factual 
description, by force of circumstance, is charged with a suspicion that produces surplus meanings. 
Michael Szalay incisively argued that writers like Hemingway “embraced literary objecthood 
for…releas[ing] the writer[s] from dependence on invariably equivocal markets” and an “audience” 
whose literary standards seem contingent and arbitrary (266). But, Szalay misses his own point 
when he claims that “[a]ccording to Hemingway, the alteration of any one word means that the 
whole story is altered, reinforcing the idea that every word is irreplaceable and fundamentally 
necessary to a text’s identity” (96). Even though Szalay observes in Hemingway’s works the 
author’s attention to the mediating functions of market and audience, it is not necessary to come to 
the conclusion that Hemingway’s formal invention is to balance the relationship between the parts 
and the whole and to preserve the integrity of literary works in face of these arbitrary standards. 
Hemingway’s works about the Spanish Civil War, including The Fifth Column and For Whom the 
Bell Tolls, however, emphasize his interest in the mediating functions of spies, propaganda, and 
(self-)censorship that complicate the communication process between the characters as well as 
between the writer and his audience. From this perspective, Hemingway’s formal innovation is less 
for the protection of his textual integrity and more for his audience to understand abundance of 
deceptions and dualities in a “total war.”  
 
4. Duality and Voice in For Whom the Bell Tolls (1940)  
 The most important technique employed by Hemingway in FWTBT as a literary work 
whose generic characteristics are different from his speeches, dispatches, and play is an interior 
soliloquy denoting the gap between action and intention. The interior soliloquy demonstrates an 
emotional affinity between the opposing political camps and a self-conscious distance toward the 
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causes of political parties. Critics have recognized the elements of hesitation or duality in this 
interior soliloquy and concluded that the use of inner voices was Hemingway’s chosen method for 
breaking away from political ideology, to focus on the individual experience. Edmund Wilson 
evaluates the soliloquy as an impediment to the flow and scale of the narrative: “the author has not 
found out how to mold or to cut the interior soliloquies of his hero. Nor are the excursions outside 
the consciousness of the hero, whose point of view comprehends most of the book, conducted with 
consistent attention to the symmetry and point of the whole” (887). Because characters express their 
inner conflict through soliloquies, this technique may have allowed the writer Malcolm Cowley to 
project a sense of rationalization in what he calls “the philosophy of Nevertheless…the only 
possible philosophy for a fighting man who also wants to remain intelligent and clear-sighted” 
(Think Back 362). For example, “Jordan tells himself that there are good and evil on his side; 
nevertheless he had balanced them together and has found that the good predominates” (362). With 
the analysis of the protagonist Robert Jordan’s soliloquy, Ichiro Takayoshi expounds on the 
two-steps rational resolutions of his inner conflict: “The first rationale—the civil war as a ‘holding 
attack’ against global fascism—prompts Jordan to volunteer in the first place and exhorts him to 
stay in the fight. The second, fallback rationale—soldierly pragmatism—helps Jordan rationalize the 
action he continues to take after the persuasiveness of the first discourse wears off” (121). For 
Takayoshi, the soliloquy reveals Hemingway’s justification of war actions through the mixing of 
anti-fascist and pragmatist rationalization. Contrary to Wilson’s argument, this section asserts that 
the interior soliloquy and limited points of view in the novel do convey a specific sense of dilemma 
that many participants of the Spanish Civil War might confront in the eyes of Hemingway. Taking 
account of the conflicting dualities suggested by Takayoshi and Cowley, this section illustrates that 
soliloquies are a significant narrative form of the novel employed to portray situations of the total 
war rather than to rationalization of war actions.  
117 
 
 At first, the third-person narrative voice shifts to the second-person narrative to reflect 
internal monologues, and this allows the reader to surmise that statements made by characters often 
differ from their actual personal intentions. This is most obvious in the protagonist Robert 
Jordan—an American who taught Spanish in college and volunteered to fight under the command of 
the Comintern. He keeps saying that he does not believe in the cause of Communism,13 but because 
only Russia decided to intervene in the Spanish Civil War, Robert has no choice but to work as an 
agent of the Comintern. His inner dialogue is developed: for example, his internal voice enters the 
narrative when he encounters Pablo, a guerilla leader. The narrative shifts to the second-person 
voice to illustrate Robert’s inner voice telling him not to trust Pablo easily: “No, he said to himself, 
don’t fool yourself. You do not know how he [Pablo] was before” (16). His internal voice is a 
commanding influence, demanding that Robert accomplish his military operation. There are many 
occasions where Robert’s inner voice talks to him in the second person as if someone outside of 
himself is trying to convince him. The second-person pronoun used by his inner voice is juxtaposed 
with his first-person voice: “You’re a bridge-blower now. Not a thinker. Man, I’m hungry, he 
thought. I hope Pablo eats well” (17). This example represents a narrative form that splits Robert 
into two selves, “I” and “you,” as he engages himself in a dialogue.  
 Even though the narrator does not have access to the inner minds of all characters, internal 
voices reveal the erosion of the boundary separating friend from foe in two important characters. 
One character is Anselmo, an illiterate guide and naïve and egalitarian ex-peasant, and the other is 
Lieutenant Berrendo, who is on the nationalist side supported by fascism. Anselmo and Berrendo 
are the Spanish citizens who have been drawn into a war and divided into two different 
camps—either the Spanish Republic or Nationalist Spain. In Chapter 15, the soliloquy of Anselmo, 
who is overseeing an enemy’s post in the freezing night, acknowledges the indistinct line separating 
him from his enemy: “I have watched them [guards at the post] all day and they are the same men 
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that we are….It is only orders that come between us. Those men are not fascists. I call them so, but 
they are not. They are poor men as we are. They should never be fighting against us and I do not 
like to think of the killing” (192-93). The narrator also provides the interior voice of Berrendo, who 
reluctantly gives orders to decapitate his three enemies, who were killed by bombs during an air 
attack: “taking the heads is barbarous. But proof and identification is necessary…There are those of 
them who like such things” (326). From Robert’s perspective, the decapitations reinforce the image 
of abominable fascists. However, the narrator’s interposition between each side implicates an 
indistinctiveness of motives related to military actions: low-rank soldiers execute brutality in the 
name of fighting against “them” with a sense of guilt. 
 The dividing line between the Republicans and the Nationalists is contingent on a familial 
background, not determined by political conviction. The inner thoughts of Andrés, a guerrilla fighter 
dispatched to deliver Robert’s message to a higher official, also mentions the contingency of his 
position: “If our father had not been a Republican both Eladio [his brother] and I would be soldiers 
now with the fascists and if one were a soldier with them then there would be no problem” (367). It 
would be easier for the guerilla members to engage themselves in the war if antagonistic relations 
between communism and fascism—between the Republicans and the Nationalists—were as clearly 
delineated as each political discourse might suggest. But, this clear delineation does not seem true to 
Robert and other soldiers, who, from time to time, glimpse their indistinctiveness from their 
supposed enemies. The characters of both camps work for their own camps without fully identifying 
with the political cause. Andrés also claims in his mind that “I believe truly in the cause” and “the 
fascists attacked and made our decision for us” (367). However, his inner voice, using the 
second-person, makes his heroic decision into obscene jokes: “You have a message to give away. 
And you’re full of crap that you can give to the earth….You can anoint it also with urine” (368). 
Ranging from self-reflection and self-accusation to self-mockery, the inner voices allow the 
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characters to create a space in the cause of their respective political camps and provide the reader 
with a sense of difference between intention and action.    
 From the perspective that sees duality in the inner voice, whole scenes of the novel turn 
into situations full of deception and counter-deception. From the beginning of the novel, Robert 
avoids being suspected as a spy by refusing to know Golz’ overall offensive plan because only in 
this way he can prove that “it was not me that talked” (7). Frenando reported that in La Granja there 
was a rumor that “the Republic is preparing an offensive” (81) and “the Republicans would try to 
blow up the bridges” (82). Although it is not clear whether the reports reflect mere rumor 
originating in a contingent guess or accurate information gained and spread by spies, this episode 
makes it plain that Robert’s worries about spy activity might spoil his mission. And Robert’s 
suspicion of spy activity shifts onto Pablo. Moreover, Karkov, who calls himself a journalist (244), 
suggests that anyone has the potential to become a fascist conspirator either by intention or by being 
falsely accused (247). Karkov, though a journalist, once destroyed all evidence “of any Russian 
intervention to justify an open intervention by the fascists” (237). This incident hints that he is 
engaged in espionage and has significant authority over the course of military operations. Karkov 
claims to “make jokes sometime” and to “make jokes in joke” (245), and his conversations with 
Robert are so equivocal and perplexing that Robert as well as the reader are unable to distinguish 
joke from truth. Preventing his words from being taken seriously, Karkov creates cynical distance 
between himself and what he says or what others say. These descriptions in the novel draw our 
attention to the sensitivity of conversation in espionage: in such situations, it can be fatal to take 
words literally. Therefore, it is inadequate to conclude, as some critics have done, that the novel is 
another debunking novel about a corrupt Republic. 
 If a conversational atmosphere filled with deception produces duality or equivocality in 
some characters, it is also possible that other main characters, such as Maria, Pablo and Pilar, have 
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their own rhetorical strategies to cope with the deceptions. Robert finds it difficult to interpret 
Pablo’s intentions through his speech throughout the novel. For instance, in Chapters 16 and 17, 
Robert cannot determine whether Pablo is or pretends to be a drunk horse lover who lost his courage. 
Pablo’s words and actions do not correspond: he claims he does “not provoke” when he actually 
insults other guerilla fighters (214). The guerilla fighters interpret his words as a sign of incoherence 
and timidity that would disturb their collective action and they decide to kill him. Right before the 
fighters execute Pablo, Robert realizes that “there are not going to be any shooting matches or 
monkey business in here with that dynamite around either. Pablo thought of that, of course” (221). 
Robert infers that Pablo had outwited him despite seeming drunk and unaware of the dynamite. If 
the fighters had taken Pablo’s insult literally, they might all have been dead at that point.   
 A similar point can be made with Maria and Pilar. Critics have opined that Maria is the 
weakness of the novel because her submissiveness to Robert appears extremely passive and 
innocent to the point of absurdity. But, is she really a docile girl? Does she really fall in love with 
Robert at first sight? Why does she trust Robert and have a sexual relationship with him even 
though she has a painful memory of sexual abuse by the enemies? On the first night, Maria tells 
Robert of Pilar’s advice that “nothing is done to oneself that one does not accept and that if I 
[Maria] loved someone it would take it all away” (73). In other words, if she does not accept what 
she experienced and if she loves someone, she will get away from “it.” What these pronouns, 
“nothing” or “it,” substitute for cannot be specified. Yet, she has her own interests beyond her 
spontaneous desire to have a relationship with him. Pilar also uses equivocal pronouns: “There is 
always something like something that there should not be. But with me there is not. Truly there is 
not. I want thy [Maria’s] happiness and nothing more” (162). While Pilar claims that she is not 
tortillera [lesbian], the relationship between Maria and Pilar is undoubtedly more than friendship. 
The reader may infer that Maria approaches Robert because Pilar orders her to do so. Pilar creates 
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equivocality by palm reading. By palm reading, she can pretend to know his future. She later 
confides to Robert that “[i]n regard to that thing of the hand. That is all gypsy nonsense that I make 
to give myself an importance” (387). Robert cannot determine whether her confession is true or 
false. At the end of the story, the internal voice brings up the palm reading again as if he believes 
she had truly learned something from his palm: “She was afraid maybe I believed it. I don’t though. 
But she does. They see something. Or they feel something” (486).14 As internal voices emphasize 
the duality of personalities in Robert, Anselmo and Berrendo as well as the similarity between 
opposing camps, other characters whose internal voices are not revealed to the reader employ 
rhetorical strategies to obscure their real intentions. Karkov is a cynical joker. Pablo is a drunk fool. 
Maria is an obedient girl. Pilar is a superstitious poet. For the reader as well as for Robert, it is 
necessary to make sure that what is said is true, however unsuccessful we may be in doing so within 
the deceptive atmosphere where it can be fatal to take words literally. 
 
5. Obscenity in the Internal Voice 
As we have seen so far, there is no simple correspondence between action and belief in 
FWTBT. Rather, the characters in the novel act with intention to hide intention in the fear that a 
revelation of one’s intention makes an individual vulnerable to others’ control and to guilt. 
Propaganda can exploit an object of belief to manipulate believers so characters attempt to distance 
themselves from any ideology. Even when they proclaim personal belief, there is a hint of aloofness 
or artificiality in the statements as if the proclamation is not meant to be taken seriously. Whatever 
their intentions may be and however disadvantageous their positions may be, Robert and his band 
end up executing their plan. Although none really believe in the political cause, the way they have to 
pretend that they believe and act according to orders from the political party is dubious. The 
paradox in the novel is that people are contingently divided into two camps to kill each other, and 
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this contingency is translated into the premise that the other sincerely believes in an ideology and 
therefore deserves to be fought against, in contrast to “we” who simply follow orders. The 
character’s internal distances from political, religious, or social ideologies lead them to separate “us” 
from “our” enemy by believing that the enemy enjoys killing people. Therefore, it is necessary for 
“us,” at least on the surface, to adhere to orders to maintain that distance from “our” enemies. This 
internal distancing brings about the intervention of internal voices, which find culpability in soldiers’ 
reasoning and paradoxically induce more violence.  
The uncanny aspect of soliloquy is especially resonant in Robert’s internal thoughts. What 
seems to be his own soliloquy emerges as a strange entity when Robert spend that first night with 
Maria and wakes up to the sound of enemy planes: “They [enemies] can’t know about the attack, he 
told himself and something in him said, why can’t they? They’ve known about all the others” 
(76-77). This inner statement is important both because Robert suspects the presence of spies and 
because this “something in him” contradict his original thought. This voice sounds both intimate 
and alien; intimate because it seems a logical conclusion after putting his thoughts together; alien 
because it gives him an opposing opinion. After the long soliloquy, which goes on for two pages, the 
narrator suddenly asks, “who censored his thinking,” and answers, “[n]obody but himself” (135-36). 
Robert’s internal voice is a kind of self-censorship. But, this censorship operates with a totally 
different purpose than the censorship required at wartime.  
At one time, when Robert attempts to distinguish “us” from “them” by referring to 
barbarity inherited from old religion, his inner voice eradicates the distinction; it urges him to 
“admit that you have liked to kill as all who are soldiers by choice have enjoyed it at some time 
whether they lie about it or not” (297). At another time, the voice throws the heavy weight of 
responsibility onto Robert: “No, himself said. You have no right to forget anything. You have no 
right to shut your eyes to any of it nor any right to forget any of it nor to soften it nor to change it. 
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Shut up, he told himself. You’re getting awfully pompous. Nor ever to deceive yourself about it, 
himself went on” (304). In this scene, the voice finds guilt in Robert’s murder as well as murders 
done by others but indirectly related to him, such as the peasant family that was shot because they 
gave Robert a place to hide. At another time, the voice commands him not to think too much but to 
concentrate on the mission: “[D]o not start deceiving yourself into thinking you won’t have to blow 
it....It is not you who decides what shall be done. You follow orders. Follow them and do not try to 
think beyond them” (335). His inner voice becomes less unfamiliar to himself until he sounds 
“schizophrenic” (394) or like he has a complete split within him. This is not the set of multiple 
voices of actual and historical people whom James H. Meredith argues Robert embodies. Rather, his 
inner voice bombards various injunctions and intensifies his sense of guilt.  
The uncanny voice of Robert ultimately manifests itself as a conflicting representation of 
his father and grandfather. Robert remembers his grandfather as a great soldier in the American 
Civil War. However, Robert considers his father a coward who, even though he fought in “the War,” 
killed himself after coming back home. These two soldiers give two different meanings to war in the 
novel. The grandfather represents an ideal soldier who bravely performs his duty to achieve a 
victory and survives the war. The father represents an ethical and emotional excess that spoils 
veterans. The grandfather’s achievement looks splendid to Robert while the father’s agony implies 
the underside of his “achievement.” Robert feels confident and encouraged by thinking of his 
grandfather, but thinking of his father offends Robert’s mood. Robert “understood his father and he 
forgave him everything and he pitied him but he was ashamed of him” (340). Although he is 
sympathetic to his father’s troubles, his inner voice advises him not to think of it: “You better not 
think at all, he told himself….When you have been concentrating so hard on something you can’t 
stop and your brain gets to racing like a flywheel with the weight gone. You better just not think” 
(340). To avoid the interference of ethical and emotional considerations with the mission, he refuses 
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to deliberate on the death of his father and the possible real meanings of his mission. 
Because of this internal voice and the sense of guilt embodied by his father, Robert, as a 
representative of other soldiers in the same situation, formally clings to external orders in order to 
relieve his guilt. As argued above, the internal voices in the novel function to abolish the boundary 
between allies and foes. What is most terrifying for Robert and the guerilla fights is not the fear of 
being killed, but rather an enjoyment of killing. What they regard as the proof that separates them 
from their enemies is the cruelties of their enemies. Anselmo concede that he killed “Many times 
and will again. But not with pleasure and regarding it as a sin” (42). In place of cruelty, Anselmo, 
who claims “I can do anything that I am ordered,” and Robert wish for orders from above to avoid 
personal responsibility: “he told himself, and there is not you, and there are no people that things 
must not happen to. Neither you nor this old man is anything. You are instruments to do your duty” 
(43). Agustín, another guerrilla fighter, explains a similar fear to Robert: “Fear and the other. And in 
his life there is no stronger thing than the other” (286). Listening to Agustín’s remark of “the other,” 
Robert contemplates the difference between him and his enemies: “We do it coldly but they do not, 
nor ever have. It is their extra sacrament” (286). While Robert asserts he does not have “the other” 
which “they” have, his inner voice coerces him to “admit that you have liked to kill as all who are 
soldiers by choice have enjoyed it at some time whether they lie about it or not” (287). In other 
words, the internal voice points out that Robert murders for personal enjoyment, if not under forced 
orders or for political cause. After the bridge was destroyed at the cost of Anselmo’s life, Robert 
renounces his responsibility for his death by shifting the blame onto Pablo or the snow and by 
suppressing his inner self: “Once you saw it again as it was to others, once you got rid of your own 
self, the always ridding of self that you had to do in war. Where there could be no self. Where 
yourself is only to be lost” (447). In war, it is so unbearable to take on all the responsibility of 
individual action that soldiers follow orders to renounce the self.  
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Hence, Robert’s internal voices are not simply his moral conscience or Hemingway’s 
attempt to debunk the whole political maneuver of the Spanish Civil War. They cannot be reduced to 
his personal desires or to social norms. They are derived from forging the distinction between allies 
and foes and from killing enemies in the name of a political cause, an excess of belief embodied in 
conduct. Any conduct based on a belief results in the production of more than the expected 
consequences. Since the consequences of actions never quite follow the intentions behind the 
actions, the characters tend to distance themselves from belief by substituting external orders for 
intentions and by unconsciously believing that it is others who act on their beliefs. Allowing the 
soldiers to simultaneously renounce their own possession of a belief and to hold a belief creates a 
motivation for them to deal with those—usually enemies—who supposedly believe. However, the 
internal voices take advantage of this dilemma and bring out the guilt of self-deception concealing a 
belief. What was previously felt as an internal voice becomes so foreign that it forces the self to 
dissipate.  
 At the very end of the novel, the uncanny voice is represented as a broken bone stuck 
against Robert’s leg skin. Its malignance is implied in the description of Robert’s broken leg, which 
gives him pain from within his body. “It was as though there was a new joint in it; not the hip joint 
but another one that went sideways like a hinge” (461). The voice comes out of a new joint! The 
broken bone is a part of Robert’s body but feels “as though it were not part of his body” (467). His 
monologue is more like a dialogue between him and an anonymous voice. The voice is 
simultaneously a part and non-part of his body. He talks to himself as if demanding permission to 
kill himself, and the voice in italics replies to Robert to discourage him from suicide.  
His leg was hurting very badly now. The pain had started suddenly with the swelling after 
he had moved and he said, Maybe I’ll just do it now. I guess I’m not awfully good at pain. 
Listen, if I do that now you wouldn’t misunderstand, would you? Who are you talking to? 
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Nobody, he said. Grandfather, I guess. No Nobody. Oh bloody, I wish that they would come. 
(469: italics in orig.)   
The sense of Robert being tempted to commit suicide in the sentence “I’ll just do it now” is obvious. 
Robert, who despises his father’s suicide as an act of cowardice, happens to be in a situation where 
the suffering is unbearable enough for him to wish to die. He worries that his suicide to be 
“misunderstood,” as was father’s. Until then, he presupposes the anonymous voice to be his 
grandfather’s. But, the italicized voice coming from his innermost mind assumes obscenity as it 
drives Robert to more violence: “And if you wait and hold them up even a little while or just get the 
officer that may make all the difference. One thing well done can make—” (470: italics in orig.). 
Even though the last statement urges him to wait for “the officer,” the fact that the coming officer is 
Lieutenant Berrendo implies a disappointing consequence: Berrendo is the one juxtaposed with 
Anselmo.     
This anonymous voice censors the culpability of Robert’s inner thoughts and generates 
guilty and “painful” feelings for Robert to enjoy—although, of course, it is impossible for him to 
enjoy these feelings. In order to examine how this sinner voice operates here, the theory of the voice 
by contemporary philosopher Mladen Dolar is extremely useful because it points to a vicious cycle 
perpetuated by failure, deception, and guilt: “It is a voice that always reduces the subject to guilt, 
and the guiltier we are the guiltier we will become, in a self-propelling process; we even relish our 
self-reproaches and our failures” (99). Too many moral injunctions suspend ethical thoughts on the 
subject and put pressure on the subject to renounce its own pleasures, attained by the pursuit of the 
desire. Dolar borrows a term from psychoanalysis to designate this kind of moral injunctions a 
“super-ego.” At first glance, the super-ego seems to be an internal voice, which saves the subject 
from the potential of transgressing moral or political norms. But, every subject is, in some way or 
other, posited as guilty from a viewpoint of the superego, which functions to increase guiltiness. It 
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finds enjoyment in the very renunciation of desire, and the belief in a certain cause is the very desire 
under which warfare is conducted since it motivates action. It is then comprehensible why Robert 
and other characters must attach themselves to the party even after its cause becomes absurd and 
impossible to them. It is unbearable for them to detach from ideology and thus to face the 
super-egoistic injunctions that constantly bring into question responsibility for war crimes. The 
party provides formal purposes and meaning that allows them to fend off the direct confrontation of 
their guilt. What sustains communal ties in FWTBT is guilt, rather than political ideologies or rage 
against fascism. 
 The reader also encounters an injunction from the obscene voice that forbidding us to 
derive a privileged position from reading the moral failures of characters. In Chapter 42, because 
André Marty delays Andrés’s dispatch, which would change the course of the war if it reached Golz, 
some readers might interpret Marty’s error as a corrupted side of the Republic. The narrator, mostly 
uses the past tense throughout the novel except for internal monologues, adds the following, in the 
present tense, as if preempt possible accusations by the reader toward Marty:  
It is doubtful if the outcome of Andrés’s mission would have been any different if he and 
Gomez had been allowed to proceed without André Marty’s hindrance. There was no one at 
the front with sufficient authority to cancel the attack. The machinery had been in motion 
much too long for it to be stopped suddenly now. There is a great inertia about all military 
operations of any size. But once this inertia has been overcome and movement is under 
way they are almost as hard as to arrest as to initiate [emphasis added]. (FWTBT 440-441)  
This passage conveys an aphorism to the reader: we should not expect war in general to be under 
the control of any human agency. It stubbornly refuses the comfortable position of judge that would 
allow the reader to regard him/herself as the very incarnation of good. As the guerilla fighters and 
their enemies do not know how to stop the cycle of violence, the war machine keeps moving 
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irrationally and without a cause. This irrationality, which the narrative voice points out from the 
omniscient perspective, may seem too abstract and universal to be true and convincing. However, 
the relationships of the characters in the novel concretize this irrational machinery at the moment 
when each takes a cynical distance between themselves and the cause and attributes one’s own 
responsibility to someone else.     
 
6. Faith in the Bell 
 The fact that there is no moral resolution but only a vicious cycle of violence and deception 
in FWTBT returns us to the epigraph of the novel because the epigraph urges us to accept “any mans 
death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind.” Reading these fictitious accounts of 
complicated situations in the Spanish Civil War, the reader is required to take a route different from 
what the protagonist Robert Jordan has taken to understand the deceptions, troubles, and dilemmas. 
Although Robert stops further attempts to penetrate the minds of Spanish people, he proclaims that 
“to understand is to forgive” (355). Robert is also unable to understand his father and therefore to 
forgive him. The unforgiven element of the father returns to Robert as an obscene voice that 
prohibits suicide. Because he cannot understand his father’s troubles or the dilemma of modern war, 
suicide is an unforgivable action for Robert. As the novel progresses, it is the reader, rather than 
Robert, that achieves the deeper understanding necessary to dispel the obscene voice.  
 The strange absence of the bell is the most significant when we think about the novel in 
terms of the title and the epigraph. Instead of a bell that tolls, it is the airplanes that announce good 
or bad news to those who can hear. After the mission is over, many airplanes fly above Robert and 
the survivors as if his mission had resulted in more horrifying retaliation: 
He had the feeling of something that had started normally and had then brought great, 
outsized, giant repercussions. It was as though you had thrown a stone and the stone made 
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a ripple and the ripple returned roaring and toppling as a tidal wave. Or as though you 
shouted and the echo came back in rolls and peals of thunder, and the thunder was deadly. 
Or as though you struck one man and he fell and as far as you could see other men rose up 
all armed and armored. He was glad he was not with Golz up at the pass. (451) 
Where John Donne’s bell tolls for the death of others for their communal ties, the airplanes convey a 
portent of death and the destruction of communities. The significance of the absent bell-toll in 
FWTBT can be found in the historical account of the social role that bells played in the lives of the 
people of the pre-modern world. In his book Village Bells, Alain Corbin, though not referring to 
Spain or to Hemingway’s works, reminds us that bells had the function of disseminating messages 
and of connecting communal ties.15 The sound of bells embodied various rhetoric related to the 
sensibility of local inhabitants. For example, with bells, a person’s death is communal, not familial 
or private. Philippe Ariès, in his book The Hour of Our Death, traces the historical process of 
separating death from daily life and an increased feeling of awe at death as a consequence of this 
separation. In the twentieth century, we deceived ourselves about the awe of death with anesthesia 
or deathbed lies. Walter Benjamin also observes the decay of stories with death’s recession from the 
public space and in new communication technology since the nineteenth century. According to 
Benjamin, the authority which death gives to a story is the core of story itself. When lies and 
information replace the stories of those on their deathbed, death no longer gives authority to stories 
and, as a result, communal ties maintained by death are eroded. We shall remember that the novel is 
set in the new and modern-total war, where the communal role of the bell is replaced by the 
airplane.  
 As these scholars’ insights confirm, it is not accidental that airplanes function as a 
substitute for the bell in FWTBT. The sound of bells was taken over by radio waves or airplane 
engines. People had to lose communal ties and adapt to national or military organizations. Political 
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purpose glossed over fear of death and treated death as mere information. With the exception of 
death as information, which is a practical necessity for strategic and militaristic purposes, stories of 
death are powerless and devoid of authority. The problems of “modern war” and “total war” that 
Hemingway strives to represent can be summarized in this separation of story from death. If death is 
only a matter of information, war is a matter of efficiency in breaking up any communal tie by 
substituting lies for stories. This is the context in which Hemingway needed to create a novel 
employing soliloquy. Thus, if we interpret the events in the novel as a depiction of what really 
happened in actual history, we overlook the story itself as well as the genre in which Hemingway 
consciously chooses to convey. FWTBT is supposed to be read as a story, not as information. The 
novel does not assert how horrible and cruel war and deception are or whose faults it is that such 
turmoil is produced and prolonged. Rather, we should understand why the characters come to 
distrust people and how consequences of war actions overwhelm our expectations.    
    
Notes on Chapter 3 
 
1 From his personal letter reprinted in Ernest Hemingway: Selected Letters (480).  
 
2 For example, Macdonald, Sanders, and Baker (esp. ch. 10).  
 
3 In his public speech at the second American Writers’ Congress. It is included in Hart’s The Writer in a Changing 
World as well as republished with the title “Fascism Is a Lie” in New Masses (22 June 1937)  
 
4 The disillusionment of Hemingway is the common topic which stays at the recent work of Scott Donaldson.  
 
5 The facts of the Spanish Civil War are usually treated as a key or a standard to comprehend Hemingway’s 
intention or commitment in FWTBT. (For example, many essays in Sanderson and Josephs.  
 
6 See Ernest Hemingway: Selected Letters, 490.  
 
7 For the relationship between “total war” and “modern war,” see Strachan.  
 
8 Edwin Rolfe also reports the story of Raven’s fate from what he heard in the frontline.   
 
9 On propaganda and cynicism, see Smith, Sproule and Gary.  
 
10 In Chapter 26 of FWTBT, there is a scene in which the protagonist reads an enemy’s letter, revealing the cause 
of the Nationalist side, which is “doing away with the Reds to liberate Spain from the domination of the Marxist 
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hordes” (302-03). For Hemingway, the letters in the novel symbolize an invisible connection between foot soldiers 
rather than a fallacy on the part of the enemy.  
 
11 For a more detailed discussion on The Spanish Earth, including its representational strategy, see Waugh, Tashiro, 
and Guill’s “Now You Have Seen It.”  
 
12 For a historical background that generates the term “fifth column,” see Bolinger and Valis. For an analogical 
reading of the play with Hemingway’s actual life experiences, see Jackson-Schebetta, Washington and Raeburn. 
Nakjavani’s argument of Hemingway’s “esthetics of detective fiction” is instructive in the sense that dramatic 
form is structured to appeal audience.  
 
13 According to Takayoshi, Hemingway changed the original version, which placed Robert’s communist 
affiliation in the foreground at the request of his publisher Scribner (119). 
 
14 According to Thomas E. Gould, Hemingway’s original draft was more explicit about Maria and Pilar’s intimacy. 
From another perspective toward Hemingway’s female characters, see Guill’s “Pilar and Maria.” For Guill, Pilar 
and Maria represent a change in gender relations as Maria with an advice of Pilar develops the sense of agency.  
 
15 Other scholarly studies on the cultural significance of church bells and the devastating impacts of warfare on 
the bells include Richard L. Hernandez and Percival Price.  
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Chapter 4 
The Physics of Laughter:  
Comic Methods in James Thurber  
 
Grace can’t save us unless we save it.1 
James Thurber 
 
1. Comedy as Weapon against Propaganda  
 During the 1930s when comedy was one of the popular genres, there were debates 
over social and political functions in laughter. Since Henri Bergson took laughter seriously 
at length and affected philosophical argument about laughter in the US during the 1930s, 
the significance of laughter has been thought to exceed the matter of individual taste. 
According to Bergson, laughter is not “a strange, isolated phenomenon, without any 
bearing on the rest of human activity” (7), but rather “a sort of social gesture” which 
“restrains eccentricity…and softens down whatever the surface of the social body may 
retain of mechanical inelasticity” (13). Laughter is a social corrective for the individual 
inertia and inattentive routines that interfere with active participation in social life. For 
some American intellectuals of the 1930s, laughter serves as a creative force in the renewal 
of communal life by relaxing the rigidities of convention, law, or prejudice. Borrowing 
theoretical insights from Bergson, Constance Rourke revealed a prototype of American 
culture in humor and insisted on humor’s function to build a communal sensibility of the 
new nation. Humor “has engaged in warfare against the established heritage, against the 
bonds of pioneer existence. Its objective—the unconscious objective of a disunited 
people—has seemed to be that of creating fresh bonds, a new unity, the semblance of a 
society and the rounded completion of an American type” (232). Kenneth Burke, another 
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reader of Bergson, argued for the importance of “comic correctives” during the nation’s 
hard times. Burke, with a slightly different tone from Bergson, accentuates the need for a 
comic framework not to ridicule others into correcting their own wrongdoings, but to 
comprehend our physical existence and to learn from inevitable errors and mistakes, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter.   
 This positive portrayal of the socially harmonizing function of laughter instantly 
shapes its obverse side, where laughter functions to compel people to submit to social 
circumstances and political imperatives without necessitating physical enforcement. 
Bergson does not overlook this negative assumption that laughter can distract our attention 
from social life and indulge us in a dream-like world of play and pleasure: “comic 
absurdity gives us from the outset the impression of playing with ideas. Our first impulse is 
to join in the game. That relieves us from the strain of thinking” (93). Instead of evoking 
thoughts for social life, laughter might become habitual, repetitive, and meaningless. 
Dwight Macdonald, also referring to Bergson, defines laughter as “a defense of the social 
order, like police force” in “societies that are flourishing and hence united” (48).  
In contrast to this “classic formula” of laughter’s policing function, Macdonald 
detects a changing sense of humor in writers contributing to the magazine New Yorker. And, 
this change takes a form of cynicism which reflects the disorganization of society. In the 
New Yorker, Macdonald argues, there is no clear boundary between “a rational observer 
and an irrational person or phenomena” (48). The loss of boundary does not allow an 
observer of comical figures to create distance between comparing norms with comical 
actions and laughing at their own deviation from the norms. The New Yorker’s comedy 
takes “the insufficiency of the norm” into its comic narrative and thus reflects “an accurate 
expression of a decaying social order” (49). Laughter here does not restore order to society, 
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but rather cynically plays with social confusion. Around the end of the 1930s, some 
intellectuals, who partook in propaganda analysis, considered cynical laughter an 
unfavorable behavior which made American citizens vulnerable to an imminent danger.2 
Robert Merton conducted research about propaganda with Paul Lazarsfeld and worried in 
1943 that “[a]ny statement of values is likely to be tagged as ‘mere propaganda’ and at once 
discounted” (Social Theory 524).3 Under such circumstances—the circumstances similar 
to those illustrated by Hemingway in his fiction and reportage as discussed in the last 
chapter—the audience may have no choice but to mock any such statements or social 
norms and, as a result, leave social issues intact. Far from a “neutral” position, laughter 
could function as a mode of escapism where an observer can privately and secretly enjoy a 
sense of resistance toward oppressive forces without any effort to initiate social change.4  
 James Thurber, one of the most famous comic authors to write short pieces for the 
New Yorker, is not an exception to the argument that laughter has both positive and 
negative social meanings.5 Many critics, including Macdonald, admit a shift in the general 
sense of humor during the depression era and judge Thurber to be the most important writer 
in this shift. Norris Yates, for instance, suggested that Thurber incorporated, though 
unsuccessfully, a politically motivated advocacy of freedom into a realistic portrayal of the 
Little Man whose “uncertainty” “was part of a general drift in American humor” (222). 
Thurber’s Walter Mitty, who has amassed sympathetic reactions from readers, is often 
considered to be representative of the Little Man.6 Even though the Little Man’s 
uncertainty might evoke a cynical attitude toward social issues, Thurber’s works are not at 
all cynical or defeatist. Yates argues that “one of Thurber’s masks has been that of a Little 
Man helpless in the grip of nature, his wife, and his own nature; the other, used somewhat 
less often, has been that of a militant of the Progressive-New Deal stamp” (296). Thurber’s 
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works are considered both subversive of and helpless against social order. Richard C. 
Tobias, another literary critic, affirmed that the comic device in Thurber’s works prevented 
them from falling into the category of “propaganda,” which would elicit direct actions. 
“Even when the subjects threaten to come close to us (and some do threaten our moral and 
emotional sensibilities) his saving comic skill pulls them away so that we can preserve a 
proper distance and keep on responding to comedy” (43). Jesse Bier, who defined the 
prominent literary style of interwar humor as a “debunking” mode, observed resistance to 
simplification in Thurber’s works: his “fantastic reversals of political or domestic epigram 
force us to see things the other way around and, in discrediting cherished formulae, educate 
us in the humorous but real complexity” (217). As Bier and Tobias specify the political 
function of Thurber’s comedy as its questioning inadequacy of social norms, their 
recognition implies not only Thurber, but laughter itself creates the potential to convey new 
social awareness to the reader.    
 Although laughter cannot be reduced to a single social function, it is profitable to 
grasp the connection between Thurber’s persistence to comedy and a social function of 
laughter. Critics could recognize Thurber’s political messages against fascism, but hardly 
articulate how his comedy may be effective at the face of an imminent warfare. This is 
partly because Thurber has not directly discussed his works in detail. Yet, Thurber once 
claims that it “is up to our writers, in this era of Oral Culture, to bring back respect for form 
and for the innate stature and dignity of comedy” (Lanterns 147). He thinks that literary 
form is the important element of his works to generate literary effects. Indeed, the 
humorous shares many experiential characteristics with the aesthetic—for instance, 
playfulness, mimicry, unpracticality, imaginativeness, and representativeness. As John 
Morreall in his general view toward the humorous argues that “humor involves not a 
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suspension of reason, but a nonserious use of reason,” comedy enables us to see beyond the 
practical aspects in daily life if seriousness signifies usefulness.7 Kenneth Burke touches 
the reason in comedy when he insisted that comic correctives are meant to help the 
individual “‘transcend’ himself by noting his own foibles” and “to provide a rationale for 
locating the irrational and the nonrational” (Attitudes 171). Through formal device, comedy 
can allow us to comprehend both irrationality and nonrationality—including those of 
practical reasoning.  
 Collaborating with other literary genres such as autobiography, self-help book, and 
fable, Thurber’s comedy not only renders otherwise-embarrassing miscalculation or 
misunderstanding comical, but also gives the reader some insights into fallibility as a basic 
human condition. His comedy is not a twisted imitation of those borrowed generic 
conventions. His comical appropriation of these genres directs our view toward the 
assumptions folded into the genres and opens our minds to the inevitable inconsistency (or 
excessive consistency) which disturbs what is supposed to be the “normally” smooth 
process of human reciprocity. Along with a focus on Thurber’s comic appropriation, this 
chapter argues that Thurber’s comedy allows the reader to touch on cracks in the boundary 
between opposing concepts such as cosmic and mundane, dream and reality, belief and 
disbelief. These cracks, which generic conventions usually hide, are not the cause of human 
wrongdoings but the possibility of establishing cooperative attitudes.     
 
2. Time to Escape in My Life and Hard Times (1933) 
 During the Great Depression, when many writers could not help but pay attention 
to political and social issues, Thurber wrote about the events that happened in the narrow 
sphere of his everyday life and published them as his autobiography. Unlike Dos Passos 
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and Hemingway, who incorporated social issues in their novels, Thurber packed his short 
stories with his life experiences surrounded by new technology, his family members, and 
dogs. My Life and Hard Times, a collection of autobiographical short stories, applies comic 
techniques to the most characteristic of autobiographical themes: the search for identity or 
self. While Thurber’s characters are criticized for refusing to face reality, Thurber 
comically affirms a motivation to escape that represents inherent incongruity in 
identification. As Lovejoy defends the importance of duality and Merton delimits the 
process of unanticipated consequences in our second chapter, Thurber presupposes at least 
two different dimensions which produce incidents that go beyond the actor’s intentions. In 
the introduction of his autobiography, Thurber explains to the reader that a short story is 
“not a joyous form of self-expression but the manifestation of a twitchiness at once cosmic 
and mundane” (138).8 This exaggerated explanation expresses a marionette-like 
characteristic of writers whose “twitchiness” is brought about by pulls from two forces: 
regular everyday life (the mundane) and more comprehensive life (the cosmic), which may 
be abstractly called social or economic structure. His autobiography, therefore, 
demonstrates that these two forces create a situation which provokes a sense of escape or 
elusiveness in characters as well as animals, machines, and language.  
Thurber emphasizes in the introduction that a writer of short stories for 
commercial magazines is not an artists who offers a new political or world vision, but a 
restless individual who is entangled with both cosmic and mundane forces. Ostensibly, the 
short story writer recognizes social issues, but separates him/herself from the writers who 
tackle the larger social life, symbolized as “nation,” “universe,” and “earth” (139). The 
short-story writer is so ill-adapted to regular life that they cannot afford to pay any attention 
to a world larger than their own personal reach. This short-story writer’s inability to go 
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beyond the mundane is humorous when seen within the context of a social background that 
urged writers to take a serious, political action. Even though he left critical comments on 
what he calls “literary communism” for personal letters and a book review on an anthology 
about the proletarian movement,9 Thurber does not simply ridicule the “ideological” works 
of proletarian writers as some critics claim he does. Thurber’s middle-class characters, not 
workers or socially conscious writers, are laughable due to their willful ignorance of social 
issues. The short-story writers are “aware that billions of dollars are stolen every year by 
bankers and politicians, and that thousands of people are out of work” (139), but his 
primary concern about “time” is the fear of wasting time on pointless action. Thus, Thurber 
does not attempt to divide life into the mundane and the cosmic or to isolate his characters 
from social issues. He seems to admit that the strings attached to short-story writers stem 
from both regular life and socio-economic life. They are not separate, but combined (or in a 
sense tangled) to enhance Thurber’s humor.  
 Although Thurber posits these mundane and cosmic aspects of life, his 
autobiographical self-reference and humor confide his lack of intention to create practical 
consequences either for he himself as writer or for his reader. In his introduction, Thurber 
announces that his autobiography is functionally different from other autobiographical 
works that highlight the authors’ excellent accomplishments, joyous self-expression, or that 
paint a picture of the author’s time. In other words, he denies any feasible purpose for his 
autobiography:  
The ‘time’ of such a writer, then, is hardly worth reading about if the reader wishes 
to find out what was going on in the world while the writer in question was alive 
and at what might be laughingly called ‘his best’. All that reader is going to find 
out is what happened to the writer. The compensation, I suppose, must lie in the 
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comforting feeling that one has had, after all, a pretty sensible and peaceful life, by 
comparison. It is unfortunate, however, that even a well-ordered life can not lead 
anybody safely around the inevitable doom that waits in the skies [italics added]. 
(Thurber 139)   
Thurber acknowledges the merit of reading his “time” only in “the comforting feeling” 
which seems unrelated to the actual events of the past world. These quoted passages do not 
specify an object of “comparison” to acquire that feeling. It is possible to assume that by 
comparing his/her own situation to Thurber’s confused experiences the reader may achieve 
a sense of peace. Or, many readers may compare their personal life with “inevitable doom”, 
and interpret Thurber’s comic autobiography as a desperate attempt to seize the day. His 
autobiography, in short, seems to be a form of escape from “the” reality into personal 
fantasy and hilarious experiences even though an eschatological ending pardons any 
escape.10 In a sense, what Robert M. Coates said in 1933 about the autobiography is right: 
Thurber “isn’t really trying to lead anybody anywhere. Mostly, he is trying to escape” 
(138).   
 His escape, however, should not be considered another mode of aestheticism in the 
sense of “pure” comedy dedicated to the principle of pleasure or amusement. His comic 
autobiography is highly conscious of its generic elements of comedy and autobiography. In 
the final chapter, he maintains that he could not write about his life around the time of the 
Great Depression because “the confusions and the panics of last year and the year before 
are too close for contentment” (204). He requires a certain amount of time for “memories 
of blunderings and gropings” to be transformed into “the painstaking examination of 
distress and the careful ordering of event” (204). It is easy to dismiss these passages as 
mere excuses by an aesthetician for evading the social issues of the day. But, we should not 
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ignore his emphasis on the “time” required for a comic retelling of events. The immediacy 
of raw experiences does not bring out an accurate or detailed reflection of those 
experiences. With his statement about time, Thurber emphasizes the gap between a past 
event and its representation, and he incorporates that gap into self-referential elements of 
his autobiography. In other words, Thurber’s comic autobiography accentuates the temporal 
gap that is part of identifying process: there is always a gap between a past occurrence and 
its (comic) meaning because the past experiences that Thurber represents as comic were not 
usually comic for those who were actually experiencing them when they occurred. When 
he proclaims in the introduction that his autobiography is about “his own personal time, 
circumscribed by the short boundaries of his pain and his embarrassment” (138), many 
critics take it at face value and urge us simply to enjoy Thurber’s My Life and Hard Times 
as if his “time” is not really hard times. However, his language, even in the introduction of 
his autobiography, is ambiguous in a sense that we cannot determine whether we should 
take his words at a mundane level or a cosmic level. Tobias points to this ambiguity when 
he remarks that “we do not know whether simply to laugh at the events or whether to look 
beyond for what Thurber may be telling us about our world” (47). His comic treatment 
disturbs the process of identification in autobiography while his comments indicate that his 
own autobiography is not a strict duplication of his past experiences. The comic narrative, 
making good use of time, allows the enjoyment of that moment of almost achievable but 
always slippery correspondence between expectation and consequence or between subject 
and object.  
 “A Note at the End,” the last chapter of Thurber’s autobiography, somehow 
represents what the book is about—the story is about “escape,” and the autobiography itself 
is full of various unsuccessful escapes. In the last chapter, the narrator imagines himself 
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escaping “like a character out of Conrad, silent and inscrutable,” and soon remembers that 
beads salesmen and native women “tried to sell me baskets,” which means that they had no 
problem recognizing him as a tourist (205). He could not escape false identification. He 
reaches the conclusion that “there are always, ready to snap at you, the little perils of 
routine living, but there is no escape in the unplanned tangent, the sudden turn” (206). Both 
Thurber’s narrator and Joseph Conrad’s fictional character, Lord Jim, fantasize an escape a 
routine filled with “little perils,” but it turns out that they are vulnerable to “the unplanned 
tangent, the sudden turn.” At the end of the chapter, Thurber decides not to stay from the 
tour ship to be left out at Martinique, one of the Caribbean islands, and comes back to the 
ship, only to find out “that somebody had stolen the pants to my dinner jacket” (206). 
While Thurber’s “unplanned tangent,” resulting in stolen pants, may not be as tragic and 
remarkable as Lord Jim’s, the narrator cannot escape “the sudden turn” that brings him 
back to the “little perils” of routine. The point in this story is that escape is an act of finding 
an authentic self as well as an elusive characteristic of selfhood during the identification 
process. After he fails to discover individuality free from social norms or routines in a 
foreign country, he is probably determined to content himself with his ordinary life, from 
which he had attempted to escape. The loss of his pants indicates that his tenuous grasp of 
his own self in the first place. So, it is ridiculous of him to go back to his “former” self 
because that self has never existed. He thinks he has escaped from his former self, but from 
a converse viewpoint, his authentic self is constantly escaping his apprehension. 
 By focusing on the personal obsessions of himself and of other characters, 
Thurber’s autobiography demonstrates that escape is the representation of a person’s 
obsessiveness or uniqueness. Contrary to the assumption that escape is an act of cowardice 
or insanity meant to avoid reality, the stories designate characters with personal obsessions, 
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or their own unique ways to cope with reality. Characters are constantly obsessed with 
something through which they comprehend their own experiences. This obsession usually 
comes across as very funny in his stories. For example, each character in “The Night the 
Bed Fell” has an object that occupies their mind. While his “father had decided to sleep in 
attic…to be away where he could think,” his mother worried that “the heavy headboard 
would crash down on father’s head in case the bed fell, and kill him” (141). Her worry 
would not be strange if we ignored the fact that his grandfather, who is obsessed with the 
memory of the American Civil War, usually sleeps in the bed which might fall down. The 
narrator continues naming family members and their obsessions: Briggs Beall, “who 
believed that he was likely to cease breathing when he was asleep;” Aunt Melissa Beall, 
who “suffered under the premonition;” Aunt Sarah Shoaf, who has “the fear that a burglar 
was going to get in;” and Aunt Gracie Shoaf, who also has “a burglar phobia” (141-42). 
Thurber identifies the uniqueness of the characters with relation to the objects of their 
obsessive concerns.   
 In order to become the objects of laughter, these personal obsessions appear 
eccentric only when the methods employed to relieve the worries are unusual. These 
obsessions are logically established by characters in an effort to understand their situation 
and escape from their worries while at the same time, the logic itself seems unpractical to 
the reader. Aunt Sarah and Gracie contrive an unusual counterplot against burglars to 
address their worries: Sarah “always piled her money, silverware and other 
valuables…outside the bedroom,” and Gracie “throw[s] shoes down the hallway” (142). 
The lack of practicality of their solutions as well as their seriousness is meant to provoke 
our laughter. Yet, seen from a different perspective, however faulty their selected means are, 
their efforts to escape their indefinite fear, or “the sudden turn,” are comprehensible and 
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commonplace. Here, Kenneth Burke is helpful in drawing our attention to how accusations 
of “escapism” unfold:  
It is quite normal and natural that people should desire to avoid an unsatisfactory 
situation…. Whereas [the term “escape”] properly applies to all men, here was an 
attempt to restrict its application to some men…. At least, there are many critics 
who avoided telling us precisely what they meant by life, avoidance, and facing 
reality. In this way, through escaping from the difficulties of their critical problem, 
they were free to accuse many writers and thinkers of escape. (Permanence 8)11 
The accusation of escapism, in other words, may be based on mere differences in 
orientation. Using “escape” in a derogative sense comes with the possibility that the user of 
the term is in the same category of “escapist” and thus in another potential object of 
laughter as s/he is also attempting to escape from understanding other people. With 
Thurber’s comedy, we can go a step further and interpret the peculiar (ir)rationality of 
characters as a condition of human interactions.  
 Moreover, the characters, both physically and symbolically, simultaneously take 
action to escape a situation and to catch an escapee. In Chapter 1, which describes the 
father sleeping in the grandfather’s bed, the whole sequence of attempting to escape or to 
make others escape only complicates matters: when Thurber’s cot flips over, his mother 
rushes to the conclusion that the sound came from the father’s bed and that she has to go 
upstairs to save him. Her shouts wake up Herman whose shouts wake Briggs whose 
struggle to get out of bed wakes Thurber who supposes “the whole uproar was being made 
in a frantic endeavor to extricate me from what must be an unheard-of and perilous 
situation” (145). In a sense, none of the characters correctly judge the overall situation. One 
misjudgment elicits another misjudgment, and so on and so forth. The sequence develops 
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when the very act of trying to escape made each situation harder to escaped from. Their 
very efforts to escape added to “the general banging and confusion” (146). The whole 
slapstick sequence results in the mother’s final comment, “I’m glad…that your grandfather 
wasn’t here” (147). This is the highest point of absurdity in the episode because the end of 
story refers to the initial cause of the whole sequence: because of the grandfather’s absence, 
the father has decided to sleep in the grandfather’s bed. Her comment is humorous when 
she sees the actual cause of the whole sequence of events as the blighter side of the 
confusion. So, there is a twisted cycle of cause and effect: because there was no worst case 
(the grandfather is absent), there was, ironically, a whole series of slapstick escapes.  
 Another incidence of a gap in communication generating reality is in Chapter 4, 
“The Night the Ghost Got In,” where a suspicion of the presence of a ghost shifts to a 
suspicion of burglars which shifts to a suspicion of deserters. In his childhood, the narrator 
heard footsteps around the dining table and went to identify the cause. The narrator and his 
brother Herman heard footsteps coming toward them, but did not see figures. Their mother 
also said that she heard footsteps and speculated that they must be from a burglar. She 
throws a shoe to break a neighbor’s window to tell them to call police (165). In an effort to 
identify the cause of suspicion—it is a ghost for the children, a burglar for the 
mother—they unknowingly act as if their expectations actualize the presence of figure they 
suspect to be in the dining room. Even though there is the possibility that they are 
mishearing, the point is that the results of their own imagining are materialized as if there 
actually were ghosts, burglars or deserters, for whom their grandfather mistook the police. 
No one actually confirms the identity of the suspected figures, but the glass of the 
neighbor’s bedroom window shattered, the house looks burglarized, and the police go back 
to the station house. The referential function of a word is suspended while its performative 
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function is fully in effect: the word precedes its referent. The character’s actions, which are 
an attempt to understand the meanings of words that are escaping their understanding, 
simultaneously produce consequences induced by those same words. At the end of Chapter 
4, the grandfather’s inquiry, “[w]hat was the idee [idea] of all them cops tarryhootin’ round 
the house last night?” (168), points to another example of a twisted cycle of the logic: a 
means to solve the problem is the actual cause of the problem. It turns out that what broke 
into the house were not ghosts or burglars, but cops.  
 In these stories,12 Thurber brilliantly shows the creative aspects of symbolic 
dimensions where action and language interact to generate unanticipated consequences. 
Thurber’s comedy exploits a gap in the communication process. Characters wish to escape 
from a situation, but the situation itself is not objective or neutral: it is in the process of 
change as if the situation itself is escaping from characters’ comprehension. Even in the 
mundane realm, there is no harmonious and stable wholeness within a situation upon which 
everyone in that situation can base judgments leading to mutual understanding. Any effort 
to establish order in a situation either complicates further or settles in an unexpected way.      
 Thurber’s stories, therefore, consist not only of cosmic-mundane worlds, but also 
of physical-symbolic escapes. These chapters in the autobiography demonstrate that one of 
Thurber’s comical devices is the semi-autonomous function of communication gaps.13 
While human characters attempt to judge the true meaning of a statement or event, they fail 
to fully grasp it. But, their failures can be made known to them and to the reader only in the 
narrator’s retrospective, which organizes a sequence of miscommunications into a comic 
narrative. The reader may feel amused when these miscommunications elude factual 
grounding. While Bergson may point out that laughter at miscommunication has a 
“corrective” function calling for clear understanding, Alenak Zupančič, a philosopher 
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strong in Lacanian psychoanalysis,  highlights another aspect of laughter in relation to 
excess language usage:   
[W]e don’t laugh simply to mark and “correct” a linguistic fault or deficiency, we 
laugh at “miraculous” occurrence of the surplus-sense that was produced from that 
very failure or nonsense. We don’t laugh because spirit or thought failed to be 
expressed, or didn’t get through correctly, we laugh because a thought or spirit did 
emerge, materialize “out of nothing” (but words). (119)   
This observation well explains Thurber’s representation of the comic sequence because his 
characters obsessively and sometimes mechanically react to their presupposed or possible 
failures, ranging from miscommunication to the malfunction of machines. While the 
surplus sense seems a product of misidentification, this surplus sense of nonsense is a very 
significant element propelling Thurber to prefer a comic narrative to a logical explanation 
of irrationality and nonrationality in human relations.  
 
3. Non-Dupes Err: Let Your Mind Alone! (1937) 
The point of Thurber’s comedy is that there is a moment or a space where 
unexpected surplus of meaning pops up because we are symbolic animals living in society. 
Just like the writing style of John Dos Passos reveals that there are too many motivations 
surrounding our mind, Thurber’s comedy demonstrates that our rational attempt to know 
our reason by directly examining it is often paradoxical and turns out to be irrational. 
Thurber’s Let Your Mind Alone (1937), a collection of popular mental science essays, 
examines the unpracticality of the logic in mental efficiency books whose purpose is to 
make the mind more efficient and practical for happiness. Thurber quotes Professor Walter 
B. Pitkin, a self-help book author, who argues that “all the external conditions required for 
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happy living were present…The only obstacle was a psychological one” (309). The 
professor, who calls his discipline the “Science of Happiness,” thinks highly of scientific 
techniques applied to everyday life in an effort to “modernize” the mind to catch up with 
modern industrial society. As Thurber gives Pitkin and other advocates of mental efficiency, 
various names like “Success Experts,” “Shaper of Success,” or “inspirationalist,” for 
terminological convenience I have chosen to use the designation “inspirationalist” to refer 
to Thurber’s antagonists. Against inspirationalist like Pitkin, Thurber, who again 
appropriates a generic convention, this time critical essay, to his counterargument, proffers 
the thesis that “man will be better off if he quits monkeying with his mind and just lets it 
alone” (309). While Allen Tate in our Chapter 5 boisterously plays up “naturalism” of other 
thinkers, Thurber humorously demonstrates the illogicality or “excess” of the 
inspirationalists’ emphasis of logical thinking, using illustrations of his experiences and 
quotations from self-help books. Kenneth Burke, who reviewed Let Your Mind Alone!, 
asserts that Thurber’s book shows “many paradox” that “the study of mind has brought fore” 
and humorously treat those inspirationalists “who will expend his jocular enterprise to 
vindicate the judgments of common sense” (“Thurber Perfects” 221). As I argued above, 
Thurber affirms with a comic tone the inevitability of miscommunication and misjudgment, 
which literally and symbolically sets us on the run. By defending fantasy and redefining 
mechanical views in the age of electricity, his comic essays in Let Your Mind Alone! 
criticize errors in the inspirationalists’ presupposition that miscommunication can be 
corrected with proper discipline.  
Thurber holds that it is a lack of imagination that enables the inspirationalists to 
think highly of their techniques and to dismiss works of imagination. In Chapter 2, Thurber 
claims that “the problems they set up, and knock down, are in the main unimaginative and 
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pedestrian” (315). He pokes fun at the improbable situations assumed by these authors. 
Quoting passages by inspirationalists, Thurber picks out the unrealistic characterization of 
the obedient woman “who wept with delight when you gave her a smile, and trembled with 
fear at your frown” (315). He produces a counterexample of “a mentally disciplined 
husband with mentally undisciplined wife,” Mr. and Mrs. Conner on whom their friend 
Bert Scursey plays a trick by “pretending to be, and imitating the voice of, a colored 
woman” (316) on the phone. Mr. Harry Conner is familiar with “a theory of logical 
behavior which he had got out of the Mind and Personality books” (317). Provoked by a 
prank call, Mr. Conner goes downstairs to talk to the hotel’s assistant manager, Mr. Bent, 
who is also “a dabbler in psychological books” (319). Even though Misters Conner and 
Bent have learned human psychology from best-selling inspirationalist books, they fail to 
discern Bert Scursey’s mimicry or Mr. Conner’s trouble. Thurber implies a paradox that a 
consistent and efficient thought process is likely to obstruct its own consistency and 
efficiency. Instead of “the streamed mind,” which is too confident in its own efficiency and 
consistency to admit its mistakes, Thurber cherishes the value of an “undisciplined mind:” 
“the undisciplined mind runs far less chance of having its purposes thwarted, its plans 
distorted, its whole scheme and system wrenched out of line. The undisciplined mind, in 
short, is far better adapted to the confused world in which we live today than the 
streamlined mind” (321). Thus, the discipline of a streamlined mind cannot handle the 
unpredictable occurrences resulting from technological advancements, such as the 
telephone or car. Chapter 4, “A Dozen Disciplines,” and Chapter 6, “Anodynes for 
Anxieties,” are Thurber’s criticism against this sort of unpractical, if not impossible, 
discipline of streamlining the mind and to alleviate anxieties. Thurber applies concrete 
counterarguments to imperatives like, “[t]hink one hour a day about one subject exclusively” 
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(327), to insist on their unfeasibility.  
Thurber’s essays take issue with the binary opposition of reality and fantasy, and 
draw attention to the indirect profits of “unprofitable” daydreams or fantasies. He 
complains that the inspirationalists tolerate fantasy only if it has some kind of purposeful 
relation to reality:  
They allow you a certain amount of reverie and daydreaming (no woolgathering), 
but only when it is purposeful, only when it is going to lead to realistic action and 
concrete achievement….I have had a great deal of satisfaction and benefit out of 
daydreaming which never got me anywhere in their definition of getting 
somewhere. (322)  
Thurber is skeptical of the “realist” view that a dream is to be made to come true. He gives 
an example of his personal experience when he was very annoyed with an official in a dog 
show whom he nicknamed Mr. Bustard. Irritated with Mr. Bustard’s treatment of him, 
Thurber “fancied a much more successful encounter with Mr. Bustard.” In a daydream, he 
“enraged Mr. Bustard,” and “floored him with a beautiful right to the jaw” (323). If he were 
a realist and had made his daydream come true, he would have been beaten down and 
humiliated further since Mr. Bustard “outweighs [him] by sixty pounds” (324). While his 
daydreaming does produce physical or material profit, he suggests that the benefit is “to 
visualize a triumph over the humiliator so vividly and insistently that it becomes, in effect, 
an actuality (324). In other words, it is not a matter of actualizing the literal contents of a 
dream: daydreaming is effective even in fantasy. He does not impose upon the reader a 
purpose for daydreaming: rather, the imaginary narrative of his encounter allows Thurber to 
impress Bustard with “an enigmatic, triumphant smile, which must have worried him a 
great deal” (324).  
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 Thurber’s imaginative daydreaming and fantasizing is not simple make-believe 
that attempts to control personal mental status. He refers to another inspirational writer, 
Dorothea Brande, who gives “practical” advice for fulfilling a dream to go to Italy. Not 
only does Thurber poke fun at Mrs. Brande’s “practical” advice, which demands too much 
effort and sacrifice to be considered “practical” at all, but he is also critical of Brande’s 
imperative, such as “act as if it were impossible to fail” (325, 335), and of her realist 
distinction between reality and dream. In Thurber’s view, however, the dream is not the 
ideal core around which an individual realistically or mechanically organizes his/her 
everyday life. While reality depends on imagination to visualize the impossible vividly and 
insistently, a dream need not be a practice serving for reality. This may sound paradoxical, 
but the visualization of impossibility—not of a dream that is possible, but of a dream that is 
actually unfeasible—is how fantasy contributes to actuality for Thurber. This does not 
mean that fantasy is voluntarist panacea or self-deceptive pretension. Indeed, Thurber does 
not accept any definition of imagination without reserve. Rather, he rehabilitates the 
strength of imagination by stealing back from the utilitarian definition of imagination 
celebrated by scientists including the inspirationalists in his essays. In Chapter 6, he 
ridicules efforts to employ imaginative activities as “anodynes for anxieties” (341). Far 
from a realistic solution, he argues, an imaginative conversation in the self with “a ghostly 
banker or industrialist is an escape mechanism calculated to take a man so far from reality 
he might never get back” (342). The type of make-believe which smothers the actual 
absence in reality is “wish fulfillment, fantasy, reverie, and woolgathering at their most 
perilous” (342). Imagination, in other words, can be bogged down in practical, realist aims 
to become “unpractical” wish fulfillment. Thurber uses his imagination to examine 
examples and imperatives of inspirationalists in order to uncover unexpected backdoors or 
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slippery gimmicks in the minds of the experts of the mind. And, this unexpected result is 
something at which we cannot directly arrive.   
 Therefore, while his strategic treatment of self-help books tirelessly translates 
logical thoughts of the mind into humorous illogic, his aesthetics revolve around the 
unexpected and inevitable short circuit or malfunction of a normal circuit. His comic 
strategy also pokes fun at the inspirationalists’ confidence in their own reasoning by 
pointing to elementary mistakes: for example, a miscalculation in Dr. Murseel’s 
“Pythagorean theorem” and a grammatical error in Dr. Shellow’s sample intelligence tests 
(314, 361). For Thurber, trust of machines and rationality causes more problems than it 
solves, especially when intelligence makes individuals vulnerable to cracks in what they 
have thought of as well-ordered structures, varying from machine to society. There is a 
contrast between Harvey Lake, who experienced an accident that made him afraid of 
automobiles, and Marvin Belt, who is “not afraid of machinery, or of high places, or of 
crashes” (358). Marvin’s trust of machines is, however, flawed because of his lack of trust 
in human conducts: “He was simply afraid that the pilot of any plane he got into might lose 
his mind” (358). Above all, Thurber’s comic focus strives to enhance attitudes of 
frustration, irritation, dissatisfaction, disappointment, or embarrassment—all of the mental 
gaps which are inescapable symptoms of the electric age. That is why Aunt Kate Obetz is 
represented as alternative to inspirationalist and Marvin’s distrust of human:  
She admitted failure; she had no code for removing irritations and dissatisfactions; 
she viewed herself as in a single mirror, directly; she lost her temper; she swore in 
the presence of subordinates; she confessed complete surrender in the face of a 
difficult problem…And yet her workmen and her family continued to love and 
respect her…. Her failure did not show up in my aunt’s character; she was always 
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the same as ever. (338)  
Thurber admires Aunt Kate for not changing herself despite all the negative consequences 
of machines. Aunt Kate does not imaginatively calculate the gains born of her failures. 
While his description may be criticized as nostalgia for small factory community, what 
Aunt Kate and Thurber share indicates that comedy is a strategy for admitting failures and 
still coming out unhurt. In other words, miscommunications, errors, and fallacy are not 
breaks in the human relationship, but rather missing links to the preservation of social 
interactions. His comedy is not meant to laugh at broken connections or to re-channel 
human relations into straight lines of organized logic. Every character in Thurber’s stories 
makes mistakes in a way anticipated by that person as well as viewers/readers. His comedy 
moves as if something everybody missed appears for laughter. This “something” is always 
and already a by-product of our reasoning and expectation. But, this very by-product which 
can only be attributed to everyone’s nonknowledge paradoxically makes us human and 
social.  
 Although psychoanalytical vogue in the 1930s produced sexual readings which 
Thurber denounced in his essays,14 Lacanian psychoanalysis is helpful in allowing us to 
understand Thurber’s denial of the practicality of imagination and Aunt Kate’s actions. 
Slavoj Žižek emphasizes the importance of not working directly to reach a goal by using 
examples of attaining “respect” and “dignity:”   
If I consciously try to appear dignified or to arouse respect, the result is ridiculous; 
the impression I make, instead, is that of miserable impersonator. The basic 
paradox of these states is that although they are what matters most, they elude us 
as soon as we make them the immediate aim of our activity. The only way to bring 
them about is not to center our activity on them but to pursue other goals and hope 
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that they will come about “by themselves.” Although they do pertain to our 
activity, they are ultimately perceived as something that belongs to us on account 
of what we are and not on account of what we do. The Lacanian name for this 
“by-product” of our activity is object petit a, the hidden treasure, that which is “in 
us more than ourselves,” that elusive, unattainable X that confers upon all our 
deeds an aura of magic, although it cannot be pinned down to any of our positive 
qualities. (Looking Awry 77)  
Indeed, this is a very strange attempt since Žižek discusses that “elusive, unattainable X” 
which does not have “any of our positive qualities.” Yet, I insist that Thurber’s comic view 
preserves the provocative strength of “what we are” when most critics in his time were 
obsessed with “what we do” by presupposing that actions elicit intended (or unintended) 
changes and meanings. Thurber must be aware that the pursuit of efficiency and practicality 
to attain a goal is paradoxically inefficient and unpractical. Without recognition of failures 
and mistakes, inspirationalists miss the escape of object petit a, their uncontrollable 
“by-products.”  
 
4. The Big Other is Not Watching You: Fables for Our Time (1940) 
 Therefore, I argue that Thurber’s persistence on comedy, even in hard times, 
brings back repetitively this non-knowledge that can be shared for the renewal of 
cooperative sense beyond practical gains. One of Thurber’s literary strategies that have 
baffled his critics is his use of fable in Fables for Our Time & Famous Poems Illustrated 
(1940), a collection of fables published in eight issues of the New Yorker between January, 
1939 and October 1940. Each issue has three or four stories in one or two pages. Critics, 
especially those who connect Thurber’s fables with George Orwell’s Animal Farm, agree 
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that his choice of the fable genre indicates his literary commitment to political action in the 
guise of stupid animals.15 However, how his fables are political statements is not very clear 
when we consult his critics. There are 27 short fables, and 15 of them include the death of 
animal characters. In the rest of the fables, animals and some human characters avoid death 
but experience defeat, loss, and terror. Although it is the characters’ behaviors that induce 
the failures resulting in negative consequences, and each fable concludes with a moral, it is 
very hard for the reader to learn from those failures and morals.16 Norris Yates, for 
example, remarks that “since the animal kingdom can match the human race in showing an 
irrational urge to destroy itself…there is little consolation or wisdom to be found in the 
nonhuman world, except for the courage and tranquility of certain dogs” (291). The 
irrational behaviors represented by animals could be an object of derision without 
consolation. If this pessimistic and somber view in and toward Thurber is what Thurber 
intended, his political strategy is unconvincing to anyone and merely provides another 
example of cynicism. It is successful in dislocating our expectations by remaking old fables, 
but the fables do not recreate a standard of conduct. Only when we suppose a continuity of 
Thurber’s comical technique from My Life and Hard Times to Fables for Our Times, does 
the close analysis of his fables reveal a symbolic strategy which restrains actions and 
disarms our unbelief on the verge of a catastrophe.17     
 As many critics have complained, the morals at the end of each of Thurber’s fables 
are not unanimously acceptable to the reader, especially when one moral contradicts with 
another. In the issue of August 26, 1939,18 there are four fables the morals of which the 
reader may have found difficult to accept after reading the stories. One of the fables is 
about a hen who decided not to fly to get across the road after seeing two flying geese shot 
down. Despite the fact that “[f]ive of her sisters and three of her daughters’ husband were 
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killed trying to cross the road in one month” and that “an enterprising wood duck set up an 
airways service across the road” (487), the hen persuaded others not to fly. The moral is 
“[u]se the wings God gave you, or nothing can save you” (487). The first question that may 
occur to the reader is whether the hen’s fault is disloyalty to her God-given nature. But, if 
we disregard the moral, the hen’s problem might be interpreted differently: she does not 
recognize that her avoidance of danger and death is causing a new potential for danger and 
death. This ambiguity becomes obvious when we move to another fable in that issue. In the 
next fable, a goldfinch which bumped into a sheet of glass reasoned that “all of sudden the 
air crystallized on” it. When the goldfinch told other birds, including a sea gull, hawk, 
eagle and swallow, about it, all the birds except the swallow laughed at the goldfinch’s 
reasoning and resolved to fly the same course. The three birds, which “use the wings God 
gave,” all bumped into the glass and passed out. The moral is “[h]e who hesitates is 
sometimes saved” (489). Comparing these two fables, we cannot derive a principle of 
action from their respective moral lessons. If we want to be saved, should we make good 
use of our natural ability or hesitate to use it? When we understand that those who trust the 
hen’s warning are killed and that those who doubt the goldfinch’s report are knocked out 
cold, should we doubt or trust what others say? Or, is it, rather, possible that it is 
“sometimes” better to hesitate?  
As it seems inadequate to reduce Thurber’s fables to a series of moral lessons for 
the purpose of eliciting an immediate action, let us instead explore how the fables touch on 
the unrecognized relationship between intention and action. Harold John Blackham, who 
theorizes about the generic features of fable, argues that a “fable shows what it has to show, 
and leaves it open to reflection; it is not in the business of illustrating general propositions, 
although it may be used by others for that purpose” (176). Similar to Thurber’s cosmic and 
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mundane forces as mentioned above, in Blackham’s theory, there are “the poles of [its] 
sphere” such as “memorable illustration of the familiar and exposure of the unrecognized” 
(176).  Blackham’s theory resembles a critical comment of Thurber’s critic, Richard C. 
Tobias, who argues that the fables “employ a standard comic technique of repeating a habit 
or custom beyond what is appropriate to the situation” (103). I accept Tobias’ point with 
reservation: even though animals make wrong decisions and take inappropriate actions, I 
do not think that the position of reader reveals the appropriateness, or lack thereof, of a 
certain decision in a particular situation. From the perspective of human reader, who is 
familiar with highways, hunting, and glass, the animals in the fables appear repetitive, 
ignorant, and laughable. However, we cannot blame the animals for their inadequate 
knowledge to judge an actual situation and determine a proper course of action. We can 
hardly conceive what we should learn from their mistakes. If we maintain a safe distance 
from the animal characters (or the human behaviors represented by the animals), we will 
not notice “exposure of the unrecognized.” In order to derive the unrecognized from the 
familiar, it is necessary for the reader to renounce the privileged position from which they 
may judge the appropriateness of characters’ actions. This also means that the reader should 
not presuppose that some human characteristics or behaviors correspond to the 
characteristics or behaviors of “lower” animals. We can imagine an infinite number of 
situations where we, like the animals personified in fables, do not know what action is 
appropriate in a given situation. And, this sort of reflection creates an important juncture 
where the reader can stand. Rather than gaining a set of moral lessons through the failures 
of the animals in the fables, we should begin with the premise that our inadequacy of 
knowledge in any situation will affect our actions.  
 By implying that no choice is legitimate, Thurber’s literary strategy prompts the 
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reader to find an alternative to blaming the inadequacy of others’ knowledge. Each fable 
presents a character’s choice, and the choice does not lead to an intended result. Moreover, 
it is dubious that any other possible choice would be correct, so we cannot determine the 
value of the reasoning that leads to the character’s choice. Clear examples of this appear in 
the February 4, 1939 issue. There is a story of a “fairly intelligent fly” which is careful 
enough not to fall victim to a spider’s web, but careless in judging that it can safely land on 
the place where other flies are. Despite the warning of a bee, the fly lands on flypaper. The 
moral is “[t]here is no safety in numbers, or in anything else” (453). The moral implies that 
the old saying, “there’s safety in number,” no longer serves to help us avoiding danger. Not 
only do Thurber’s fables often represent a piece of conventional wisdom as obsolete, their 
morals simultaneously reject the existence “any” safe choice. Another story in the same 
issue is about a lion snatching wings from an eagle. The lion at first tells the eagle to lend 
him his wings in exchange of his mane. Though he plucks the wings, the lion keeps his 
mane; but, the lion could not fly because his “weight was too great for the eagle’s wings to 
support, and besides he did not know how to fly” (455). The eagle takes his wings back, 
gets the lion’s mane, and goes back to his nest. He ends up being shot by his mate “who 
was very nervous anyway…thinking he was a lion” (455). The moral is “[n]ever allow a 
nervous female to have access to a pistol, no matter what you’re wearing” (455). Again, 
this moral has nothing to do with the exchange between the lion and the eagle. As long as 
“a nervous female [has] access to a pistol,” this kind of incident could happen. The lion’s 
mane is one of several factors that lead the nervous female to take up a gun. It is easy to 
detect that the eagle’s prank, to “have some fun with her,” only ends up producing an 
undesirable result.  
No one in either fable could make a choice that allowed them to avoid danger. 
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Even though the fly recognizes the deceit in spider’s invitation to its house, the fly is so 
confident in his judgment that it fails to see the truth of the bee’s warning. The lion lies to 
the eagle in promising to exchange his mane for the eagle’s wings, but actually the lion 
keeps the mane and snatches the wings. Although the eagle is being truthful when he says, 
“I bet you can’t fly off the top of that great rock yonder” (455), the lion interprets it as a lie 
or challenge, and then fails to fly. At this point, the fable seems to repeat a conventional 
pattern in which the eagle’s sagacity outwits the lion’s pride. But the fable does not end at 
that point: the eagle is not sufficiently sage to anticipate the possibility that his mate would 
mistake him for the lion. As seen in the lion and spider characters, the fables seem to warn 
against unconditional trust in the words of others. At the same time, the fables also 
represent a situation where skepticism of the words of others prevents the characters from 
making “correct” choices. The fables do not tell when or which statements are reliable. 
Neither do they give the reader a practical solution for the misunderstandings or mistakes 
to which the characters of fables are liable. The moral lessons at the end of each fable 
cannot be generalized, especially when one moral contradicts another.   
 Thurber’s fables show that the author does not commit himself to propaganda 
efforts, whose basic strategies are unmasking enemy propaganda and constructing 
counter-propaganda to consolidate supporters. In the fables as well as in propaganda, there 
are false statements, lies, pretensions, and disguises which exploit old sayings, 
conventional wisdom, popular beliefs, and social norms either deliberately or accidently. 
“The Very Proper Gander,” another fable in the same issue as those of the lion and fly, not 
only reflects Thurber’s concern over propaganda, but also reinforces the inconclusiveness 
of the moral lessons. As a gander sings, “[t]here is a very proper gander,” a hen that 
overhears the song believes that the gander is engaging in propagandist activity. The 
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punning of “proper gander” with “propaganda” reveals the absurdity of the hen’s 
accusation. However, false statements by the hen cause a rumor which situates the gander 
on the enemy’s side with accusations of “Hawk-lover! Unbeliever! Flag-hater! 
Bomb-thrower!” (457). From the reader’s perspective, the gander suffers false charges. But, 
the fable ends with the moral that “[a]nybody who you or your wife thinks is going to 
overthrow the government by violence must be driven out of the country” (457). This 
moral seems to justify the choice of driving the gander out of the country: the fact that the 
gander is thought to be a rebel by “you or your wife” might be enough cause for 
preemptive action. Conversely, the ostensible absurdity of the moral imperative makes the 
reader skeptical of Thurber’s moral lessons: it induces the reader to be watchful for 
propagandistic elements in the accusatory phrasing, “overthrow the government by 
violence.” Thurber’s fables, therefore, are attempts to alert the reader to propaganda’s abuse 
of wisdoms and norms rather than their own form of propaganda demanding certain 
immediate actions.  
 As discussed above, a previously unacknowledged reading of Thurber’s fables 
indeed suggest the author’s edgy insight into the social as well as literary predicament of 
the 1930s. Our examination of the fables reveals that Thurber’s comical strategy appears to 
demonstrate communication gaps at least three levels, suspending the validity of the 
existing moral system. The first and the most distinct gap is, as critics have pointed out, at 
the content level where the inadequacy of a character’s knowledge produces a gap between 
expectation and result. This involves the notion that conventionality or virtuousness is 
misused for the purpose of deceiving. The second gap is between the story and its moral. 
Morals are so obscure and mysterious that it is hard to conceive of them as new guiding 
principle; they are far from an insightful interpretation of the story. This fact reminds the 
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careful reader of the fable’s generic component: a fable is an invented story whose 
generality produces flexibility calling for multiple interpretations. A short story does not 
necessarily include the moral lesson that would make it a fable. Thurber’s enigmatic morals, 
therefore, mobilizes these critical awareness of the reader rather than forcing the reader to 
accept an interpretation stemming from each tale. The third gap is between the tales 
themselves, revealing a lack of consistency within what one would expect to be a coherent 
system of values collectively represented by fables. Often one moral contradicts another. 
No story exemplifies a correct decision or righteous act. One particular story, “The Hen and 
the Heavens,” which is the last fable in the book version, epitomizes the absence of 
guarantors of truth. Based on Brothers Grimm’s Chicken Little, in which a young chicken 
mistakes an acorn for a falling star and fears that the heavens are falling, Thurber’s fable 
affirms that “the heavens actually were falling down” and ends with a moral, “[i]t wouldn’t 
surprise me a bit if they did” (497). As the possible loss of the heavens implies the loss of 
conceptual support for the physical world, the gaps in these three levels of Thurber’s fables 
may weaken the viability of values united in efforts to fend off propagandistic abuse of 
language. Thus, while the fables doubt the trustworthiness of various ethical principles and 
conventional wisdom, at the same time they recreate a relationship between human beings 
and language. 
 
5. The Physics of Laughter: James Thurber and the 1930s 
As we have seen in this chapter, Thurber finds it important to treat failures 
retrospectively in comical ways, but not to consider failures as bad examples which should 
not be imitated and repeated. His fables as well as his other comedies emphasize that 
fallibility is a basic human condition while laughter is an appropriate means to deal with 
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this fallibility. Fallibility comes from humankind’s inability to control its own products, 
including machines, bodies, and language. Overcoming fallibility is not a matter of 
knowledge or rationality. Fables for Our Time repeatedly clarifies the notion that nothing 
can guarantee the definite outcome of an action, and this is made especially obvious in 
“Our Time” when the bloody confrontation among countries grows more intense. Due to 
our physical existence, there are infinite variations of the gaps between the intention behind 
an action and the result of that action. The infinite variations may discourage a belief in 
autonomous subjectivity and encourage tragic resignation to contingent doom. However, 
this is not the case in Thurber’s comedy. His comedy nourishes the energy created through 
the absence of consistency between subjective intention and objective result. His comedy 
points to the absence of an omnipotent arbiter—or the big “Other”—which is supposed to 
distinguish right from wrong and to guarantee the consistency of a conduct’s intention and 
result. His comedy translates this absence into the potential for conditions that allow us to 
renew our belief in a communal sense shared by others. It is not a positive principle 
expressed in words that a community. Again, a psychoanalytical theory of comedy can 
elucidate the basis of regenerating belief or “trust” in others through comedy: “trust is 
precisely what comes at the point of the lack in the Other, of the Other’s inconsistency and 
inconstancy. The subject thus credits the Other precisely at the point where the latter 
escapes reciprocity and predictability” (Zupančič 84). In other words, comedy, including 
Thurber’s, is an attempt to recover trust through the realization of gaps rather than to sneer 
at other’s blind trust in words.  
The analysis of Thurber’s works enables us to see his efforts to found a new sense 
of “physics” in comedy. As Bergson emphasized, “any incident is comic that calls attention 
to the physical in a person when it is the moral side that is concerned” (27)—the most 
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significant attainment in Thurber’s works is the reworking of physicality through comedy. 
In her book on comedy, Zupančič reminds us that there is always a smack of metaphysics 
in “realist” or humanistic proclamation and that it is necessary to admit human flaw 
because human existence is physical and finite. Zupančič calls the supposition of human 
limitation “metaphysics of the finite,” and by contrast she defines comedy as “physics of 
the infinite” of which she gives a concise description: “Not only are we not infinite, we are 
not even finite” (53: italics in orig.). The refusal of the notion that we are infinite, or that 
our spirits, not bodies, are eternal, does not automatically resolve into a finite existence. 
The admittance of finitude paradoxically separates human beings from a place to believe 
the finitude firmly. We cannot fully grasp the range or numbers of finitude. Thurber’s 
works reveal his awareness of this paradox, and his comedy stops before submitting to 
finitude and translates this physicality from a proof of alienation to a possibility of 
communal ties. 
Readers of Thurber’s comedy are exposed to the loss of objects of belief in order 
to regain trust in the human condition. However paradoxical this may seem, his comic 
treatment of inconsistencies or gaps forever separating the effects of action from intention, 
in the end restores our trust in communicability. In I Believe (1939), which Clifton Fadiman 
edited to present essays in which famous writers at that time made personal statements 
about their own beliefs, Thurber questions a clear opposition between belief and disbelief 
with his reading of Robert Browning’s dramatic monologue Bishop Blougram’s Apology. In 
the first part of the essay, he claims with exaggerating tone that human choice of abstract 
reasoning over instinct has caused “the loss in sagacity, balance, co-operation, competence, 
and purpose which Man has suffered since he rose up on his hind legs” (297). The 
environment is not plastic and abundant enough to meet rational expectation while a 
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product of intellect such as “Art” “brings us to God and Heaven” (299). Thurber confesses 
“[t]he Dignity of Man and the Divine Destiny of Man are two things which it is at the 
moment impossible for me to accept with wholehearted enthusiasm” (299). His disbelief in 
religious immortality or anthropocentric reasoning is, however, constitutive of belief. 
Citing Blougram, Thurber insists that “[i]f it is hard to Believe, it is just as hard, as our 
poet’s Bishop Blougram points out to the cynical Mr. Gigadibs, to ‘guard our 
unbelief’…and we are safe once more in our conviction that there can be no God watching 
over this sorrowful and sinister scene, these menacing and meaningless animals” (300). 
With this view, belief is not at odds with disbelief; rather, disbelief is ancillary to belief in 
the sense that you have to believe in yourself who do not believe. Thurber’s comedy is 
devised to entice the reader to renounce their blind trust and to renew trust through the 
recognition of miscommunication, inconsistency, and inhumanity. And only laughter can 
recover a communal sense from fallibility.    
 
Notes on Chapter 4 
 
1 A quote from Thurber’s “The Saving Grace” in Lanterns & Lances (124).  
 
2 For arguments on cynicism, see Riesman and Smith. For a more detailed analysis of the shift from 
propaganda analysis to democratic education in the fight for cynicism, see Cmiel.  
 
3 Originally published in 1943. The essay is reprinted in Merton’s The Social Theory and Social 
Structure.  
4 Consulting Peter Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason which distinguishes kynicism from cynicism, 
Slavoj Žižek emphasizes that a cynical distancing from social norms is also an ideology which prevailed 
in post-ideological society.   
 
5 For a general view toward Thurber’s life and works, I am indebted to Morsberger and Tobias. And. 
The important critical essays are included in Holems. Although not many people deny that his values in 
terms of the history of American comedy are comparable to Chaplin and Marx Brothers, he is rarely 
mentioned in critical discourses after the sixties and seventies.   
 
6 Although caricatured middle-class Little Man characters had developed through the nineteenth century, 
the Little Man in the New Yorker represents literate and college-educated men whose intellectual 
abilities does not exempt them from being hoaxed. 
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7 On the humorous and the aesthetic, see Morreall. His emphasis on incongruity in humor echoes 
Burke’s concept of “the perspective by incongruity” that we discuss in Chapter 5.   
 
8 Although I deal with three different works by Thurber, all of them are included in The Library of 
America version of James Thurber: Writings and Drawings, which I will cite in this chapter.  
 
9 See Burton Bernstein, Thurber: A Biography (223-36). And Thurber’s book review on Granville Hicks, 
Proletarian Literature in the United States, in “Voices of Revolution,” in New Republic (March 25, 
1936). He does not acknowledge any literary significance in that anthology except Dos Passos’ “The 
Body of an American.” Thurber saw the difference between Dos Passos and other writes in Dos Passos’ 
attention to the reader and thus “the literary effects” (200).      
 
10 According to Bluefarb, the escape motif has been dominant in American literary tradition. He 
analyzed the escape motif in literary works after the closing of the frontier which expanded westward by 
about 1880. Writing in 1972, Bluefarb went back to Mark Twain to trace an escapist heritage leading to 
the Beats and hippies. Thurber denied Twain’s influence over his works. It is Henry James who Thurber 
asserts influenced him.   
 
11 One of Burke’s counterstatements is this barren accusation of “escape” for aesthetic discussion. In Let 
Your Mind Alone, Thurber claims that “[e]scapism means the activities of anyone who is not a leftist 
critic or writer” (225).  
 
12 Other chapters contain structural form. Any effort to correct miscommunication is also doomed to 
fail: a pursuer is caught as an escapee. In Chapter 2, “The Car We Had to Push,” the family members 
tried to correct misunderstanding of Uncle Zenas by following Zena’s illusory story, only ending up the 
family members are ones who act strangely. In Chapter 5, the father thinks that his children have gone 
crazy when they wake him up in the night and say something beyond his comprehension. He wakes his 
wife to witness their eccentric behavior, and it is he, in turn, who is incomprehensible to his wife.  
 
13 There are many miscommunications between a servant and his family member in Chapter 6, 
Miscommunication with servants in “A Sequence of Servants,” with a dog in “The Dog That Bit People;” 
with automobile (198-99), microscope (188), football player (190-91), governmental document and 
doctor (203).  
 
14 For example, Chapter 8, “Sex ex Machina.” As its title suggests, his criticism is especially directed at 
a pan-sexual reading of psychoanalysis. With the spread of electricity, contact between machines and 
humans becomes more vital and unpredictable. It is as if a person encounters a stranger without any 
shared language. Thurber refers to his past experience when a short circuit causes an automobile horn to 
sound at one o’clock in the morning (357). In the electric age, mechanical devices are not fitted to the 
logic of mechanism, the causal logic. Even though Thurber understands that a short circuit is the cause 
of the unexpected incident, his anxiety is not alleviated. Machines are excessive in this sense, and the 
psychoanalytical terminology of sexual repression or the unconscious on the side of human cannot 
dispel this excessiveness. 
 
15 From 1940, Thurber contributed a column twice a week to PM, an antifascist daily newspaper 
established by Ralph Ingersoll, his former colleague at the New Yorker (The Years with Ross 105). Also, 
he initiated a critical review of John Steinbeck’s novel, The Moon is Down (“What Price Conquest?” 
370). Even though Thurber was distancing himself from any “ideological” tendency in his writing, his 
critics claimed that his fables and other writings during the war time were imbued with his political 
views.  
 
16 The critics have noticed Thurber’s comic exploitation of the traditional fable form. They can say that 
he is against conventions, clichés or propaganda, but they also criticize his pessimism. For example, 
Pack Carnes states that Thurber’s fables “cannot help or really instruct, save to tell us that there is no 
real help to be found in past human experience” (14).  
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17 For other accounts of Thurber’s fables, see Carnes and Triesch.  
 
18 Even though I refer to a specific issue of the New Yorker, for referential convenience the page 
numbers for this citation are from the Library of America version of a book. The book version allows me 
to more easily specify stories because the New Yorker groups two or three stories together on one page. 
Also there are no titles in the magazine version.  
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Chapter 5 
Aesthetics of Medium in Literary Criticism:  
Close Reading as a Collaborative Strategy  
 
The necessities of history are the “villain” that makes the total drama go 
---Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History 
 
1. Redefining Literariness 
 Before the 1930s, there were two main tendencies, humanist-formalist “criticism” 
and historical-philological “scholarship,” within academia. As the 1930s witnessed various 
attempts to comprehend cultural dynamics and social relationships, much effort was devoted 
to establishing the principles of literary criticism outside the academic field.1 As we saw in 
Chapter 2, new academic disciplines such as the history of science and communication 
studies were fairly quick to develop their own interpretative frameworks. In comparison to 
those disciplines, university departments of literature were rather slow to inquire into their 
own modes of textual interpretation. Discussions of 1930s American literary criticism often 
depended on the categorization of many different groups, and, consequently, shared aims or 
flexible interactions among these groups were obscured. Alfred Kazin’s On Native Grounds 
(1942), Robert E. Spiller’s Literary History of the United States (1948), and Floyd Stovall’s 
The Development of American Literary Criticism (1955), for example, divided critics into 
categories such as “Humanist,” “Formalist,” “Marxist” and so forth, and drew attention to 
their hostile attitudes toward each other. As “New Criticism” was widely implemented in 
American universities after World War II, even those categorizations of literary debates were 
pushed into oblivion. Even New Criticism came to be considered as having a particular set of 
characteristics, principles, and political interests—and this description of New Criticism is 
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still alive today. According to Geraldine Murphy, who criticized New Criticism’s contribution 
to the Cold War ideology in 1988, New Criticism “emphasized tradition, craftsmanship, the 
autonomy of the work of art and the impersonality of the artist. The profound sense of 
cultural crisis which Eliot’s generation experienced led to the conviction that order and 
harmony were available only in the realm of aesthetics” (740). While some recent research, 
like Murphy’s, has reconnected New Criticism with proper historical and political 
backgrounds, it tends to presuppose that New Criticism, but not “deconstruction,” can be 
replaced with a set of characteristics and historical interest.  
 It is a great loss that the rich diversity of the critical debates of the 1930s were 
obscured by the tirelessly repeated argument that New Criticism only accepts autonomous 
and ahistorical aspects of literary works and embraces critical objectivity and neutrality in 
perceiving them. The foremost misunderstanding of New Criticism is its treatment of 
“history,”2 which we will examine later. Also the term New Criticism seemed a strange label 
to those who were thus categorized. A quick glance at the discussion held in 1951 about New 
Criticism for The American Scholar allows us to realize the difficulty in defining the newness 
of literary criticism in the ‘30s. In the discussion, the participants can neither extend the 
definition of New Criticism beyond “explication de texte” nor agree on a list of member of 
the New Criticism. Malcolm Cowley, for example, explains the pedagogical origin of 
“explication de texte” in France and implies that it is not as “new” as post-war American 
academicians want to assume. Allen Tate shared this view and asserted that “it began as 
explication de texte, and from there people went in many different directions” (97). For them, 
it was not “the” New Criticism; rather it was simply a variety of individual writers who tried 
to devise a critical standard to evaluate contemporary literary works. Tate continued that there 
was not “any definite purpose” in “communication among critics” (220) while Kenneth 
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Burke, another participant in the discussion, insisted the contrary. This conflict is crucial for 
our argument in this chapter because Burke saw in the literary critics something common 
which Tate could not see. The comparison of Burke to Tate allows us to observe their 
theorization of errors, and the consideration of errors is not only a step toward “newness” in 
literary criticism but also a social advantage for defense and cooperation.  
 The change in literary studies during the 1930s would have been impossible without 
interdisciplinary perspectives that attempted to determine the historical and social place of 
“literature” in the larger context of modern culture. As we saw in Chapter 2, it became 
necessary to assess even the effects of scientific knowledge and technological development 
within larger social and cultural contexts especially after the First World War. Literary studies 
were also sensitive to the influences of the progress of science and technology. This progress, 
as we saw in other chapters, had a tremendous impact on American culture, especially the 
cultural values of language. When the “aesthetic” dimension is stressed in the new trends of 
literary criticism of the interwar period, the aesthetic is like a hermitage which shelters 
fugitives such as bourgeois selfhood, communal tradition, and anything excluded from 
modernization. The contemporary scholar, Catherine Gallagher, in her 1997 article “The 
History of Literary Criticism” assumes that modernist/new critic’s “sentiments about modern 
society were translated into a critical practice by letting the ‘integrity’ of the literary work 
stand in for the ‘integrity’ of all forms of endangered specificity” (134). For Gallagher, 
untranslatability and ambiguity in the discourse of New Criticism are strategies employed to 
protect this “endangered specificity” from the destructive process of modernization. I do not 
disagree that writers of the interwar period like Dos Passos, Hemingway and Thurber, worked 
out literary techniques to confront mass culture and to compromise with, if not give in to, 
commercial-practical interests. Yet, too much emphasis on the formalistic approaches of “the” 
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New Criticism has obscured critics’ historical and sociological concerns about the purpose of 
literature, reading, and imagination.   
As I have pointed out in previous chapters, the aesthetics of the 1930s were not 
limited to personal, subjective tastes, but rather open to efforts to cooperate with the audience 
and to reveal the unique characteristics of a communicative process of literature. Writers did 
not hesitate to refer to useful insights of natural and social sciences either to incorporate into 
or to distinguish from literary studies. Like the rise of theories, which provided a language to 
compare and contrast different disciplines and to reestablish each discipline in the 1980s, 
intellectual exchanges among academic disciplines as well as “little magazines” also helped 
establish new inquiries that led to new disciplinary fields in the 1930s.    
 Kenneth Burke and Allen Tate are two crucial figures who contributed to the literary 
debates of the 1930s. Even though their approaches seem different and remote—they only 
mention each other in passing—they dealt with the same subject: the gist of aesthetic 
experience derived from reading poetry and fiction. Their aesthetic concerns were not limited 
to literary forms and to pleasure principles. Both referred to the findings of other disciplines, 
especially the “scientific” use of language, and to the historical development of human 
society and culture. Scientific discourses and utilitarianism have recreated the conception of 
language in terms of efficiency, practicality and unmistakability: under this pressure, the 
aesthetic aspect of language is considered either ornamental or hortatory. In other words, the 
aesthetic was marginalized as a meaningless trace of individuality, and in revolt it furiously 
adjusted to a practical standard and developed into a social gesture meant to provoke 
immediate actions from others. Through a close analysis of Burke and Tate’s discussion of 
literary forms, this chapter demonstrates that they not only recreated literary forms into a 
communicative platforms rather than personal styles, but also integrated the inevitability of 
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errors into the aesthetic discourse. Even though they exhibit two different attitudes toward 
science—Tate opposes it while Burke accepts it—they agree on the benefits that reading can 
impart to society without directly demanding immediate and direct actions in return for those 
benefits.3  
 
2. Allen Tate: Agrarian Dialectical Materialism 
Frederick A. Pottle, one of the earliest critics of New Criticism, claimed in 1953 that 
“[a]ll varieties of New Critics unite in strong antipathy to what is called the historical method 
of studying literature; that is, to the method of approaching a poem, a play, or a novel as 
something having historical and relative, rather than metaphysical and absolute, existence” 
(15). While this dichotomy between historical-relative and metaphysical-absolute is dubious, 
Pottle’s investigation of the concept of history in New Criticism provides a better outline of 
New Criticism than does the stereotyped view that New Critics prefer the absolute to the 
relative. Pottle introduces two representatives of New Criticism: Allen Tate as a theoretician 
and Cleanth Brooks as a practitioner. Tate is known as a central advocate of what New 
Criticism stands for, along with I. A. Richards and T. S. Eliot, but he would not like that 
designation. Tate was known for his boisterous stance, often attacking any distinguishable 
schools of thought besides his own. Once Kenneth Burke remarked that Tate “is more given 
to pursing the enemy, thus tending not to let the enemy’s thoughts develop, and rather visiting 
upon them such scorn as would quickly cause them to pine and wither” (132).4 Never 
satisfied with the causal logic or what he calls “naturalism,” Tate insists on a poetic 
knowledge different from the knowledge provided by scientific discourse or everyday 
conversation. This insistence on poetic knowledge is challenged by Gerald Graff’s 
well-articulated analysis of the difficulties that New Critics, especially Tate, confront:  
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Outside the mediating categories of rationality, logical relevance, and truth of 
correspondence, “experience” becomes nothing more than the chaotic flux of an 
infinite, undifferentiated subjectivity, and the theorist is obliged to concede a poetic 
“truth” to any mere dramatic exhibition of the flow of consciousness. (Poetic 17) 
When Tate withholds causal logic in order to free literature from the domain of factual 
information, he is confronted by the “chaotic flux” and left with only an alternative of the 
autonomous realm of poetry which may be much closer to heaven than to the earth. If Tate’s 
poetic knowledge is merely a by-product of such detachment from rationality, it would not be 
worthwhile to piece together his insights from the offensive tones of his articles. Yet, by 
assigning each conceptual word a position set by other words rather than identifying the 
definition of an overall concept, his support of poetic knowledge does not seem reactionary to 
modernization. His insight in connecting religion with history and style challenges the 
conception of language and the literary value of his contemporaries, and attempts to generate 
a realm, however paradoxical, where we can admit both success and failure. When  
language is understood within this paradoxical realm, we realize that an excess of words is 
not due to misuses, but rather is the very possibility that the qualities of words reside in both 
their successes and failures to in-form the real. 
 In order to comprehend Tate’s complicated lexicon, we first need to clarify the terms 
Tate uses in his works and construe the foundation which his argument is based upon. What 
probably perplexes the reader of Tate’s work is that “religion” and “history” are not 
contradictory terms. In conventional wisdom, religion is timeless whereas history assumes 
the flow of time. For Tate, rather than opposing one another, those two terms oppose 
“naturalism,” which is a tendency for reasoning that presupposes unconditional and concrete 
foundation in the objective world. In his response to New Humanists’ call for “ethical 
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imagination,” Tate endorses “religious imagination.” Where “ethical imagination” helps to 
place historical events into successive and logical order, religious imagination adheres to the 
concreteness of historical events. In “The Fallacy of Humanism,”5 Tate argues that  
[c]oncrete, temporal experience implies the existence of a temporal past…the only 
way to think religiously is to think in time. Naturalistic science is timeless. A 
doctrine based upon it, whether explicitly or not, can have no past, no idea of 
tradition, no fixed center of life. (146)  
Contrary to the common presumption that religion strives for the eternal and timeless, Tate 
maintains that religious imagination is necessary for concrete, temporal experiences whose 
relations to the past and tradition can become a “fixed center of life.” However, just because 
he requires “religious imagination” for concrete experiences, it does not necessarily follow 
that he idealizes the past or asks others to recover the social structure of theocracy or of the 
antebellum South, for example. He builds a foundation of human reason in religious 
imagination rather than ethical imagination because the “historical method” of New 
Humanists turns out to “de-temporize” the past in an effort to “contemporize” it (147). Here, 
interestingly, Tate’s arguments are in an opposition to the usual accusations against the New 
Criticism of practicing “de-temporization.”6  
Tate criticizes the New Humanists’ “ethical imagination” because they place human 
reason above nature and simultaneously assume the function of reason to be naturalistic in the 
sense that it operates according to a certain set of predetermined laws. Tate points to the 
paradox of New Humanists who “cannot have reason checking the natural and still keep it 
natural” (139). If human reason can distinguish the natural from the un-natural or control 
nature within and without, as Tate implies, where is the origin of such reason or how is it 
created? Without a proper explanation beyond that of “nature,” reason alone cannot validate 
173 
 
the correctness of its own judgment. This is why Tate sees New Humanist logic as “another 
instance of naturalism trying to unnaturalize itself” (141). To be sure, Tate acknowledges that 
New Humanists would not accept Tate’s criticism of the very naturalism which they 
themselves were criticizing. It is also clear that the New Humanist conception of “tradition” 
aims at solving this issue of reason or “will” as a means to control nature. Yet, Tate argues 
that the foundation of “ethical imagination” is too obscure to be distinguished from Romantic 
“imagination,” which is based on human instinct—“nature.”  
If the presupposition of human nature is a method of “de-temporization,” Tate’s use 
of “religion” had to avoid the naturalizing tendency of taking a view overlooking other 
historical situations. For Tate, religion is something that mediates between value and 
experience. This conceptual configuration is meant to denounce empiricism, which supposes 
that the immediacy of an experience minus the intervention of preconception or prejudice can 
guarantee its true value. Religion as a medium, severing experience from value, is to avoid 
solipsism as well as metaphysics, including naturalism. The problem is that he does not give 
positive definitions to religion lest the characterization of religion privileges a certain set of 
characteristics while repressing others. It is easy to conclude that his avoidance of a definition 
simply makes this medium seem mysterious and idealistic. For Tate, however, religion 
operates as something that could touch upon the significance of style. He was dedicated to 
saving the concept of “style” from the cliché that style is mere ornamental wrapping around 
values. In response to the claim that “style merely dresses [moral values] up,” he asks,  
how can there be abstract results apart from the means—apart from the medium 
which, under temporal conditions, fixes the values in experience? Style—the way 
values are apprehended—is the technique for validating them. (159) 
Religion is, in a sense, another name for style, or “the means of creating and preserving 
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[values]” (160), and style has temporal dimensions not only in its generation but also in the 
mediating process between value and experience.  
By emphasizing the mediating process to “fix the values in experience,” Tate 
surpasses a conventional division between Quantity and Quality—a division between 
scientific abstraction and its residual excess, which Romantics and New Humanists have 
attempted to quantify by paradoxically using abstract words. He explains that religion is 
“experience, immediate and traditional fused—Quality and Quantity—which is the means of 
validating values. Experience gives the focus to style, and style is the way anything is done” 
(163).7 Religion here is another name for the experience of a combination of the past and the 
present. If he only insisted on the immediacy of experiences, his argument would be nothing 
more than empiricism on which knowledge of his opponent “naturalism” was based. 
However, Tate is not a promoter of objective or disinterested views for knowledge production. 
Detours to style and religion are necessary when a mutual relationship between experience 
and style is highlighted: experience is the giver of a focus to style and style is a technique for 
affixing values to experience. In his argument of religion as a medium, there is a sense of 
dialectical movement between reader’s experience and writer’s style. As will be clarified later, 
the relation between experience and style in Tate’s mind is similar to Burke’s terminological 
interchangeability between situation and motive. We have also seen Lovejoy’s ideas acting in 
a fashion similar to Tate’s style.   
 Although Tate himself does not associate his language with the philosophical 
concepts of other thinkers, the term “religion” in his lexicon is translatable into “ideology” in 
Marxian terminology. This indicates that Tate considers style a significant component of our 
experiences and values. For example, in his “Remarks on the Southern Religion” in I’ll Take 
My Stand: the South and the Agrarian Tradition (1930), Tate seems to designate “religion” as 
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a criterion of values. The utilitarian criterion, by which things are evaluated in terms of 
functionality and serviceability, is “a religion of how things work, and this is the American 
religion” (157). Our experiences cause us to perceive that value is not limited to utility. On 
the other side of this utilitarian criterion, there is another religion, aestheticism, which 
“asserts nothing works” and supposes “an infinite object” which “you cannot predict” (158). 
The utilitarian criterion abstracts specific properties from material things: the utilitarian style 
allows us to appreciate usefulness as valuable. As long as the utilitarian criterion is dominant, 
counterarguments end up celebrating the utility of unpracticality. Tate finds fault with the 
infallibility of utilitarian logic: “the cult of infallible working is a religion because it sets up 
an irrational value; it is irrational to believe in omnipotent human rationality” (158). While 
this line of argument is similar to what Thurber depicts throughout his works of fiction, Tate 
here treats “religion” as interchangeable with “cult” and insinuates an “irrational” criterion or 
false consciousness. He assumes that his view of religions is distinguishable from “the cult of 
infallible working,” and he can take the position of being able to predict both the success and 
error of each religion. 
Referring to a rough history of the idea of rationality, Tate traces the framework of 
modern reasoning and its development. The men of the Renaissance “[t]hrow over the spirits 
and symbols, which are irrational anyhow, not rationally necessary, and find those quantities 
in nature which will work, the quantities that are barely necessary for work” (164; italics in 
orig.). Here the concept of work is split into the italicized verb work and non-italicized noun 
work. The former indicates that only scientifically rational quantities that work for human 
beings are valuable, while the latter implies that the rational is not necessarily related to what 
has been thought of as “work.” This split shows the turning point where a particular criterion 
for values— the “utilitarian” criterion—becomes the general foundation of all values. 
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Similarly, to Merton in Chapter 2, Tate describes this turning point with a master-servant 
analogy and the personification of quality and quantity.  
The Western Church established a system of quantity for the protection of quality, 
but there was always the danger that quantity would revolt from servitude and 
suppress its master….Once reason ceased to be the instrument...it began to see the 
natural setting as so many instances of quantity; that is, nature began to see the 
practical possibilities of knowing herself. (165) 
Reason is transformed from a passive instrument into an active agent which actually “sees the 
natural setting as so many instances of quantity.” Thus, the contemporary religion of 
utilitarian “work” constitutes experiences by turning the partial value of practicality into the 
whole value of humanity. When Tate counts reason not as an access to the truth but as a 
model of thoughts peculiar to Western Europe,8 it is likely that he follows a procedure 
similar to ideological critique, which betrays the craftiness of a finite thought disguised as a 
universal thought.    
 Tate’s main concern is to determine ways to save Tradition—that is, elements 
considered irrational from the scientific-utilitarian perspective but considered indispensable 
to constitute value judgments. However, he obstinately refuses to specify the characteristics 
of an ideal figure for this purpose because he has denounced any abstraction which can elicit 
action. His concern is rooted in the very framework of his argument: he was cautious not to 
reinforce utilitarian values of language by making his words and definitions elicit actions. 
Even the American South is not the embodiment of the ideal figure for Tate. The South has 
never developed a southern religion, and the absence of religion will not change if the South 
identifies itself in the utilitarian criterion or what he relabels Protestantism. He pointedly 
complains that “[b]ecause the South never created a fitting religion, the social structure of the 
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South began grievously to break down two generations after the Civil War; for the social 
structure depends on the economic structure, and economic conviction is the secular image of 
religion” (168). It is important to emphasize that economic structure and economic conviction 
in this quotation sound close to base and superstructure in Marxian terminology. Tate is 
especially interested in the super-structural elements necessary for agrarians to imagine an 
alternative life. However, at the end of his essay, Tate renounces all the possibility of “boring 
from within” by establishing “a fitting religion” and supports “boring from without”—a 
method that is “political, active, and in the nature of the case, violent and revolutionary” 
(175).  
 As his goal of saving Tradition by creating religion persisted in his literary and 
cultural criticism throughout the thirties, Tate continued to resist the temptation to define 
Tradition and religion. It would not be difficult to dismiss his refusal of definitions and 
practicality as inadequate for social change. But, for him, the separation of politics from art 
preserves the potential for art to make groundbreaking achievements. Tate understands I. A. 
Richards’ endeavor to fend off the utilitarian pressure on readings, but criticizes him for 
subordinating his argument to scientific assumption.9 In his 1934 essay “Three Types of 
Poetry,” Tate claims, “his desperate efforts to make poetry, after all, useful, consist in justly 
reducing its ‘explanations’ to nonsense, and salvaging from the wreck a mysterious agency 
for ‘ordering our minds’” (190). Tate rejects any definition of poetic language that includes 
complements such as “nonsense” or “pseudo-statement” because Richards paradoxically 
affirms the practicality of art by renouncing any social or cultural meaning. Given Tate’s 
concern over style and experience, he might have acknowledged Richards’ intention for 
“salvaging from the wreck a mysterious agency”10 and sought a different way to validate 
“the mysterious agency” beyond claiming the value of “pseudo-statements.” While neither 
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man presupposes a distinction between science and art, Tate categorizes those who let the 
whole to be explained by a part and who pretend to control nature by making it intelligible as 
“allegorists.”  
The allegorist had before him no standard by which he could measure the extent of 
his failure to find the right abstractions for the control of nature. He could spin out 
his tales endlessly in serene confidence of their ‘truth.’ But by the end of the 
eighteenth century his optimism had waned; it had passed to the more efficient 
allegorist of nature, the modern scientist. (180)  
The modern scientist is more efficient at imposing their will on nature by rendering it abstract 
for practical purposes. The problem is that neither the allegorist of the Renaissance11 nor the 
modern scientist can “measure the extent of his failure.” Again, Tate highlights aspects of 
failure and error which are constitutive of the totality of poetic experience: “The fusion of 
human success and human error in a vision of the whole of life, the vision itself being its own 
goal, has almost disappeared from the modern world” (188; italics in orig.). For Tate, the 
totality of poetic experience disappears when values are thought of in terms of success 
according to the utilitarian criterion.   
While Tate considers the outcome of the loss of symbols and myths that men of 
science have thrown away since the Renaissance, he asks for a reading strategy different from 
an allegorical reading—a reading which allows an understanding of the fusion of success and 
error. He criticizes the “perpetually modern impulse to allegorize poetry, to abstract for use 
those features that are available for immediate action, and to repudiate the rest” (Essays 195). 
In other words, allegorization translates the contents of literary works into factual knowledge 
or information whose ostensible neutrality paradoxically instigates for practical action. The 
problem with reading literary works as political statements or historical fact is that it renders 
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us blind to other possible readings—that is, the “Great Refusal” in Tate’s words (Essays 152). 
Because “we no longer…believe in literature,” as Tate claims, we are “translating 
[knowledge of literary forms] into an analogy derived from the science” such as psychology, 
economic, and sociology (150). In other words, we tend to justify the correctness of our 
reading of literary works by referring to scientific findings. In “Literature as Knowledge,” he 
tries to demonstrate how the sciences, including semiotics, have failed to articulate the 
aesthetic and settled on the conclusion that “[s]ince the language of poetry can be shown to 
be not strictly relevant to objects and situations as these are presented by the positivist 
techniques, poetry becomes either nonsense or hortatory rhetoric” (90). Because science 
imposes a realm of value onto art in order to secure the realm of fact, science cannot explain 
how values are interpreted. Consequently, the realm of value—literature as knowledge—is 
mere excess, which emotivism considers personal interest. Against this characteristic 
opposition between science and art, fact and value, Tate identifies two forms of interaction 
between mind and Nature; these two ways are antinomic, and only poetry reconciles that 
antinomy. Tate quotes Richards’ argument to support his own point. Richards asserts that “[i]t 
is the privilege of poetry to preserve us from mistaking our notions either for things or for 
ourselves. Poetry is the completest mode of utterance” (Coleridge 163). This statement, 
however it may seem to idealize poetry, relays to us an important vision that Tate and 
Richards had. Knowledge of poetry is the irreducibility of actual notions to material thing or 
ideal will—that is, un-transformability. Because knowledge of poetry cannot be put into other 
forms to convey its full values, only mistakes through reading experiences can make that 
knowledge intelligible. Although an organic model, which presupposes the integral 
relationship between parts and the whole, was implemented as a metaphor in readings of New 
Criticism in the post-World War II period, organism was not a contender for Tate’s model of 
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poetic knowledge.   
 Therefore, the reading with which Tate replaces an allegorical reading is the 
converging point of style and experience and simultaneously the diverging point of notion 
from “things” and “ourselves.” These points, in other words, are colored by encounters with 
conflicts and mistakes, which split the mind into two—one before and the other after an 
encounter with the text. The reading does not call on the reader for certain actions. Nor does 
the reading treat the literary work as an object itself to be examined as a natural scientist 
would. The wholeness of art means not logical but formal coherence in literary works. As he 
clarifies in his criticism of his own poem, “[s]erious poetry deals with the fundamental 
conflicts that cannot be logically resolved: we can state the conflicts rationally, but reason 
does not relieve us of them” (597). It is here that form animates words to stylize an 
experience full of conflicts. With a form, a feeling becomes an experience dramatic and 
intelligible for the reader, including the poet him/herself who participates as the medium of 
the form. “What was previously a merely felt quality of life has been raised to the level of 
experience—it has become specific, local, dramatic, “formal”—that is to say, in-formed” 
(598; italics in orig.). Form is a way to elevate conflicts into knowledge, and a closer reading 
allows the reader to create a distance from his/her notions.12 Examining Tate’s agrarian 
dialectical materialism in this way shows how the critic struggled to generate a meaningful 
literary criticism different from the mainstream of the 1930s, which he considered a neglect 
of the literariness of literature. Tate’s reading differentiates itself from New Criticism, and a 
close study of it reveals layers of rich critical practices at the time.   
 
3. Kenneth Burke: The Propagandist of Folk Criticism  
 None took more important role in affecting a variety of literary and cultural 
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criticisms in the 1930s than did Kenneth Burke. Not only did Burke incorporate discoveries 
of many disciplines into his critical theories, but he also actively dedicated himself to 
eliciting productive discussions among different social groups and political camps. He was 
personally acquainted with Tate: there were no doubt rich intellectual exchanges between 
them. It is very interesting to observe that it was Burke who became aware of agrarian 
radicalism and sought cooperation, which no intellectual of the proletarian movement did. In 
1931, Burke claimed, “it is among the farmers, the only surviving American conservatives, 
that a radical anti-industrialist movement must be fostered” (Counter-Statement 118). Even 
though this view is often judged as pragmatism or optimism, Burke’s approach to literary as 
well as social issues is to find similarities in what has been considered different. Avoiding any 
polarization including that between art and propaganda, he argues for the inevitability of 
propagandistic aspects of art in his famous speech of 1935, where he appealed for the 
symbolic replacement of “the worker” with “the people:”  
Insofar as a writer really is a propagandist, not merely writing work that will be 
applauded by his allies, convincing the already convinced, but actually moving 
forward like a pioneer into outlying areas of the public and bringing them the first 
favorable impressions of his doctrines, the nature of his trade may give rise to 
special symbolic requirements (Hart, American 88-89).   
By “propagandist,” Burke means that writers should convince a different group of people to 
share in their opinions, and a “special” symbol “must embody an ideal” to induce ambitions 
to changes rather than sympathies for suffering. Even though Burke was addressing Marxist 
critics in his speech, he hesitated to use the term “propaganda” “to denote literature 
characterized by specific types of didactic maneuvers” (Foley, Radical 132); his emphasis on 
“propaganda” urges writers to revel themselves as “alive to all the aspects of contemporary 
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effort and thought” (Hart, American 90). And he did exactly what he demanded in the speech. 
Unlike Tate, who tenaciously unmasked naturalism in his opponents’ thoughts, Burke 
negotiated with different opinions rather than debunking them by exposing contradictions. He 
did not waste energy in convincing those who were already convinced, but drew upon other 
contemporary thoughts to create a cooperative alternative view toward “all the aspects” of 
life within a decaying moment of capitalism. Traversing historical periods and crossing 
disciplinary boundaries, Burke attempted to make countless “methods” of interpretations 
communicable to each other by establishing “methodology.”  
 Refusing to start from a scientific discourse of language, which presupposes a 
distinction between art and science, Burke analyzes aesthetic aspects of the scientific use of 
language. While Tate refutes scientific prejudice against artistic style or form and shows the 
necessity of form—or “in-form,” in his words—for literary experiences, Burke displaces the 
art-science dichotomy, repositioning it as a psychological distinction between form and 
information in Counter-Statement (1931). Through the nineteenth century, Burke argues, 
“[t]he seeming breach between form and subject-matter, between technique and 
psychology…is the result…of scientific criteria being unconsciously introduced into matters 
of purely aesthetic judgment” (31). The dominance of scientific discourses not only changed 
that which had authority to judge truth, but also influenced our concept of language and 
aesthetic judgment. The distinction between form and information points to the recognition 
that literary form gradually stops catering to the tastes of an audience and begins providing 
psychological information: “the great influx of information has led the artist also to lay his 
emphasis on the giving of information—with the result that art tends more and more to 
substitute the psychology of the hero (the subject) for the psychology of the audience” (33). 
For example, common literary methods for “maintaining the interest” of the audience under 
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the influences of science became “surprise and suspense” (37). Moreover, the audience’s 
reading style also changes as a writer’s methods change: “The contemporary audience hears 
the lines of a play or novel with the same equipment as it brings to reading the lines of its 
daily paper” (37). Because the “aesthetic value of information is lost once that information is 
imparted” (35), the aesthetic value of form that endures repetition is downplayed. These 
changes in both writing and reading reveal the influence of science on taste.  
 By clarifying the contesting ground for art, Burke proclaims the defensiveness of the 
aesthetic against utilitarian pressures on language usage. Tate tries to weaken the utilitarian 
pressure by dismissing causal logic as reductive and praising experiences as exceeding literal 
expressions. Burke engages himself in s similar argument with a different twist: “When the 
appeal of art as method is eliminated and the appeal of art as experience is stressed, art seems 
futile indeed. Experience is less the aim of art than the subject of art; art is not experience, but 
something added to experience” (77). As Tate turns to “style” for a dialectical relation to 
experience, Burke’s discourse divides the aesthetic into experience and method. Method, like 
style in Tate, is essential to signification. Without this kind of split of the aesthetic, art seems 
meaningless because what is imaginatively experienced in art is considered to be the same as 
a dream, which is less than an actual experience. Method is an indicator which separates art 
from dream. What Tate only implies, Burke makes explicit: the audience is constitutive of a 
method to create form. Challenging psychoanalytical critics who identify both art and dream 
as subjective experience, Burke insists, “whereas a dream is wholly subjective, all competent 
art is a means of communication, however vague the artist’s conception of his audience may 
be” (73; italics added). In the sense that a literary form inevitably encompasses its reader, the 
aesthetic is not an autonomous field from which artistic genius shuts out practical concerns 
about society and politics. Rather, the aesthetic motivates one to touch others.  
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Burke argues that even those who are considered advocates of the autonomy of the 
aesthetic, such as Gustave Flaubert, Walter Pater and Remy de Gourmont, have social aspects 
of their art and art criticism. Burke’s readings of their apologies recover evidence that their 
arguments of art for art’s sake cannot simply be attributed to a bourgeois standard of art. By 
“struggling to alter the moral code in keeping with the changes brought about by science and 
technology,” “the disciples of Art for Art’s Sake” are to serve for “the bourgeois interests, 
though the bourgeois public was prompt to resist them” (67). In addition, these disciples are 
not destroyers of all conventional habits, but “the preserves of older standards which the 
bourgeois themselves were attempting to discredit” (67). In other words, art for art’s sake is 
not a bourgeois preference that suppresses the social function of art.  
Burke’s “counter-statement,” therefore, opposes the dominant presupposition of the 
division between art and propaganda by enhancing aesthetic attention to methods of 
“communication” with the audience. Here communication is not an “efficient” exchange of 
ideas from one mind to another through language. Instead Burke thinks that while the 
standard of a technological society leads to the perception of art as unpractical and luxurious, 
art, in fact, saves the realm of democracy by being inefficient. Inefficiency is a fundamental 
of the democratic government system whose legitimacy is “based upon the fear that central 
authority becomes bad authority” (114). By reevaluating the socio-communicative 
significance of method, form, and style, Burke provides new ground of theoretical debates 
without falling into the art-propaganda dichotomy.  
 It is reasonable that Burke originally intended to title his next book Permanence and 
Change (hereafter P&C) which he wrote in 1932-33 (but published in 1935), “Treatise on 
Communication.” At the beginning of P&C, he brings up several theories of recognition in 
order to set a standard for evaluating those theories to determine a (always failed) process of 
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communication. What Burke does here is to interpret our interpretations. In establishing an 
interpretative framework of many distinct understandings, he does not base his judgment on 
true-false or right-wrong polarities. He presupposes the possibility of various interpretations 
of a single event, and then illuminates the reason why one person’s interpretation of the event 
seems a misinterpretation of it to another person. Burke does not presuppose that there is a 
“correct” understanding of events, rather he inquires about why an individual has 
misunderstood the meaning of the event. Contrary to the critical tendency to debunk 
opponents with denunciatory vocabulary including “scapegoat mechanism,” “rationalization” 
or “escapism,” Burke asserts that any interpretative framework creates a blind spot which 
another interpretative framework considers an instance of misinterpretation, “rationalization” 
or “scapegoat.” He explains, “[o]ne adopts measures in keeping with his past training—and 
the very soundness of this training may lead him to adopt the wrong measures. People may be 
unfitted by being fit in an unfit fitness” (10). Our fitness in particular situations may disturb 
our propensity to adjust to different or new situations. There is no all-encompassing 
interpretation to comprehend all details of every situation.  
In addition to the lack of an absolutely correct universal interpretation, Burke 
renounces the notion that interpretation originates from either the internal mind or external 
world, thus avoiding the opposition between idealism and materialism. For him, the very 
terms that we utilize in our explanation of the motives of an action are already parts of the 
very situation which motived the action: “Any given situation derives its character from the 
entire framework of interpretation by which we judge it” (35). In contrast with Tate’s 
convergence of style and experience, which we have already discussed, Burke highlights the 
mediating function of the interpretative process to erode the boundary between a subjective 
motive and an objective situation. In other words, our interpretation of a situation depends on 
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the concepts, “which select certain relationships as meaningful” (35), we apply to that 
interpretation. But, we do not usually recognize the process of “interpretation” without a 
conscious interpretation of interpretations: we only recognize that it is the situation. Thus, it 
is not advisable for Burke to judge someone’s misinterpretation in terms of psychological 
“motive.” An interpretation actualized in action always has a social aspect.  
 Burke’s aesthetics dissects intentional as well as unintentional ways to “select certain 
relationships as meaningful” through a metaphorical-analogical operation, or what he calls 
“perspective by incongruity,” which is also a title of the second part of the book. There are no 
natural relationships waiting for an objective perspective in order to be captured meaningfully. 
Interpreters metaphorically or analogically relate one thing to other things while the linguistic, 
historical and social elements restrain the range of personal choice. Burke introduces poetic 
elements into the cognitive process: we read a metaphor or an analogy in literature as well as 
in everyday lives. Thus, “perspective by incongruity” is “taking a word usually applied to one 
setting and transferring its use to another setting” and “violating the ‘proprieties’ of the word 
in its previous linkages” (90). The word “perspective” itself is already a metaphor which can 
be used to describe the invisible relationships between abstract concepts. Human reasoning 
involves abstraction, classification, and expectation, and these are also products not of logical 
reason, but of analogic and metaphorical linkages. For example, we have considered 
ourselves “at different eras in history…as the son of God, as an animal, as apolitical or 
economic brick, as a machine, each such metaphor, and a hundred others, serving as the cue 
for an unending line of data and generalizations” (95). As his title Permanence and Change 
indicates, our dependence on “perspective by incongruity” is for Burke the permanent 
element of historical and conceptual change. Curiously, Burke uses a bodily metaphor for the 
sociality of our being: “the fact that man’s neurological structure has remained pretty much of 
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a constant through all the shifts of his environment would justify us in looking for 
permanencies beneath the differences, as the individual seeks by thought and act to confirm 
his solidarity with his group” (159). This refers not only to the permanency of biological facts 
but also to our bodily existence, the limitations of which unexceptionally force each of us to 
rely on “perspective by incongruity” to interpret reality and on metaphorical relations to other 
interpretations to cover up incongruity.       
 Arguing for the blind spot of any interpretative framework and the presence of 
“perspective by incongruity” in our process of understanding the world, Burke emphasizes 
that there are “byproducts” of interpretation. He delineates the dialectical relationship 
between change and permanence in two ways. On one hand, from a cognitive view, our mind 
rationalizes the world only through a perspective by incongruity. On the other hand, from a 
socio-historical view, he also states that “the mind is a social product, and our very concepts 
of character depend upon the verbalizations of our group” (173). Also technological 
developments in modern times renew circumstances so quickly that new demands for an 
interpretative framework are incessant. These socio-historical changes have established the 
concept of modern science as a pseudo-permanent component in an effort to withhold 
circumstantial changes. Yet Burke does not renounce the scientific presupposition of hidden 
principles in nature as other literary critics often do in an effort to give unique significance to 
art. Whether or not the mind is determined by a permanent biological mechanism or by the 
invisible principle, both cognitive and socio-historical views share the conclusion that 
interpretations are destined to change. Because any interpretative framework made of 
analogical linkage cannot produce perfect order in our comprehension of the world, a certain 
set of interpretations fosters unexplained residues or inconsistent excesses as its “by-products,” 
and this eventually disturbs the very framework. The accumulation of by-products demands 
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another cooperative endeavor to initiate a new interpretative framework. The following long 
quotation epitomizes Burke’s dialectical crossover of history and biology:   
the externalizing of [the] biologic patterns will bring forth by-products that raise 
important demands in themselves. And these by-products may eventually attain such 
proportions that a new set of interpretations must be invented to handle them, 
because the accumulation in its advanced stage either frustrates the same biologic 
need as it satisfied at an earlier stage, or frustrates other biologic needs equally 
important. But the new patterns of interpretation will also take their shape from 
biologic, or non-historic factors. Historic textures can be said to “cause” our 
frameworks of interpretation in the sense that they present varying kinds of materials 
for us to synthesize—but the synthesis is necessarily made with reference to 
non-historic demands, the genius of the human body as projected into its ideological 
counterparts. (228-29; emphasis added) 
The two occurrences of “but” in this paragraph reveal Burke’s acceptance of historical 
materials as important for the making of interpretations, and simultaneously refuse to reduce 
that making to mere historical materials. His theory leaves open the possibility of “biologic, 
or non-historic factors” without privileging the non-historic factors over historical-material 
factors. It is here that Burke strings “materialism, idealism, and dialectical materialism” 
together into “dialectical biologism” which underscores, “in accord with science, the need of 
manipulating objective material factors as an essential ingredient to spiritual welfare” (230; 
italics in orig.).  
Not assuming that the oppositions between science and art, and between materialism 
and idealism are inexorable, Burke anatomizes the constituents of interpretations and 
determines the “purpose” of interpretations, that is, their “metabiology.” While Burke admits 
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that every interpretation has its own purpose, he abstracts a kind of meta-purpose preserved 
in the act of interpreting itself from his study of interpretation. Interpretation is an act of faith, 
which has both personal and social aspects. The assertion of one’s interpretation is a social 
act which inevitably takes on ethical dimensions and implicitly hinges on a faith in the 
cooperative nature of human beings. If the classic argument about nature has circled around 
idealism and materialism, Burke replaces this idealism-materialism dichotomy with two 
fundamental interpretations of human nature, such as “combative” or “cooperative.” He 
admits that it is impossible to determine the “real purpose” of human beings because we 
cannot ontologically know the truth of the world. But Burke believes that “good, rather than 
evil, lies at the roots of human purpose” partly because “by no other fiction can men truly 
coöperate in historic processes, hence the fiction itself is universally grounded” (236). It is 
essential to Burke’s argument that, to the extent that interpretation has a social dimension, 
any interpretation can strive for “good,” motivating interpreters to share their interpretations 
with others. Paradoxically important in this argument is that interpretation always creates 
byproducts that devalue the “good” purpose. Therefore, with a faith in cooperative acts, 
Burke claims that it is the purpose of “dialectical biologism” both to pay attention to the 
interpretative framework and its byproducts and to recreate the interpretative framework to fit 
our nature into historical moments.   
Burke’s discussion of the interpretative framework and its byproducts develops into 
his next book Attitudes Toward History (hereafter ATH), which “hinges about a particular 
perspective by incongruity, ‘the bureaucratization of the imaginative’ (a formula for the 
imperfections that arises in human societies when ideal ends are translated into material 
means)” (Counter-Statement 216).13 In P&C, Burke proclaims his faith in human goodness 
and a cooperative attitude. In ATH, he articulates a process of transition from one 
190 
 
interpretative framework to another in order to prepare for the “byproducts” of cooperative 
attitudes, or what he calls “bureaucratization.” From the first part of ATH, Burke deepens his 
scrutiny of bureaucratization through analysis of poets’ strategies to articulate their situations. 
Burke uses the phrase “framework of acceptance” instead of “interpretative framework” to 
emphasize active elements in recognizing and describing situations. As long as we recognize 
something, we actively accept our relationships with certain norms (or symbols of authority, 
in Burke’s words). The rejection of norms always comes after our acceptance of our 
relationship to the symbol of authority; if there is no acceptance, rejection is not possible. 
Thus, Burke argues that there is no complete discontinuity between acceptance and rejection: 
“‘Rejection’ is but a by-product of ‘acceptance’” (21). This asymmetry in the relationship 
between acceptance and rejection indicates that any poet inevitably works on accepted norms 
of the historical moment to make his/her rejection intelligible to him/herself and the 
audience.14 Here he implies conditions of literary and cultural criticism whose debunking 
strategy often ignores its reliance on the framework of acceptance, which it rejects.   
In order to further map this human process of reading, Burke names conflicts, “the 
bureaucratization of the imaginative,” which demands both a new framework of acceptance 
and a process of change within that framework. Burke equates any individual with an 
artist-poet who refashions his/her vision with materials and symbols. It is impossible for 
anyone to materialize their exact vision: the artist-individual has to give a form to the vision 
while a form makes the vision communicative but simultaneously downgrades it. This 
process of giving form is “bureaucratization,” and it occurs “when [imaginative possibility] is 
embodied in language and habits, in the property relationships, the methods of government, 
production and distribution, and in the development of rituals that re-enforce the same 
emphasis” (225). The vision that would imaginatively solve a social conflict or mental 
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conflict may materialize within social organization or law, and thus is accompanied by 
“byproducts” which are related to the stylization of a vision rather than to the vision itself. 
ATH applies “bureaucratization of the imaginative” to a diachronic explanation in the second 
part of the book and a synchronic explanation in the third part. As we discussed in Chapter 4, 
striving to observe the frame of acceptance and its by-products, such as rejection or error, is a 
comic attitude. The comic attitude “cherishes the lore of so-called ‘error’ as a genuine aspect 
of truth, with emphases valuable for the correcting the present emphases” (172) on truth or 
enemy, for example.  
Moreover, Burke proposes to establish “folk criticism” by associating acceptance of 
errors with “popular vocabulary” utilized in politics, business, crime, and proverbs. This 
vocabulary, taking over the specialized terminology of academia, are to “name the 
relationships, or social situations, which people have found so pivotal and so constantly 
recurring as to need names for them” (173). The interconnection of lexicons separated by 
specific domains enables the reader to pay more attention to problems and opportunities 
involved in “the bureaucratization of the imaginative.” By sharing vocabulary, errors can be 
perceived not as grounds for a polemic, but as grounds for a cooperatively restructuring the 
frame of acceptance.  
Although his proposal for “folk criticism” identifies cognitive and communicative 
advantages in “popular vocabularies,” Burke performs a close analysis of the synthetic 
constituency of literary works to the extent that any agreement on textual meaning seems 
impossible. He claims that “[s]ince the work of art is a synthesis, summing up a myriad of 
social and personal factors at once, an analysis of it necessarily radiates in all directions at 
once” (199). The “myriad” cannot lessen while deflections and convergences of “radiation” 
are as various as numbers of theoretical concepts. Burke is not saying that critics can 
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objectively criticize literary works in order to elucidate their “formal” features. However, 
literary “strategy” in stylization like “bureaucratization” is worth attention partly because the 
strategy shows its relationship to the frame of acceptance and its by-product, or, more 
accurately, to the “shift in allegiance to the symbols of authority.” Through this way of 
learning from strategies of the past and from art-work, literary analysis can influence social 
change, without presupposing enemies or scapegoats. As Burke briefly suggests when he 
writes, “necessities of history are the ‘villain’ that makes the total drama go” (343), our “folk 
criticism” can aim to grasp the “villain” in the historical currents.  
 Overall, Burke restores an appropriate value to further discussion of the aesthetic 
when the dominant aesthetic discourses designate either personal taste or propagandistic 
exploitation. His continuous attention to the aesthetic from Counter-Statement (1931) to The 
Philosophy of Literary Form (1941) allowed him to cross disciplinary boundaries and to 
translate criticism of literary forms into social forms without subordinating literary works to a 
social and historical “cause”. As Burke demonstrates by employing Medusa as an analogy in 
The Philosophy of Literary Form, the aesthetic is considered “appealing” and “sinister” at the 
same time. Against this aesthetics, he stresses the defensive nature of art, especially poetry: 
“poetry is produced for purposes of comfort….It is undertaken as equipment for living, as a 
ritualistic way of arming us to confront perplexities and risks. It would protect us” 
(Philosophy 61). However, we cannot directly obtain a total set of this “equipment” to protect 
us from dangers. Just as Perseus uses a mirror to confront Medusa with an “indirect 
reflection,” we need to consider the poet’s style as form, going through “the sublime” and 
“the ridiculous” in order to delineate “the aesthetic” (61). This characteristic makes it difficult 
for critics, including Burke, to define and defend the protection of this “equipment” because 
defense does not change a situation but rather “encompasses” it, and we cannot be sure how 
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successfully the equipment is encompassed. Only a sense of errors, or by-products, points to 
deficiency. That is why we need aesthetic strategies, the value of which can be evaluated in a 
style and the by-products of which can be described within the vocabularies of critics. It is 
Burke’s aesthetic that every style is a strategic action, determining and assuaging a situation 
by reaching the audience and constructing a new frame of acceptance. This protective but 
elusive side of the aesthetic was, and still is, necessary for literary theory—especially in the 
age of capitalism when “[r]evolution is avoided by making revolution the norm” (134).  
 
4. Media Aesthetics and Close Reading  
 Taking account of Tate and Burke’s arguments on the concept of literary forms in 
relation to a socio-political dimension, we can acknowledge different values of close readings 
of literary forms, and develop theories and lexicons of the aesthetic. For Tate and Burke, 
close readings were not just pedagogical tools imported from France and fitted to modern 
universities. They examined the relationship between “critical” reading and society, and 
established their own aesthetic discourses on communication with other disciplines. While 
Tate argues for the particularity of aesthetic experience in opposition to anything logical, 
Burke develops his “communicative” aesthetics in an effort to bridge the gaps between 
modern departmentalized disciplines. Tate’s “religion” and Burke’s “perspective by 
incongruity” are two concepts, which reveal their efforts to interpret the process of 
interpretation. For Burke, the motivation to bundle various interpretation together is what he 
saw in new emphasis on literary form and criticism. It may be more appropriate to consider 
Burke’s rehabilitation rhetoric rather than aesthetic, but the crucial point is that both rhetoric 
and aesthetic were never left intact with Burke and Tate’s contemplation. Language is not all 
about a beauty which guarantees the universal perceptual means of the human body or the 
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particularity of autonomous selfhood. Neither is language all about rhetoric in the sense that 
its values reside in practicality and utility, as it incites someone to act.     
 When Tate and Burke cannot but situate literariness in larger social and historical 
contexts, we should not ignore their suggestion that the cultural value of science has a great 
deal of influence over our preconception of language. According to Tate, rationality makes a 
part of an experience intelligible only by drawing out serviceability and functionality without 
attention to the judgment of such characteristics. Linking up with scientific-technological 
discourses, utilitarianism privileges descriptive and referential language over poetic language, 
which strives for invisible and conflictual materials. Burke shares with Tate an idea that 
experiences attained through logical thoughts are not the whole of our daily life. As Burke 
clarifies, analogy, metaphor, and expectation are also viable parts of our experiences and 
symbolic strategies to deal with situations. Furthermore, it is very interesting to observe that 
when Burke discusses “symbolic action,” he tries to connect language not only with visual 
perception, but also with other bodily organs. He argues that we are apt to forget our bodily 
existence as language loses its voice:  
Our gradual change of emphasis from the spoken to the documentary (with many 
symbols of mathematics and logic having no tonal associations whatsoever, being 
hardly other than designs) has made increasingly for a purely ocular 
style….Paradoxically, [the essayistic styles’] great accuracy, from the standpoint of 
mimesis, is in their very absence of [heard poetic speech], for by this absence [the 
essayistic styles] conform with our sedentary trend from the bodily to the abstract.” 
(Philosophy 16-17) 
For our linguistic concept presupposing a division between signified and signifier, which only 
marks a difference to other signifiers, Burke’s theory of relationships between language and 
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body or between thought and medium of language is not entirely agreeable. If language can 
be more rational and descriptive without sound or voice, our rationalization paradoxically 
forgets our bodies.  
 Moreover, Tate and Burke do not discount the importance of fallibility in our 
experiences. While abstract and logical thoughts regard errors and failures as things that 
should not be repeated, Tate and Burke emphasize close readings not for organic totality or 
formal consistency, but for the coexistence of conflictual forces or multiple layers of 
meanings. Tate never tires of pointing out that the problem of rationality is its indifference to 
its origin, presumption, and ignorance. When he calls for “religious imagination,” it demands 
that we conceive of a literary work as a concrete crystallization of traces from history and 
society, but not as a partial example of History or human nature. Burke’s explanation also 
makes it clear that any interpretative framework is not fixed; it always inherits by-products. 
At some point, these by-products necessitate a different perspective (through incongruity) to 
comprehend a (new or confusing) situation. Also, Burke asserts that, paradoxically, only a 
close reading distances us from a literary works and allows us to perceive the configuration 
of the writer’s terms and various layers of meanings.   
 As a final point, I would like to defend what Tate and Burke had difficulty defending, 
namely the social purpose of a close reading. Tate believed that there is in literature a kind of 
knowledge different from scientific or practical knowledge. Burke also insisted that literature 
is the equipment of living which protects rather than propels. We usually presuppose the 
power of language only in human actions visible for observation and dismiss other effects of 
language as purposeless or dissolute. From this perspective, a close reading is secluded 
passivity that can cry for the hardship of reality but do nothing to change it. But, the truth is 
that immediate actions do not necessarily mean better actions. The value of an utterance or 
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articulation is not limited to actual and immediate changes in thought or circumstance. If 
reading, whether close or not, from the first absolves us from the potential misunderstandings 
or chaotic flow, how can we prove absolution, especially when it is invisible and 
“naturalized?” Recently, due to modern literary theories, we have been improving at 
criticizing the natural as unnatural, but we cannot perceive or believe that our very act of 
criticism is freer than a stay in reading. Burke reminds us all that “‘[a]bsolutes,’ strangely 
enough, means ‘freedoms’” (229).   
 
Notes on Chapter 5 
 
1 For a more detailed discussion on academic journals and little magazines, see Jeffrey Williams, “The 
Rise of the Theory Journal.”   
 
2 In his famous “Criticism, Inc.” John Crowe Ransom stated “language and history are aids” and “cannot 
be the end itself” (339). This statement is often cited as proof of New Criticism’s neglect of history. Marx 
Jancovich is right that Tate “did not deny the social and material relations which constitute individual 
identity” (47). 
 
3 The personal relationship between Burke and Tate, which started in Greenwich Village, New York in 
1924, was partially mentioned in Selzer. According to Selzer, they often exchanged the letters, and Tate 
commented on Burke’s Counter-Statement. Tate thought that Burke embraced an aesthetic conception of 
art as autonomous. Burke, opposing this view, emphasized social and rhetorical aspect of literature through 
the personal letter. Their intellectual exchanges continued throughout the 1930s in personal letters as well 
as academic journals and critical-literary magazines. Also, the other book-length study of Burke by a 
collaborative works of Selzer and Ann George can visualize Burke’s relationship with several different 
schools of thought during the thirties. For other discussions about Burke’s influences on literary critics, see 
Tell, Burks, and Wander. For general views of Tate, I am indebted to Singal and Janocovich.      
 
4 See Burke, “Key Words for Critics.”  
 
5 Originally published in Commentary in 1928 and republished in The Critique of Humanism (1930).  
 
6 Even Pottle alerts us to the fallacy created when New Critics’ “de-temporize” their own perspectives in 
order to judge literary works in the past. (22)  
 
7 Tate refers here to Norman Foerster’s division between Quality and Quantity. Foerster means the realm 
of Quantity to be degree and that of Quality to be kind.   
 
8 According to Tate Reason is “the way of discovering historical “truths” that are true in some other world 
than that inhabited by the historian and his fellow men: truths, in a word, that are true for the historical 
method. (Essays 299)  
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9 Tate’s criticism of I. A. Richards’ distinction between “aesthetic” and “practical,” which had inherited 
from Immanuel Kant, changed as Richards himself clarified his theoretical arguments. Recently, Joseph 
North argues that New Critics mistakenly thought that they inherited the Kantian distinction supported by 
Richards even though Richards himself was against that distinction. In my argument, Tate was also critical 
of that distinction. If we can count Tate as a southern on the New Critical camp, the difference between 
Richards and “New Criticism” is not as considerable as North argues it is.  
 
10 Tate refers here to John Crowe Ransom’s argument. See “A Psychologist Looks at Poetry,” The World’s 
Body and Tate’s “Literature as Knowledge.”  
 
11 From our perspective, scholars of the Middle Ages have read the Script as a simple allegory. But Tate 
argues that they read the Script as a religious allegory which means they read it as both factual and moral.  
 
12 This very distancing opens the backdoor to smuggling back moments of elitism. If this distancing is 
considered “quantitatively” measurable—that is, there is an appropriate distance between a notion and 
things or ourselves—the perspective which can measure that distance is privileged over perspectives 
produced from other readings. This privilege may provoke a sense of elitism which some cultural 
criticisms use as a reason to castigate the literary canon and close reading.  
 
13 This citation is from “Curriculum Criticum,” which was added to Counter-Statement in its republication 
in 1953.  
 
14 This is related to Burke’s famous analogy of “unending conversation” in “The Philosophy of Literary 
Form” (111). See Less and Letrincchia.  
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Conclusion: Aesthetize History 
 
Literature would seem to depend for its existence on a certain loss or distancing of the real, 
and this absence is vitally constitutive of its presence. The same could be said of the human 
subject known to psychoanalysis. It is as though the work seeks to compensate for this loss of 
the real, one which is a condition of all symbolic practice, by repossessing it even more 
intimately in language.  
---Terry Eagleton, The Event of Literature  
 
It’s ironic the same set of people who say God lives in the sky is the same set of people who 
criticize me anytime I get high. And they even have a problem with my drinking.  
And I say fine, but if Jesus had a problem with drinking, would he turn water into wine? 
I am ready for a new religion 
---Tanya Stephens, “Sunday Morning” 
 
 Though the definition of modernity is far from being satisfactorily fixed—as if the 
lack of stability and coherence were the very definition of such phenomena—the aesthetic 
domain in modernity is either idealized or marginalized as well as either neglected or feared. 
In the capitalistic process of commodification, the aesthetic is translated into a surplus value 
that increases the quality of commodities without touching on criteria for the use value, and 
this surplus value both fabricates a new object of desire and reproduces that desire by 
partially satisfying it. In the face of this aesthetic translation, modernism as an aesthetic 
undertaking attempts to secure a place for the autonomy and disinterestedness of artists. 
Some avant-garde artists and conservative academicians shared the aesthetic discourse to 
fend off the utilitarian imperative of being meaningful, useful, and salable. Because of 
capitalistic subordination of the beautiful to its own reproduction, any alternative calling for 
communal resistance strikes a code similar to the utilitarian exclamation, “believe and act!” It 
is not surprising that few intellectuals are willing to admit that they manipulate their creative 
acts to “persuade” others for the purpose of insinuating a belief into their minds and 
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instigating them to act. From a different perspective, this unwillingness reveals a fear of art’s 
excessive attraction, which either controls human affects or channels our attention away from 
“real” issues. Astradur Eysteinsson, who overviews several conflicting definitions of 
modernism, highlights a paradox where “the theory of aesthetic autonomy frequently appears 
to coexist with that of cultural subversion, or a questioning of the very foundations of the 
reigning social order” (16). The aesthetic domain is negligibly marginalized to maintain an 
autonomous harmony away from the chaotic realm of commodities, but at the same time the 
utility of arts in capitalistic reproduction, political propaganda, and cultural industry proves 
the competence of the aesthetic elements in our everyday life.  
 The safest way to avoid tension between art and politics, or, to put it in dismissive 
tones, between the ivory tower and propaganda, would probably be to renounce the pursuit of 
beauty altogether and to instead debunk the abuse of beauty in socio-political realm. Arthur 
Danto, an art critic who discusses the avant-garde influence on aesthetics, calls this 
repression of beauty “kalliphobia,” which means “a fear of beauty.” Danto points out that 
kalliphobia’s questioning of beauty came from “members of the Zurich-based Dada 
movement at the time of the First World War, who decided to suppress beauty as a gesture of 
contempt toward a society responsible for a war in which millions of young men were 
slaughtering one another” (25). If we forget this gesture, which was meant to provoke 
preventive conduct against the potential loss of beauty in modern warfare, and accept that 
loss as a part of the human condition, the gesture of Dada movement is deprived of the edge 
of contempt and construed as the opposition to beauty. While the kalliphobic attitude helped 
to break down a norm of beauty confining the aesthetic discourses, the new trend of 
aesthetics arising after the 1930s prized the seriousness of the arts in the modernist impulse of 
ambiguity, tension, and subversion. I agree with the notion that aesthetics do not have to be 
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entirely about a sense of beauty, but too much emphasis on subversion or the modernist 
categories of “newness” and groundbreaking, misses what the discourse of beauty 
traditionally considers. James Thurber captures this shift of aesthetics in terms of humor. In 
1961, he wrote “I am worried about the current meanings of the word ‘funny.’ It now means 
ominous, as when one speaks of a funny sound in the motor; disturbing, as when one says 
that a friend is acting funny; and frightening, as when a wife tells the police that it is funny, 
but her husband hasn’t been home for two days and nights” (“The Future, If Any, of Comedy” 
41-42). Our “modernist” enjoyment is to ascetically melt anesthetic effects of all things solid.    
 This dissertation has discussed several strategies of argumentation, theorization, 
organization and narrativization to promote cooperation rather than isolation and competition. 
It is perhaps safe to say that these strategies share a basic principle that introduces a rupture 
between belief and conduct. Personal or collective belief is only part of the motivation to act 
in a certain way for a particular purpose. It is too crude to assume every action is at its core 
embedded in an actor’s belief, whether the belief is conscious or unconscious. Debunking 
methods precisely aim at the subjectivity of such belief and nurture a concept of emotivism 
which reduces an evaluative judgment, whether moral or aesthetic, to a personal preference 
and private taste. Conduct, including the utterance of certain words, is not dependent on the 
actor’s belief for its real significance. An actor, including a critic or writer, cannot be 
autonomous in the sense that he/she can control the significance of his/her works and take 
full responsibility for their consequences. Literary studies acknowledge this kind of gap 
between action and meaning with the term “the death of the author,” but often overlook the 
fact that rather than an “authority” to judge the ultimate meaning of an act, there may be a 
“conductor” who simultaneously leads the audience and is mediated by audience. In short, 
conduct is possible in collaboration with an audience in order to bear meaning and material 
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effects.  
 Discussing the rupture between belief and conduct, the representation of temporality 
marks significance in strategies of the writers and critics mentioned in this dissertation. Dos 
Passos’ U.S.A. trilogy represents temporality on the content level as well as in four different 
literary modes. On this level, Dos Passos illustrates a new middle class and different speeds 
in communication media including physical transportation and disembodied information. The 
differences in modes raise our awareness to the fact that each medium requires the adaptation 
of our perception. By withholding the description of the personal motivation of characters, or 
even obscuring personal commitment with use of the “Camera Eye” point of view, Dos 
Passos’ behavioristic narrative prioritizes the repercussions of conduct over a correspondence 
between personal belief and the results of actions. This may be considered the representation 
of History propelled by the dynamism of capitalism. Yet, what Dos Passos clarifies in his 
work is that History is revealed through cracks in the communication process as if it resides 
in the consequences of our misrecognition. New communication technology increases the 
possibility for misrecognition and thus separates the initial meaning of an action from its 
actual consequence, which none is entitled to expect or create. Those in power may be in a 
position to receive some privilege from such misrecognition; nonetheless, they too are 
powerless to its effects. For Dos Passos, art is not noun which can be treated as an object and 
contrasted with politics. His works train us to retrieve senses from insensible forms of 
documents.  
 Dos Passos’ multi-layered but behavioristic narratives and Merton and Lovejoy’s 
historiography betray their feelings of inadequacy of the linear and progressive narrative of 
temporality as the emergence of different media captured their attention to the influences of 
form in conveying messages. As objectivity loses its foothold in supporting knowledge about 
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nature and society, Merton and Lovejoy incorporate historical/temporal elements in their 
discussions of epistemology rather than building up “objective” descriptions of cognitive 
properties. Temporality involves many irrational factors—for example, emotions, 
misunderstandings, dreams, and errors—which the scientific concept of knowledge has 
excluded. Their histories reveal that these factors, conventionally assigned to the aesthetic 
domain, are actually necessary ingredients for the growth of our civilization. Their 
admittance of these “irrational” factors of knowledge, however, does not invalidate that 
knowledge. Instead, the knowledge produced is a set of actual reactions to certain historical 
moments and influences, and thus possesses some traces of true humanity or nature. Again, as 
Merton’s term “unanticipated consequences” indicates, those reactions may be based on 
belief but may not end up as part of what has been believed. Yet, their historiography with 
mediating concepts such as “idea” and “institution” allows us to anticipate the 
semi-autonomous capacities of those media rather than to attribute definite responsibility to 
some actors.  
 Hemingway, who actively adopted different media ranging from motion pictures to 
speeches during the 1930s, must have been aware of the difficulty in conveying intended 
messages under the fear of propaganda and deception. Hemingway portrays a war situation in 
which the threat of espionage meant that taking someone’s word literally could have fatal 
consequences. Only an internal distance to words as well as political slogans could make war 
the situation bearable to the participants. However, the intervention of the uncanny voice in 
Jordan’s monologue allows us to see culpability in the disjunction between action and belief. 
The voice, as the psychoanalytical theory of superego elucidates, takes nourishment from 
guilty feelings of those who recognize the gap between belief and action. The more the 
characters follow external order in an effort to shut their eyes to the fact that they are acting 
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against what they believe, the more they are stuck into a cycle of guilt and action. Without the 
support of evaluative judgments which can subsume the effects of media such as Merton’s 
institution and Lovejoy’s idea, the consequence of every action becomes a burden on the 
shoulders of soldiers at the frontlines. Hemingway’s work does not resolve how to relieve the 
burden of this superego-like voice except, with John Donne’s bell.   
 Thurber exploits for his comedy what Hemingway tries to demonstrate ominously 
with war. Thurber derives laughter in the quick development of expectations to unexpected 
results. In Hemingway, practical concerns push away the matter of correspondence between 
belief and action and this ends up generating feelings of guilt. Thurber makes another turn of 
the screw and transforms guilt into laughter, and non-knowledge into a platform of the 
sharable. Since we are “social” being tangled with “mundane” and “cosmic” forces, it is not 
easy for us to settle in one place and observe another. Through his comedy, we can see 
irrationality and nonrationality more rationally, if not intimately, and the recognition of 
unexpected event with a touch of surprise—though sometimes traumatic—make our 
non-knowledge precise and humane. That is a moment of grace. Protecting common sense 
from the insipirationalist discourses on the mind, Thurber shows how practical thoughts can 
actually be short-sighted and unpractical. Laughter is the very strategy necessary to dodge the 
derision of superego by allowing us to admit our failures and to stay intact.  
 Under the contemporary currents of literary strategies, literary criticism has 
attempted to establish aesthetics that locate the basis of literariness in society at large. Both 
Tate and Burke realized the audience as an active participant in the production of knowledge 
and art-work. Not only has propaganda, which exploited the sympathetic attitudes of its 
audience, confirmed reading as an action performed by both the writer and the reader, but the 
audience is also no longer a homogenous group of readers who passively accept what writers 
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want them to do. Thus, their aesthetics pay serious attention to communication and its failure. 
While there are many conflicting and competing arguments, misunderstandings, prejudices, 
and discords, there are also many movements that intend cooperation with others. What 
Michael Denning calls the “Cultural front” points to this tendency toward cooperation. Even 
though this dissertation focuses on the theoretical and artistic developments of individual 
thinkers rather than on cooperative movements, I believe it shows that these thinkers deal 
with errors, fallacies, and mistakes from rationality and temporality, with the common 
understanding that intention or belief not necessarily match (results of) action. 
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